

CHINA'S RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: SELECT CASE STUDIES, 1989-2004

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**China’s Response to International Terrorism: Select Case Studies; 1989-2004**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

JAGANNATH PRASAD PANDA

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Dr. Alka Acharya
Chairperson, CEAS

Dr. Alka Acharya
Supervisor

PREFACE

The fight against terrorism tends to follow the politics of the latest outrage both at the international and domestic politics. A country's domestic laws and regulations and its involvement in various international conventions are mostly discussed and eventually agreed upon after major events. This pattern can be observed from the era of League of Nations debate on the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander and the French foreign minister in between 1934 to 1937. After the formation of United Nations (UN), the same pattern was also seen with the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics village in 1972. Eventually with this incident, the issue of *terrorism* became an international concern in UN agenda and also made it a debatable one in the years to come.

Though the debate of 1972 was a failure and did not arrive at any conclusion; this debate in UN left the issue of terrorism more complicated and open over its definitions and nature. Till the writing of this thesis, no final agreement has been reached on the legal project of a comprehensive anti-terrorist convention or on the definitional aspect of the term. However, the problem is not merely one of definition per se but also one of, who defines it and in what manner? Much therefore depends on the position and the approach that is taken by various major powers and countries in dealing with it.

Since 9/11, countering terrorism has become a major issue confronting most of the states and governments in the world today. The need of the hour is to look into the actual practice of various states in generally accepted cases involving terrorism. The purpose of this study is to try and understand what the Chinese approach to terrorism is and what are the various ways and means they endorse in dealing with it. One must further add that the practice of Asian states and also the potential victims of terrorism, such as China, would also be very important in this context.

Since the collapse of the bipolar pattern in the early 1990s, in the context of international terrorism (*guoji kongbu zhuyi*), the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center is clearly a major watershed. The plethora of writings that have come up in response to the incident appear to suggest that 9/11 constitutes a defining moment in international relations, in that terrorism has now become the foremost threat confronting the world today. Thus the crucial question here is, whether terrorism should be perceived as a differentiated or an undifferentiated threat and whether 9/11 can be seen as marking a major discontinuity in post-Cold war international politics and/or in the world order. However, it is clear that the 9/11 incident has radically altered the international and

regional strategic environment and has made the Asian region so tense that its ramifications have affected major powers in the region like India and Pakistan. It would not be wrong to say that China is also one among those who have been considerably affected. It appears that China's position on the issue of terrorism is marked by uncertainty and at times apparent indecisiveness and changeability. The developments that have raised questions in China have largely to do with the US' military presence in Asia and the US-led international coalition on war against international terrorism.

9/11 demonstrates that terrorism in today's world tends to be multi-faceted. What is relevant here is that 9/11 has definitely helped the big powers arrive at a confluence of their common interests on the issue of fighting terrorism and China, being one of the P-5 nations, shares some of these interests. China's position on international terrorism does suggest that it is not only very complex but also debatable. Whereas, the Chinese efforts to fight terrorism in response to the 9/11 incident has been praiseworthy from the US' point of view, its stand on the India-Pakistan cross border terrorism issue and the ramifications of her own domestic problems like Xinjiang adjoining the Central Asian region, raises questions about its position on international terrorism. In the light of the above discussion, the purpose of this study is to try and understand what the Chinese approach and response to international terrorism is and what are the various ways and means they endorse in dealing with it.

Glossary of Chinese Terms

Amendments (*Xiugai*)
Bilateral (*Shuangbiau*)
Bio-terrorism (*Shengwu kongbuzhuyi*)
Case Studies (*anliyaujin*)
Cold-War (*leng zhan*)
Constitution (*xianfa*)
Declarations (*shengming*)
Détente (*ruanhe*)
Drug-trafficking (*pandu*)
Extremism (*jiduanzhuyi*)
International Terrorism (*guoji kongbu zhuyi*)
Multilateralism (*duobiau*)
Non-traditional Security (*fei chuantong anquan*)
Nuclear-terrorism (*he kongbuzhuyi*)
People's Liberation Army (PLA) (*jiefangjun*)
People's Republic of China (PRC) (*Zhonghua Renmin Gonghequo*)
Position (*weizhi*)
Religious Extremism (*zongjiao jiduanzhuyi*)
Resolutions (*jueyi*)
Response (*duice*)
Rules and Regulations (*fagui*)
Security (*anguan*)
Separatism (*fen lie zhuyi*)
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (*Shanghai hezhu zuzhi*)
Splittism (*fenlie zhuyi*)
Trans-national Crimes (*kuagnofanzui*)
Unipolarism (*danji*)
United Nations (UN) (*lianhequo*)
Violence (*baoli*)

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ICSSR

Introduction

The literature on terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*) appears to be burdened by a continuing and often acrimonious debate over its definition and nature. At the outset, the very mention of “terrorism”¹ evokes a fearful image of slaughter, an image that has been perpetuated and magnified through the mass media. The phrase, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” (Anderson and Sloan, 2002:1) aptly illustrates how subjectivity complicates the conceptualization of terrorism. A comprehensive perspective on terrorism would deal with both the cause/effect and means/ends relationships. These inform both the strategy employed by the “terrorist”, and the response. These are also of great relevance when defining, categorizing or characterizing of terrorism.² It is also maintained that terrorism is a criminal act that cannot be justified on any grounds. Terrorist acts are accordingly viewed as assaults upon the civil order that should not be dignified by being regarded as instruments for pursuing some higher cause. From this perspective, we can say that terrorism is nothing more than a form of criminal violence.

Yet another approach to terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*) is that even when it may consist of criminal action or violence, it is nonetheless action meant to achieve certain goals. From this perspective, terrorism, as purposeful action, may provide in turn the basis for an objective analysis, for it offers a functional means for understanding the major common elements of terrorism

¹ The word *terrorism* dates only to the French Revolution in the 1790s, but historians trace the first acts of terrorism to biblical times. In an irony of history, members of a Jewish sect called the Zealots, who sought to drive the Roman occupiers out of Palestine, launched the first terrorist campaign in A.D.48. As pointed out in the study prepared by the UN Secretariat for the Sixth Committee (UN Action Against Terrorism, *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism* (Agenda Item no. 148-166), this meaning of terrorism has undergone major evolution so that it "now seems to be mainly applied to actions by individuals or group of individuals" (Mushkat, 2002: 14-15 and Maxwell, 2003: xiv).

² The construction of a foolproof, definite and all-inclusive typology is not possible and it leads to an oversimplification of a highly complex and fast changing phenomenon. But under a flexible typology, it can be divided into three broad types: (1) terrorism by non-state actors (2) terrorism by state actors, and (3) terrorism guided by religious motivations or the so-called “post-modern” terrorism. But according to Richard Schultz, there are three broad types of terrorism: (a) Revolutionary Terrorism (b) Sub-revolutionary terrorism and (c) Establishment terrorism (Schultz, 1980: 9-15).

irrespective of the differing goals of various perpetrators. For the purpose of identifying some common elements, terrorism can be defined as a synthesis of war and theater, a “dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence” that which is perpetrated on innocent victims played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes (Combs, 1997:8). Following this definition, terrorism involves an act of violence, an audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims, and political motives or goals. However, there is a reluctance to append the word “political” to a terrorist act since it is feared that doing so will transform a criminal into a political actor and so confer some degree of legitimacy upon the act. Nevertheless the political content of terrorism has largely been accepted in the academic literature.

The Emergence of “New Terrorism”

International scholarly opinion has also debated at great length the term “new terrorism” (*xin kongbu zhuyi*).³ Its emergence gained prominence in the 1990’s with the rise of many incidents of “spectacular terrorist violence”⁴ which shocked the international community. Some scholars argue that “new terrorism” (Simon and Benjamin, 2000:156-172) which is specified by its religious motivation is hardly a new phenomenon. Similarly, many argue that state sponsorship may not be an essential precondition for a group to start and sustain terrorist operations; many groups in the past have done this without any state sponsor. It is further argued that an analysis of trends in terrorism worldwide does not support the contention that the international community now confronts a totally “new phenomenon of ‘post-modern’ terrorism in place of the old terrorist regimes and movements of the 1970s and 1980s”. Nevertheless, the “New Terrorism” (*xin kongbu zhuyi*) debate has brought to the center-stage certain issues of critical concern. Western scholars such as Bruce Hoffman, Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin argue that what makes this phrase “New Terrorism” (*xin kongbu zhuyi*) more debatable are the linkages between religious motivations and the increasing lethality of attacks (Hoffman, 1998: 36 and Simon and Benjamin, 2000:66).

³ The concept of “new terrorism” is being challenged on many counts and the debate still remains inconclusive. On the New Terrorism hypothesis, refer (Simon and Benjamin, 2000: 156-172, Wilkinson, 2000: 28-33).

⁴ Among the cases of major terrorist violence are the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings in New York, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo’s attack of the Tokyo subway through sarin gas, the 1995 Oklahoma city bombings, and the 1998 simultaneous bombings of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and of course the emergence of Osama bin Laden as a major figure etc.

It is noticed that until 9/11, this concept “new terrorism” (*xin kongbu zhuyi*) manifested itself through many major incidents, and these incidents demonstrated that the “new terrorism” is one that aims to produce casualties on a massive scale and that religion rather than political ideology had become the motivating factor. Many supports of “new terrorism” point to the prominence of religion, mainly radical Islam, as one of the main characteristics (Simon and Benjamin, 2000:42). Also what is more interesting to note in this context is that “new terrorism” (*xin kongbu zhuyi*) is being used to justify ‘new’ counter-terrorism measures.

There are no doubt many views on what constitutes this concept and all of them have validity on their own. But the fundamental problem remains that how can the concept “new terrorism” (*xin kongbu zhuyi*) be perceived and approach to be tackled? This is not an attempt here to examine the concept but the following fundamental characteristics and issues one encounters when dealing with this issue:

- *First*, “new terrorism” often portrayed as a terrorism, which rejects all other ways and promotes an uncompromising view of the world in accordance with the belief of the religion.
- *Second*, this religious motivation is the defining characteristics of ‘new terrorism’, which produces “radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality and world view” (Hoffman, 1998:87).
- *Third*, increasing willingness to use excessive indiscriminate violence and “...different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population” (Laqueur, 1999:81).

Whatever the perspective may be, combating terrorism is a major issue confronting most of the states and governments in the world today. It has assumed a new dimension with the formation of international ideological, financial and technological networks. These linkages have made terrorism a potent source of destabilization, regionally and internationally. The problem is not merely one of definition per se but also one of, who defines, perceives it and in what manner? Much therefore depends on the position and the approach that is taken by various countries in dealing with it.

In fact, the challenges facing the world community in fighting international terrorism (*guoji kongbu zhuyi*) have never been more diverse or threatening, and the response must, therefore, be similarly as diverse and innovative. The “insular, single-state, single-service, purely tactical and singular-approach” response, even to local terrorist conflicts, is unlikely to be satisfactory anymore (Hoffman, 1998:7). To fight against this modern breed of terrorist requires a wider response that

encompasses all the legal approaches that the state and the wider international community can muster. The 9/11 attack against a superpower has forced the world community to take a broader perspective on terrorism or “internationalization” (Laqueur, 1987:20-21) of the response (*duice*) to terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*).

The “internationalization”⁵ of both the nature of terrorism and response to it is evident from the concepts like “State-sponsored terrorism”, “religious terrorism” (*zongjiao kongbu zhuyi*) and “post-modern terrorism” (*houxiandai kongbu zhuyi*). However, Chinese scholars have somewhat different views. According to Prof. Sun Bo “new terrorism” is neither a new concept nor special...there are mainly three types of elements which come with the concept “new terrorism” and they are: ‘religious extremists’, ‘extremist-leftists’ and ‘extremist-rightists’. Though terrorism as a part of non-traditional security emerged in the 1990’s, in the post-9/11, this has been specifically associated with the American reactions and positions. It can also be seen as a consequence of the “Al-Qaeda”.⁶ In the context of religious aspect of non-traditional security threats, another scholar Li Wei notes that although ‘Osama bin Laden is a devoted Muslim, very religious in nature and has also closely studied Islamic provisions, what is more important is his method of using religion as the justification for terrorist incidents to gain political power in future’.⁷

9/11 was widely seen as a ‘wake-up call’ to the world regarding international terrorism and the grave threat it poses to humanity has galvanized the international community. In this context, the absence of a legal definition that makes it possible to the hegemonic power and its followers to determine the international terrorism in their style of portraying the case. A legal definition would definitely serve as a limitation to this discretionary power. At the surface, the definition of terrorism may be a matter of debate among legal experts in bodies such as the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the International Law Commission, or the International Law

⁵ Actually the phenomenon of internationalization of terrorism may be said to have commenced with the period of the League of Nations. Many resolutions were passed and committees were set up by the League to combat terrorism on an international basis (Laqueur, 1987:2-21).

⁶In a personal interview with the writer. Sun Bo is an assistant professor in the Institute of Security and Strategic Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing.

⁷ Personal communication with the writer. Li Wei is the Director of the Centre for Counter-terrorism Studies, CICIR in Beijing.

Association. But as soon as one looks beyond the technicalities of these legal debates, it becomes clear that the problem begins with the position or stand taken by great powers to deal with these attempts to define the very term terrorism.

The Essentials and Significance of the Study

The definition and scope of terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*) as stated earlier, is still an open question in international academic discourse. All states use force, or at least accept to use force as legitimate in international relations. As such, the use of force per se cannot be the decisive factor, in any study of terrorism. A better way might be to look into the actual practice of various states in generally accepted cases involving terrorism. The purpose of this study is to try and understand what the Chinese approach to terrorism is and what are the various ways and means they endorse in dealing with it. This is important and even necessary, because just as there are elements such as subjectivity, predilections, particularity etc, international practices also contribute towards the formulations of a definite understanding of terrorism.

The literature on terrorism is quite diverse in nature. Although much has been written on the conceptual and theoretical aspects of terrorism, little has been specially written on the positions taken and efforts made by the various countries to fight against it. The subject of China's response to international terrorism is a new one and demands a systematic academic persuasion. There is no book-length study on this subject. It is also one in which no systematic research has been done. There are a number of research articles and general accounts of the Chinese responses in the aftermath of 9/11. Equally there are hardly any systematic accounts available on Chinese response to terrorism prior to 9/11. Such observations as attributed to the Chinese have been extrapolated from various books on Chinese foreign policy. As far as Chinese writings are concerned, only very recently Chinese scholars and academicians have begun to write on this area. It is therefore clear that this study is among the first few systematic attempts to examine the PRC's response and approach to international terrorism. Consequently, the study is not based on any specific hypothesis. Nevertheless, it appears that the changing Chinese position is in many ways related to its changing international role and the transformation in its attitude towards global political and economic institutions. We can therefore draw a link between China's changing global roles and its stance on international terrorism.

The purpose of this study is to deepen our understanding of the Chinese security policy in the post-Cold War era, in the context of new emerging security threats like international terrorism

(*kongbu zhuyi*). More specifically, the objective is to examine the extent to which 9/11 has helped the major powers arrive at a consensus as regards their common objectives on the issue of fighting terrorism and how far China, being one of the P-5 nations, has shared some of these interests. It is equally necessary to trace the manner in which this issue has been taken up at the United Nations (UN) (*lianhequo*) and how China has reacted to this issue. A brief attempt to define the issue of terrorism from the great debates of UN can be immensely helpful to have a critical study of Chinese position. Though Chinese leaders and scholars have been writing on and debating the rise of non-traditional security (*fei chuantong anquan*) challenges, including terrorism, since 9/11 a new recognition of terrorism's capacity for destruction has contributed to reshaping China's security concept as well as its foreign and security policies. To quote the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the 9/11 incident underscored the imminent threat of terrorism to international peace and security" (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003:145). In recent years, the global war on terrorism has encouraged the Chinese government to undertake a series of security and foreign policy initiatives and measures in counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and regional security, as well as develop a greater commitment to multilateralism through a range of legal, military, and diplomatic measures (Wu, 2004:115). If we put it in another way, we can also say that the Chinese are clear about the international obligations imposed by the need to fight terrorism jointly (Acharya, 2006:27).

Increasingly both Western and Asian scholars are turning to the study of Chinese politics and foreign policy. Many policy analysts, academicians, journalists, business leaders, and governmental officials are tremendously interested in the sources, process, and significance of China's reemergence as a global economic and political force. In conjunction with rapid economic growth and profound social transformation, China's foreign policy is experiencing a significant transition. Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hopes to strengthen its legitimacy through a "sophisticated foreign policy", putting on the world stage China as an influential power and creating stability for the nation (Dethlefsen, 2004: pdf). Due to the emergence of the non-traditional security (*fei chuantong anquan*) threats as major threats in recent times, Chinese experts from various foreign policy advisory institutes have started to utilize comprehensive security concepts as a part of its new foreign policy formulations.

Methodology

Since the incident of 9/11, there is a growing list of scattered publications on the evolving Chinese response and position on international terrorism (*guoji kongbu zhuyi*). While these articles and publications from various Western, Asian and also by Chinese scholars have produced some useful and interesting leads and results, there are severe limits to them as these publications are not elaborative, comprehensive and exhaustive. The proposed research will be therefore part theoretical and part empirical study. For the latter part of my study, I will rely basically on primary sources such as, official statements on various conflicts and crisis, reports of China's State Council, interviews of Chinese government official scholars and researchers etc. for which a field trip has been taken to the specialized and relevant libraries in Beijing and Sichuan in China.

If we look from academic perspectives, since 9/11, Non-Traditional Security (NTS) (*fei chuantong anquan*) issues have become increasingly an important part of study for China in the policy and the research agendas of governments, in non-governmental organizations, in academic circles, as well as in the general public and the media (Wang: <http://www.iwep.org.cn/>). In China, for instance, academics and government bureaus are both interested in and concerned with NTS issues, and they are beginning to put more natural and human resources into dealing with them. Yet, they find it very difficult to prioritize in solving or easing NTS threats given so many different needs, and the relatively limited resources that are readily available. Wang Yizhou, an expert on Non-traditional security issues and a senior fellow of the World Economics and Politics section of the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences estimates that “we see an increasing number of NTS threats, nationally and internationally, arising from very different fields, such as financial turmoil, internet hacking, ecological degeneration, drug-trafficking, nuclear proliferation, new terrorism and even SARS, all of which have never before in the course of human history had such serious impact on any individual country or international community. What makes it worse is that governments and research agencies do not know how to define these threats, let alone cope with them” (Wang: <http://www.iwep.org.cn/>).

In the era of globalization, with accelerated process of China's opening up, China is closely linked to international society, and therefore closely involved with various challenges from NTS issues such as terrorism, smuggling, drug-trafficking, transnational crimes (*kuangnofanzui*) and so on. Many Chinese scholars like Yan Xuetong are of the view that “non-traditional security problems have become an essentially strategic consideration of China” (Yan, 2000:17). Among these challenges, those of various extremist forces are particularly imminent and threatening, for

instance, “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)”, Taiwan radical separatism and “Falun Gong” cult. These were rampant at the turn of the millennium, which seriously influenced the social stability, and national security of China (Jia: 2005:121). This study will focus on the analysis of the position and response of China to the international debate on terrorism. At the same time, it would try to analyze its ramifications on the PRC’s social and national security.

Select Case Studies

Three case studies (*anliyaujin*) have been taken up in this study to examine the Chinese position and response to the issue of international terrorism.

- **Case Study-One: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO):** A very important dimension of China’s response to terrorism can be seen in the formation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The establishment of the SCO, largely spearheaded by the Chinese, is seen by many observers as part of a security strategy to prevent Kazakh or Uyghur separatists from using Central Asian States as a base from which to plot separatist activities in Xinjiang. It is clear that these are serious concerns for domestic stability. It is also seen by some analysts as an organization that the Chinese have used to spread their sphere of influence, both economic and geopolitical, throughout Central Asia.
- **Case Study-Two: China’s Response to Cross-border terrorism in Kashmir:** At regional level, South Asia remains one of the most disturbed regions in the world today due to the problem of terrorism. Terrorism has emerged as a “low cost option with a high cost-benefit ratio”(South Asia Assessment: 2003, www.satp.org), which is further, compounded by the shared border with Afghanistan, which is generally accepted as the base for international terrorism by many countries. Apart from the issue of terrorism, which is a common threat for the entire region, the tense India-Pakistan relationship over the Kashmir issue, the nuclear status of both countries and USA’s military presence in Asia, have made the situation very complex. All these factors have also had an impact on China’s perspectives and relations with the region. However, after the September 11 incident, South Asia became an important part of the international fight against terrorism. The anti-terrorism war led by India in this region has become complicated by two factors particularly. The first relates to the conflict over Kashmir and, the divergent positions on cross-border terrorism by India and Pakistan; and the second relates to the somewhat but ambiguous, debatable pro-Pakistan stand of China on the issue of Kashmir as well as terrorism. It is clear that India continues to be a victim of cross-border terrorism that has been sponsored by Pakistan for a long time. While it has attracted constant condemnation from all major international bodies, China as a P-5 nation has taken no direct position on the issue of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. The PRC’s approach to terrorism in South Asia therefore would have to be examined in the context of triangular politics, China’s strategic objectives vis-à-vis the South Asian region as well as the emerging contours of a normalizing India-China relationship.
- **Case Study-Three: China’s Response to 9/11 and counter-terrorism Strategy:** The third and the most important dimension of the Chinese response to international terrorism, is apparent in the reactions to the incident of 9/11 and the developments since then. It is

the complexity of this issue, which makes its study both important and necessary. Ranging from the matter of Sino-US relations at one end to the broader question of the nature of the emerging and actual world order, the PRC's response to 9/11 thus encompasses a multiplicity of themes.

Dataset and Sources of Collections

Since the primary focus of this study is to examine the Chinese official position and response, the data used primarily comprises the PRC government's official statements, papers, reports, releases and news sources. In this category, I have focused on the official briefings and statements at the UN and other international fora. Sources from which I have tried to draw data include: UN websites, UN released policy papers, various releases of international organizations, Chinese government officials press conferences, various *Defense White Papers*, the foreign ministry's websites including other ministry's websites etc. The study has also tried to cover as many as newspapers released in English from China. China has issued well over a dozen *White Papers* outlining the government's official position on domestic and international policy issues. The Foreign Ministry's and State Council's web pages include significant data on Chinese positions, new policy developments and official statements. Perhaps most surprising, Chinese officials have started providing the international press with Western-style "background briefings" before and after major diplomatic events.

Yet another source of information and analysis are the Chinese government-controlled think tanks, research institutions, universities and foundations involved or engaged in the study of terrorism or strategic studies.

Government Controlled Institutes: Among the premier Chinese government regulated research institutes, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing is among the few which have a Centre for Counter-terrorism Studies which provides the Chinese government with policy studies on both traditional as well as non-traditional security threats. The institute also publishes a monthly journal *Contemporary International Relations* both in Chinese and English. The other notable institute is China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Beijing that is directly under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also focuses on the study of terrorism. The institute has a journal called *International Studies* (bimonthly) and in December 2001, it was recognized by the General Administration of Press and Publication of the PRC as one of the leading journals for strategic and social studies and ranked number one in the category of diplomatic publications (www.ciis.org.cn).

Another major government research institute is The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), Beijing's library have been helpful. The institute's quarterly journal, the *Foreign Affairs Journal*, has been consulted for Chinese government official's views and opinion on various strategic issues including international terrorism. China's premier institute, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has set up an Institute of World Economics and Politics, which is engaged in the research of non-traditional security threats including terrorism. Publications such as *The Journal of World Economy*, *World Economics and Politics*, *China Development Review*, *Management World* etc. have been widely consulted. Yet another major government institute is the Development Research Centre of the State Council of the PRC (DRC), a comprehensive policy research and consulting institute. Apart from these think-tanks, the publications and research reports of three premier research institutes (China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, Department of International Organizations and Conferences) under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been extensively consulted.

Independent think-tanks and foundations: The Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), conducts research on relevant international issues, security and defense issues. Two Chinese language periodicals *International Review* and *World Outlook* published from this institute have been translated. Another independent institute China Development Institute (CDI) has been consulted particularly the institute's journals *CDI Review* and *China Opening Herald*.

University publications: A number of libraries of many reputed universities of China, their journals, scholarly and academic writings on the subject have been consulted. These are Beijing University, Beijing Foreign Affairs University, Sichuan University, Fudan University, National Defense University, and Xinjiang University etc.

Interviews of select Chinese officials, military experts and scholars: A questionnaire has been used to elicit views and assessments of select concerned officials, scholars etc., as well as interviews have been conducted with relevant personnel

Non-Chinese Sources: Among the non-Chinese sources, both Western and Asian scholarly writings, publications, newspapers, think-tank project reports etc. and more importantly some interviews of subjective experts are added to the data sources to these studies.

The Structure of the study

Since the 9/11, Asia has been a focal point in the international campaign against terrorism. Although the strategic consequences are still unfolding, there is no doubt that the protracted war against international terrorism is having a profound affect on the region's political, strategic and economic situation, altering the interplay of interests and power in Asia. Asian states are very much aware that international terrorism poses the greatest threat to the region's political stability and economic growth. This threat has created an unusually strong regional consensus in support of anti-terrorism action on all levels – bilateral, regional and international – and muted many of the more strident strategic differences among the region's major powers, particularly between the United States, China, Russia and India. A western scholar argues that in the post-9/11 era, many of the traditional security concerns that have long hampered regional security cooperation have been set aside. China plays a central role in the political, security and economic dynamics in Asia, using its growing influence to shape the region's strategic security environment (Muldoon, 2004). How China plays its part in this environment will determine in large part the future course of efforts against terrorism in Asia.

More importantly, China's cooperation in the "war on terror" in Asia underscores a gradual shift in Chinese foreign policy towards multilateralism and a striking self-confidence of Chinese diplomacy. Since 9/11, China has elevated anti-terrorism to the top of its national security agenda and made it the core aspect of its "new security concept" for the region. Experts argue that for China, the war on terrorism represents an opportunity to build support for its "new security concept" and to strengthen its leadership role in Asia. Originally conceived as a means to limit U.S. influence in the region, China's "new security concept" was to reshape the structure of regional security. The most noticeable aspect of Chinese foreign policy doctrine in the post-9/11 era has been its priorities in security in order to combat terrorist networks. The need for interstate-cooperation to combat terrorist cells such as Al-Qaeda has added another dimension to China's foreign policy. This study proposes to examine the evolving Chinese response and moreover its position and policies on the issue of international terrorism. The study is divided into four main chapters.

Chapter-I: This chapter is divided into three parts. **Part one** focuses on key methodological issues relating to terrorism. This part is an attempt to examine the evolving Chinese position to deal with the emerging security threats. **Part two** of this chapter deals with how China has taken up the issue of terrorism seriously as part of its foreign policy. This part

would focus on China's engagement, approach and initiatives at the UN regarding counter-terrorism. This part will also cover and examine the evolving Chinese position on the major actions taken by the UN. **Part three** is essentially an attempt to critically discuss China's position on international terrorism in the post-9/11 period.

Chapter-II: China has since the late nineties, advocated a multilateral approach to the war on terrorism in the Central Asian region. Even before 9/11, China recognized that international terrorism was an emerging threat to regional stability, and that international cooperation was required to combat the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism. This realization provided one of the driving forces behind the development of the SCO and China's steadfast commitment to build the capacity and capability of the SCO in the field of counter-terrorism. Obviously, China's influence in the war on terrorism is much greater, and its strategic security concerns are heeded more, within a multilateral context. This chapter will discuss how China's constructive engagement with its neighbors over the course of the 1990s has developed a substantial reservoir of goodwill and has allayed most fears of China's growing assertiveness on regional and global security, especially international terrorism. In this context this chapter is divided into two main parts. The **first part** of this chapter would examine how "multilateralism" in the post-cold war Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy has enhanced China's strategic position in the region and increased its influence over the regions political and security dynamics. At the same time, this chapter will examine China's SCO's strategy to combat separatism, extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang and Central Asian borders. The **second part** of this chapter would deal with China's initiatives to combat terrorism with the Central Asian states bilaterally by using SCO as a regional forum.

Chapter-III: This chapter would be divided into two main parts. **Part one** would examine in the broader context China's South Asia policy and how apart from the issue of terrorism, which is a common threat for the entire region, the tense India-Pakistan relationship over the Kashmir issue, the nuclear status of both countries and US military presence in Asia, have made the situation very complex and have forced the Chinese government to take a stand on cross-border terrorism. All these factors more or less have also had an impact on China's perspectives and relations with the region. **Part two** would deal with two main important issues, which will relate to cross-border terrorism in the Kashmir valley. The first relates to the conflict over Kashmir and, the divergent positions on cross-border terrorism by India and Pakistan; and the second relates to China's stand

on the issue of Kashmir as well as terrorism. It is clear that India continues to be a victim of cross-border terrorism that has been sponsored by Pakistan for a long time.

Chapter-IV: This chapter would be divided into three main parts. **Part one** will examine 9/11 and its global impact as well as China's position on international terrorism. **Part two** deals with China's relationship with US while **part three** will take up Chinese strategy and initiatives to counter terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11.

Conclusion: This last chapter offers an evaluation of China's foreign policy strategy and achievements prior to 9/11, and concludes with an evaluation of China's overall response to international terrorism and future policy options.

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Chapter-I

**China's Evolving Position on Terrorism at the UN and Its New
Security Policy in the Post-Cold War**

The dramatic and unforeseen developments in international relations since 1989 have led to profound changes in the distribution of power in the global system. Moreover, the nature of the emerging regional and global scenario is difficult to fully comprehend, and analyzing foreign policy in the context of such fundamental change is a major challenge. Possibly the most important of the changes has been the implosion of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and its replacement by a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which four countries share borders with China. The Federation of Russia is by far the largest and most important of these states, but as a world power, its status is clearly not what the Soviet Union's had been. The period of the nineties saw a further spectacular rise in China's economic growth and global standing. For Samuel S. Kim, 'in the post cold-war and post-Tiananmen years, the rise of China has suddenly become all things in the eyes of theorists and practitioners of international politics-a fait accompli, a myth, an unstoppable trend, and a theoretical puzzle'(Liu, 2004: p.353).

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Socialist bloc, a period largely identified as the post-cold war phase, China's perception of the international and security situation was affected by two major incidents. The *first* was the fallout from the repression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations⁸ that produced a strong reaction from the western nations. This incident, abruptly but temporarily brought a halt to China's increasing economic and political engagement with the west and a renewed focus on the human rights question. *Second*, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union also induced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of China to reflect and reassess a range of issues-both domestically and globally. It embarked on a process of restructuring and reconstructing its global strategy and foreign policy. But the most important task for China was to evaluate the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on country's future security situation. On the one hand, the establishment of Russian

⁸ For details on Tiananmen, please refer Cheng (1990).

federation, it was hoped, would provide a new opportunity to reestablish better relations with its immediate neighbour country compared to the Soviet period though the PRC-USSR relations appeared to be improving during Gorbachev's time. On the other hand, the main challenge was to establish fresh bilateral relations with the newly created neighbouring Central Asian states (Yang, 2003:17). In general terms, for China the main task was to maintain peripheral stability and contain the rising Islamic sentiments in these states, most of which shared borders with China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

Following 9/11, the increasing US presence in the Central Asian region has only added more complexity to what China has to face. Moreover, in the wake of the war against terrorism, China has perceived its periphery as such an environment that directly or indirectly relates to China's fundamental concerns and national security (Yang, 2003:139). This chapter would examine how terrorism gradually became an important issue in China's Security Policy after the Cold War (leng zhan) and is divided into three parts. Part I would discuss China's evolving "Security Concept" and the growing significance of multilateralism in its counter-terrorism strategy; Part II would extend the discussion on China's multilateral strategy to counter terrorism at the global level by examining its evolving position, accession and participation at the UN. Part III of this chapter would critically discuss and evaluate the chief characteristics of the global order from Chinese perspective especially after 9/11.

PART-I

China's New Security Concept and Its Strategy of Multilateralism

The "Balance of Power" and the "Security Dilemma" are two major concepts in the theory of international relations. The prominent figure of "New Realism", Prof. Kenneth Waltz, once said, "Rational countries living in a state of anarchy and the security dilemma would be suspicious of and hostile to each other because of their tense relations, although that was not their original idea" (Waltz, 1992:3). In this context, it can be argued that in the post-Cold War international environment it is quite natural that countries would use the "Balance of Power" to protect their own security. This would then make the "Security Dilemma" a regular phenomenon in international politics. By following Waltz's theory, we can too argue that the "Security Dilemma" is both the root, and outcome, of the "Balance of Power," while the "Balance of Power" is a natural demand by countries in the "Security Dilemma" (Guo, 2001:167). Prof. Waltz also warned all

countries against both “practical threats” and “potential threats”, because in the security dilemma, “...measures taken by one country to increase its own security meant measures decreasing others’ security” (Waltz, 1992:3). Besides, following the neo-realist theory of international relations, the core concept of national security depends on international power distribution and reflects the country’s relative power position in the international social structure (Waltz, 1992:3).

Taking China’s cognition of security and its readjustments of such cognition as a clue in the post-Cold War era, China started putting its new security concept while economic security is still thought of highly; non-traditional security has begun to draw attention. Qin Yaqing in his paper “National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on the Interaction between China and International Society” writes that ‘China’s security (*anguan*) concept has begun to extend outwardly from the core realms. Other aspects of security such as environmental security have attracted more attention and so is international and regional security. It can be said that the new security concept of China featuring cooperative and mutual security is the new thinking of the post-Soviet disintegration and post-Cold War thinking of the third-generation leaders’ (Qin, 2002:SIIS online Journal).⁹

Under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and policy of opening up to the outside world, China experienced rapid economic growth in the 1980s. During this period, violent and terrorist activities were mostly economic in nature.¹⁰ The major terrorist or criminal activities like drug trafficking generally originated from the north-west (Afghanistan- Xinjiang) and south-west (the triangle region- Yunnan). According to Prof. Pan Guang,¹¹ views that ‘on the whole, these incidents of those time were treated by the Chinese government as ordinary criminal acts which were primarily targeted and motivated towards the Chinese economy...The Chinese authorities began to feel the threat of terrorism only when terrorist violence was committed by the separatist “East Turkistan” movement in Xinjiang in the early 1990s’ (Pan, 2004:523-532). He holds with the view that terrorism as a security issue for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is relatively a post-Cold

⁹ Qin Yaqing is a professor in the Institute of Diplomacy at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai.

¹⁰ Violent and terrorist activities were mostly economic in nature means it was basically related to economic and finance areas; like robbing banks, taking hostages and drug trafficking. Most of such activities took place in the eastern coastal regions, where the economy and overseas connections were more developed.

¹¹ Director of the Institute of European and Asian Studies, SIIS, Shanghai.

War phenomenon and that China's growing concern with terrorism starts with its domestic worries relating to the issue of ethnic separatism and religious extremism and directly impinges on China's national security policy. Prof. Pan also argues that in the early 1990s, "when international relations were undergoing radical transitions of the early post-cold war era, Chinese leadership under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping were already considering how to transcend the cold war mentality and construct new notions of security, new state-to-state relations and new patterns of regional cooperation" (Pan, 2004:534).

China's Formation of "New Security Concept"

China's process of engagement with security regimes began with a highly conservative approach to multilateral cooperation as China endeavoured to craft a new strategic policy to reflect the end of the cold war and its own changing security needs. However, since the mid-1990s this approach changed to reflect the PRC's growing maturity and confidence, allowing it to pursue its own goals within regional and international security institutions more actively and effectively. While relations between China and Russia have warmed considerably since the early 1990s, other parts of the former Soviet Union, namely the Central Asian Republics (CARs), have presented new and unique challenges for Chinese security (Lanteigne, 2005:115). As a response to these challenges, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (*Shanghai hezhu zuzhi*) (SCO) has emerged as been the tool to shape the future Chinese security as well as the new counter-terrorism strategy.

China's concern with the rise of secessionist and Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia is a product of concerns about how these developments will influence the Muslim population in Xinjiang. The prospect of "splittism" (*fenlie zhuyi*) (cited in Lufti, 2001:161), the traditional term used by China to describe a forcible breaking away of Chinese territory, has been of paramount concern for China since the founding of the People's Republic. Xinjiang is a major strategic asset to China for its proximity to Central Asian trade routes and for its petroleum and mineral reserves (Lufti, 2001:162). Therefore, China is very sensitive to the problem of separatism in that territory. In seeking to restrain extremist factions within its Muslim populations, China has linked itself through a common cause not only to the Central Asian regimes, but also to Russia, which struggled against armed Islamic-based insurrections throughout the 1990s in northern Caucasus provinces of Chechnya and Dagestan. The Chinese scholars of the view that the creation of "Shanghai Five" agreement of 1997 provided the post-Cold War world with a new security pattern entirely different from the "Cold War mentality" (Li and Wei, 1997:5).

Briefly, since the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, “East Turkistan” separatists rarely undertook armed activities within Chinese borders, but only engaged in certain overseas propaganda under the auspices of Turkey, and certain Western countries.¹² Prof. Pan writes that “the end of the “jihad” against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the chaotic situation in this country in the early 1990s provided the “East Turkistan” separatists with a golden chance of waging a “jihad” in Xinjiang” (Pan, 2004:524). Through the 1990s, China has feared about the emergence of unrest and terrorism in its largely Uyghur Muslim-inhabited frontiers region of Xinjiang. These concerns have heightened since the events of 9/11 with the advent of more prominent U.S. presence in Central Asia and Chinese attempts to link Uyghur separatism to international jihadist groups. The terrorist acts of violence carried out by “East Turkistan” movements inside and outside China not only have endangered China but also have posed serious threats to regional security and stability. These elements have constituted a component of the international terrorist forces and, the actions taken to crack down on the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces are a part of the international struggle against terrorism as well. This fact was well supported with the inclusion of the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)” on the list of international terrorist organizations (CISS & HIR, 2004:333). It is also noticed that since the incident of 9/11, a steady flow of reports from the international media-as well as official PRC releases (a document on “East Turkistan” terrorism, a *White Paper* on Xinjiang, and a list of terrorist groups)- have prominently highlighted the separatist and terrorist crisis in the Xinjiang region (CISS & HIR, 2004:334).

Li Wei, the Director of the Counter-terrorism Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC writes that ‘in the light of the developments in the last decade, the realistic threat of terrorism faced by China primarily originates from “East Turkistan” terrorist forces’ (CISS and HIR, 2004:331). He also views that ‘the terrorist acts of violence carried out by “East Turkistan” elements inside and outside China not only have endangered China but also have posed a threat to

¹² The actual activities of the “East Turkistan” separatism in China can be traced to the great uprising of the Hui people in the mid-19th century. At the time, Yaqub Beg, the Muslim leader who led the expedition against the rule by the Qing dynasty, turned for fully 10 years (1867–77) parts of Xinjiang into a kingdom independent of the Qing control. Nevertheless, it was in the 1930s and 1940s that a so-called “East Turkistan” state was really established. Uyghur separatists established the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkistan in November 1933, but the regime collapsed in less than five months. In November 1945, the Eastern Turkistan Republic was set up in Yining, but it lasted half a year only (Pan, 2004:523-532).

regional security and stability'.¹³ In a similar view, stressing a new security policy and strategy, Yang Yan Li, Deputy Director General of the Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his *Foreign Affairs Journal* article writes that 'in the face of the ongoing complex and profound changes in the global security situation...it might be worthwhile to take a closer look once again at China's perception and policy on security cooperation' (Yang, 2003:17-19). Even Prof. Li Yihu, Secretary General of Association of International Political Studies of the Beijing University views that "in the post-Cold War period,...non-traditional security issues caused by international terrorism have become more and more serious against the background of settlement to a great extent of traditional security issues through the enhancement of cooperation between nations, of international norms and of effectiveness of international systems and international laws" (CIIS and HIIR, 2004:270-271). Similarly, an article in *People's Daily* pointed out that 'to conform to the changing international situation, China has made a timely adjustment to its national security conception. China maintains that a universally-accepted new security model should be set up to replace the Cold War mentality and bloc politics. To lay a political foundation and provide a pre-requisite for global and regional security, China proposes countries should establish relations with each other on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' (*People's Daily*, 30 June 2002).

In this context, Xiong Guangkai's¹⁴ presentation paper at the Munich Conference of International Terrorism on *The Global Challenge of International Terrorism* speaks about the "New Security concept" and links the national security with foreign policy of China. The paper mentions that "... the growing threat of terrorism to human security shows that the issue of security in today's world touches on broader issues and is becoming more global. Nations share more common interests and are increasingly interdependent in terms of security" (Xiong, 2003). With this in mind, in order to secure an international environment of peace and shape a future in which all human beings can enjoy prosperity and security, the Chinese Government believes it important to foster a new security concept that keeps pace with the times and to enhance mutual trust through dialogue and promote security through cooperation.

¹³ My interaction with Li Wei, the Director of the Centre for Counter-terrorism Studies, CICIR in Beijing.

¹⁴ Xiong Guangkai is the Deputy Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China.

The new security concept initiated by China has four pillars, namely "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination" (Xiong, 2003). This paper also defines the four pillars of the "new security" concepts as follows:

- 'By "mutual trust", we mean nations should think beyond the difference in ideology or social systems, discard the Cold War mentality and power politics and refrain from mutual suspicion and hostility.
- "Mutual benefit" means that nations should meet the objective demands for social progress in the time of globalization, respect the security interests of one another and try to create conditions favourable to the realization of security of others while pursuing security interests of their own with a view to realizing common security.
- "Equality" means all nations should be regarded as equal members of the international community despite their different size and strength, and respect and treats one another on an equal footing. Nations should not intervene in the internal affairs of others, but rather promote the democratization of international relations.
- "Coordination" emphasizes that disputes should be settled peacefully and nations should promote extensive and in-depth coordination on security issues of common concern to remove the hidden perils and avoid wars or conflicts' (Guangkai, 2003).

The fundamental elements of what has been dubbed "the new concept of security" are "common security" based on common interests (as contrasted to the traditional single state security), "cooperative security" (since the security of all states is clearly interlinked and interconnected); "multidimensional security" (security is no longer understood in politico-military terms but now is far broader and includes economic, scientific, technological, environmental, cultural as well as other non-conventional aspects); and finally, "comprehensive security" which underscores the necessity from the non-traditional security threats such as terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*), drug trafficking (*pandu*), pandemics, environmental degradation, ethnicity, identity, intervention, migration, fragmentation, financial instability, energy security etc., which are often also interlinked, which have gained in importance and danger (Acharya, 2006:28).

Rational Behind Multilateralism

In the existing literature on Chinese foreign policy, it is argued that China is often portrayed as a reluctant and suspicious participant in multilateral diplomacy, particularly in the domain of security multilateralism (Lanteigne, 2005:10). As a staunch advocate of the Westphalian international system of nation-state and national sovereignty, China is more comfortable dealing with other nations bilaterally rather than multilaterally (Hongying, 1997:158). Since entering the United Nations (*lianhequo*) (UN) in 1971, China's perception of the UN, particularly its function of collective security in international and domestic conflict resolution, has experienced some

significant changes: from being suspicious and non-participatory to being passively involved with reservations to being a more active and conscious advocate of multilateralism and the UN (Jianwei, 1999:75-81). Indeed as late as 1999, some Chinese elite still regarded multilateral diplomacy as a taboo that should not be touched.¹⁵ Yet, the beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed China's increasing embrace of multilateralism in its foreign policy and a flurry of new initiatives and practice of multilateral diplomacy where security has of course been given the prime importance.

If we look at China's association with international institutions since the 1980s, participation has been a crucial component in its multilateral approach to foreign policy and to the advancement of state power. China's embrace of multilateralism, however, has been more forcefully reflected in its regional foreign policy. Ever since the Western sanctions against China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China has implemented the so-called "peripheral diplomacy", or "good-neighbourly policy", to break the post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation (Lanteigne, 2005:7). While initially a tactical measure to counter the Western pressure after Tiananmen, the peripheral diplomacy has gradually gained strategic significance in the entire Chinese foreign policy.¹⁶ This strategic adjustment was first implemented by traditional bilateral diplomacy, through improving relations with the former Soviet Union and later Russia as well as through establishing diplomatic relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries.

Starting from the late 1990s, however, multilateral diplomacy obtained its salience in China's peripheral or regional strategy. There has emerged a consensus among the Chinese foreign policy establishment that multilateralism might be the most effective means to mitigate the suspicions of China's Asian neighbours, maintain good relations with China's neighbours, and increase its influence in the region (as cited in Lanteigne, 2005:2). Some scholars like Pang Zhongying advocate that China's Asian strategy should be the so-called "flexible multilateralism"

¹⁵ A Chinese scholar of international relations quoted from his conversation with an army official in his article on Multilateralism. A general of the Chinese Defense University warned him: "China should not get involved in multilateral diplomacy. It is not suitable for China. You scholars could do a lot in other areas, but don't touch this subject. In any case, for China, multilateralism will do more harm than good" (Wang, 2001:3).

¹⁶ Jiang Zemin defined this strategy at the Sixteenth Party Congress as "building a good neighbourly relationship and partnership" with China's neighbours (*Xinhua News Agency*, 17 November 2002).

(as cited in Lanteigne, 2005:3).¹⁷ This “flexible multilateralism” means that China will not pursue a single model of multilateralism in the region. Instead, China will take different approaches of multilateralism according to different geopolitical and geo-economic conditions. It is interesting to note that the scholars in the field of Chinese foreign policy and politics, opine that what separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status (as cited in Lanteigne, 2005: p.1). Jianwei Wang writes that China’s accelerated pace in global and regional multilateral diplomacy is not just a kind of ad hoc, short-term reaction to outside stimulus. It also reflects its overall assessment of the nature and trends of the international system and the international environment, its evolving concepts of national security, and its deepening understanding of the function of multilateral diplomacy under new circumstances (Wang, 2005:160).

At this point, it might be appropriate to discuss how China has shifted from passive-individualist response to active participation and even initiation, of multilateral diplomacy, which has increasingly become an integral part of Chinese foreign policy to counter terrorism. The following section will focus on the evolving Chinese participation at the global fora like UN to fight against terrorism. China’s multilateral approach to counter terrorism does not merely serve the traditional function of external balancing or utility generating; it also indicates China’s growing interest in establishing a less-instrumental, more rule- and norm-based international order (Pan, 2004:527). Under the new international circumstances, and with a new understanding of the international security situation, especially after the 9/11 incident, multilateralism has been increasingly regarded as a more effective means to address China’s security concerns. In fact, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, head of the Chinese delegation, at the First Committee of the Fifty-Eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly opines that instead of just reacting or responding to the call of multilateralism by others, China “should vigorously promote multilateralism”.¹⁸ With regard to counter-terrorism, China’s increasing multilateral practices need to be examined closely.

¹⁷ Pan argues that although China’s Asian neighbours always want to use multilateral mechanism to check China, China should not be afraid of multilateralism and should not reject it. Rather China should positively and actively pursue multilateralism in the region to safeguard China’s national interest and security.

¹⁸ Statement by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, head of the Chinese delegation, at the First Committee of the Fifty-eight Session of the United Nations General Assembly, October 7, 2003, New York.

PART-II **UN, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CHINA'S ACCESSION**

Terrorism emerged as a serious international issue following the February 1972 Munich Olympics massacre in which eleven Israeli athletes were killed.¹⁹ Although “terrorism” has been in public discourse for more than two hundred years, with this incident, the serious threat of “International Terrorism” was perceived and debated by the members of the United Nations (UN). There was pressure on the People’s Republic of China (*Zhonghua Renmin Gonghequo*) (PRC), which had been admitted, to the world body in 1971, to react to this incident.

On 25 October 1971, the 26th UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 with a majority unseating representatives of Taiwan from the UN and its related organization and bringing in the PRC. Although the entry of the PRC into the UN was supported by much of the third world with the expectation that it would become an active proponent of the Non-Aligned Movement, the PRC has had mostly a passive role within the UN since 1971. It has only rarely been an active mover of events within the UN and this occurs mainly when it perceives its national interests to be at stake. Looking at the Chinese position at the UN during this period, it was one of the rare occasion where the PRC government reacted and participated in the debate on international terrorism. In general terms, the initial Chinese position (*weizhi*) on terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*) can be assessed from the first UN debate on the Munich Olympics massacre of February 1972.

A first attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations, but the convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence. The UN member states still have no consensus regarding the definition. In addition to this, many governments in the world have failed to appreciate the extent and implications of the terrorist threat to modern societies. As a result, a large number of countries are still short of confidence and commitment to deal effectively with the challenge. It is clear that the major reason for this failure is the definitional

¹⁹ Against the backdrop of increasing terrorist incidents, including acts of violence against national leaders, diplomats, international passengers, and civilians in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim asked the General Assembly to place the issue of terrorism on its agenda in 1972. He acknowledged that the problem was complex and not easy to solve but pointed out that far from being an isolated domestic activity, terrorism was taking on an increasingly international character, both in terms of its violent expression and its root causes, that it was becoming increasingly sophisticated owing to modern technology, and for these reasons, that it needed to be discussed in an international setting.

and moral clarity over what constitutes terrorism and terrorists.²⁰ Every sovereign state reserves to itself the political and legal authority to define terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs. And yet, some governments speak with a bewildering variety of voices on the subject of terrorism. Terminology consensus would, however, be necessary for a single comprehensive convention on terrorism, which some countries favour in place of the present 13 piecemeal conventions and protocols. The lack of agreement on a definition of terrorism has been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures. In order to cut through the definitional Gordian knot, terrorism expert A. Schmid suggested in 1992 in a report for the then UN Crime Branch that it might be a good idea to take the existing consensus on what constitutes a "war crime" as a point of departure. If the core of war crimes - deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking and the killing of prisoners - is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism as "peacetime equivalents of war crimes" (Report of the Working Group of the Six Committee, Item No.148-166).

The debate of 1972 was a failure and didn't arrive at any conclusion; this debate in UN left the issue of terrorism as complicated and opens over its definitions and nature for the years to come. In the UN debate on the terrorist attack 1972 China opposed US government's draft *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism*²¹ tabled in the General Assembly, which was explicitly and deliberately limited to certain acts of international terrorism and did not suggest any legal definition of the phenomenon. Exactly after thirty years, the debate following 9/11 in the UN, China was more active, prompt and immediate to support many US and UN actions against terrorism (refer Table II) and moreover, to impress both UN and US, it released an official *Position Paper Against International Terrorism* (Permanent Mission of the PRC: 2001).

The then Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, while drawing the attention of the various countries of the world, commented that the UN should not remain a "mute spectator" to such acts of terrorist violence but should prepare concrete measures to prevent further bloodshed. Many countries of Asia, Africa and the Arab world, by opposing the Secretary General's view

²⁰ For sources on the definitional issues of terrorism as well as for literature on the general topic of terrorism, see, for instance, (Alexander, 1991; Crenshaw (Ed.), 1995; Hoffman, 1999; Laqueur, 1999; Reich, 1998).

²¹ A/C.6/L.850 draft Convention-25.09.1972.

(which was supported by Western countries) argued that “people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force” (Hacker, 1976:174). The non-Western countries tried to justify their position and views by arguing that all genuine liberation movements were invariably decried as “terrorists” by the regimes against which they were waging their struggles and it was not the violence per se that was relevant as much as its “underlying causes” which included “misery, frustration, grievance and despair” that led to the violent acts.²²

The General Assembly, in referring the agenda item to its Sixth Committee on Legal affairs, foreshadowed the basic outlines of the debate on terrorism that followed by giving the agenda item the rather explicit title of: “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes”.²³ In that committee, the United States introduced a draft convention for the prevention and punishment of certain acts of international terrorism, which provided that rectifying states would impose severe penalties in punishment of terrorist acts.²⁴ The United States supported the convening of an international conference to establish a convention. The Soviet Union preferred that a convention result after consideration by the International Law Commission. Both countries disavowed the use of terrorism for any purpose, including that of national liberation. However, a number of Third World countries expressed the view that Western

²² It has been noticed that international law tolerates acts of war undertaken by states for legitimate reasons, such as self-defense and as a collective punishment for aggression, especially when they are undertaken by the armed forces of countries and protect innocent civilians, terrorism explicitly targets innocent civilians. However, acts of terrorism have been very common in the post-World War II era, often in connection with struggles for national liberation and self-determination, which complicates any effort to outlaw or punish terrorist activities, especially when they are financed or supported by the policies of governments. The issue was also significant in the UN setting, because the secretary-general himself sought to have the matter included on the General Assembly agenda.

²³ In November 1972, the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) considered these articles and, in Resolution 2926, invited States, specialized agencies, and interested inter-governmental organizations to submit their written comments concerning the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other protected persons. Debate over this title evoked considerable controversy, and the decision to include it on the agenda was effected by a vote of 66 to 27, with 33 abstentions, indicating that many states even had reservations about discussing this thorny issue.

²⁴ Weighing heavily on the minds of many speakers were the recent attacks on Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich. Many delegations held that all such acts undermined international order and required priority attention.

governments had long tolerated brutal, inhumane, and terrorist treatment of oppressed and colonized peoples and only now reacted when this mistreatment manifested itself in international terrorism.

As a newly appointed member of UN as well as being a nation from the Third World, there was enormous pressure on the People's Republic of China (PRC) to comment, react and participate in the prevailing debate. In general terms, the Chinese response to and understanding of terrorism can be seen from its support for the national liberation movements worldwide. In the early 1970s, its endorsement of individual armed struggles was actually quite sparing: only 23 out of a possible 120 revolutionary and armed struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America in 1965 (Van Ness, 1970:82). Nonetheless, China's entry to the UN marked a decline in verbal support for 'people's war' in favor of emphasis on a united front within the Third World against superpowers 'hegemony' and power politics. This new policy reflected greater emphasis on relations with regional governments and, following its admission to the UN (*lianhequo*), China quietly halted support to groups seeking the overthrow of governments with which it had diplomatic relations (Kim: 1974:178-182).

But the post-Cultural Revolution moderation of Chinese sponsorship for 'people's war' worldwide was not immediately evident in the Middle East where, during the early 1970s, China continued to advocate armed struggle as the only way to achieve victory over Israel (Van Ness, 1970:83). It is quite important to note that Arab as well as US and Soviet peace initiatives were rejected by China. The evidence in this regard can be seen in the March 1972 'Hussein Plan' for a United Arab Kingdom comprising the east and west banks of the Jordan, which was deplored by *People's Daily* as 'a wicked conspiracy of the Jordanian reactionaries' (*People's Daily*, 18 March 1972). Later that year China refused to support the Jarring peace mission or to join big power talks on the Middle East. Reacting for the first time on any conflict situation especially on a sensitive issue like terrorism, in that October 1972 debate in the Sixth (legal) Committee of the General Assembly; the Chinese representative declared that activities of Palestinian and African liberation movements did not constitute terrorism. The Chinese delegation went to the extent of arguing that by calling for measures against terrorism, the UN was in fact proposing to deprive the "oppressed nations and peoples" of the only effective weapon which they could use to oppose "imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and Israeli Zionism" (Weng, 1972:30).

Referring to the 1972 'Munich Massacre' of Israeli Olympic athletes as detrimental to the Palestinian cause, in September 1972 while condemning retaliatory Israeli air strikes on Palestinian targets in Syria and Lebanon, Huang Hua told the UN: 'The occurrence of the Olympic incident...is unfortunate. we have never seen such adventurist acts of terrorism' (*Peking Review*, 1972: 13). Although Chinese ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua voted for the Security Council condemnation of Israel (26 June 1972) for attacking Lebanon, *Peking Review* asserted that: "China has reservations on the wording 'deploring all acts of violence' in the resolution, which makes no distinction between right and wrong, or between the aggressor and the victim of aggression and other ambiguous wording and phrases" (*Beijing Review*, 1972:21). This was the PRC's first official position at a global forum. However, with the introduction of open-door policies in 1978, Deng Xiaoping's domestic economic modernization considerations began to play a greater role in China's international image. Decreased tensions with the superpowers allowed China the strategic space for improving its relations and project itself as a 'responsive and responsible' power. This included making its stand more clearly to the world on the issue of terrorism, in 1985 Premier Zhao Ziyang clarified China's previous ambivalent stand on terrorism by declaring that; "We oppose all forms of terrorism and the practice of using terrorism as a means in political struggle" (*Xinhua*, 1985:A-3).

Almost after thirty years after the 1972 UN (*lianhequo*) discussion, during the debate following 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the Chinese government while releasing the official "Position Paper Against International Terrorism" stated, "The Chinese Government opposes and condemns *all* forms of terrorism and is against using terrorism as a means of achieving political objectives" (*italics added*) (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China, Geneva: 2001). There has thus been a rather long march from the initial position on terrorism taken by China to its current stand at UN. The 2001 *Position Paper Against International Terrorism* also stressed that "China supports all efforts aimed at strengthening anti-terrorism conventions within the framework of the United Nations, including the early completion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism". What is really interesting to observe that in the aftermath of 9/11, the Chinese government has attached more importance to the enhancement of international counter-terrorism cooperation through multilateral mechanisms like the UN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (*Shenghai hezhu zuzhi*) (SCO). More

impressively, in the rising fight against international terrorism, China has supported the adoption of a series of counter-terrorism resolutions by the UN Security Council and has maintained that the UN charter and the principles of international law must be observed in the counter-terrorism process.

Professor Li Yihu, Secretary General of Association of International Political Studies of All-China Institutes of Higher Learning in his article “Strengthening the Role Played by the United Nations in the International Struggle against Terrorism” writes that “...In a sense, the United Nations and other international organizations have become an organic component of the international order and one of the basic factors of “state of autonomy” which has emerged in the international community” (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:267). Justifying the rationale behind the fight against terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*) through UN, Prof. Li writes that in the field of international struggle against terrorism, the important role played by the UN in recent years has attracted much attention: *First*, the UN has provided the legitimacy of striking international terrorism (*guiji kongbu zhuyi*) through international cooperation; *Secondly*, the role played by the UN in the international struggle against terrorism cannot be matched by any other international organization; *Thirdly*, the UN has already done a great deal of work in the international struggle against terrorism.

The Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Security, PRC, Yang Huanning in his paper “New Features of the Current International Terrorism and the Basic Principles of the Chinese Government on Counter-Terrorism” writes that “the task of counter-terrorism is arduous and the road is long looking at the new features of international terrorism” ‘(sic)’...the Chinese government has all along resolutely opposed and denounced all kinds of terrorism, and has taken all necessary steps to prevent and crack down on terrorism according to *law*” (italics added) (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:183). Following this line of argument, Xiong Guangkai views that “terrorism and counter-terrorism have been the primary driving force on which the development of the international situation hinges. It was against this backdrop that a new round of adjustment of the major power relations was kicked off, and cementing the cooperation of fighting terrorism has become the common view of the international community, and as a result, terrorism has become “a political rat”” (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:165). Supporting UN norms to fight against terrorism, Xiong Guangkai also goes on to say that the Chinese government has shaped up a systematic and comprehensive stance on the issue of counter-terrorism and they are:

- ‘China is against *all* (italics added) kinds of terrorism;
- China maintains that international community should take the same stand and concerted actions to crack down upon terrorist activities regardless of where and at *what time they happen, their organizers or in whatever form they take* (italics added again). No double standards should be practiced in dealing with terrorism;
- The scope of fighting terrorism should not be broadened infinitely. Counter-terrorism should not be related to a specific nationality or religion, and should not (sic) broaden the scope of counter-terrorism willfully;
- Fighting against terrorism should not exacerbate national conflicts, religious hatred and civilization clashes, and should not foment the feelings of estrangement among people.
- Counter-terrorism should be an operation of treating both the cause and the symptoms of the problem;
- The struggle against terrorism should be carried out by sticking strictly to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the commonly recognized regulations of the international laws. The Chinese government advocates that a *fair, rational and effective* (italics added) international mechanism for fighting terrorism should be established as quickly as possible and full play should be given to the leading role of the UN and the Security Council in fighting terrorism;
- China is willing to join all the countries in the world to prevent and to crackdown on terrorism and to cement cooperation with other countries in terms of information sharing with regard to counter-terrorism, cutting off the financial supply for terrorism, extraditing and expatriating suspects of terrorist crimes, in particular’ (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:170-172).

In addition to this, Xiong also writes that China, being a responsible power has been energetically taking part in the international struggles against terrorism and has done a great deal of effective work and the following actions testify to it:

- ‘The Chinese government has been constantly and seriously implementing the related resolutions adopted by the UN;
- China is a pioneer in the initiation of strengthening regional cooperation in terms of opposing terrorism, has been vigorously participating in experience exchange and cooperation within SCO, APEC, and ASEAN forum, and has inspired SCO to establish a regional standing organization of counter-terrorism;
- China’s effort in cracking down on “East Turkistan” terrorist forces has, in its own way, made great contributions to the international struggles against terrorism’ (CIISS and HIIR: 2004: 171-72).

Furthermore, the most important statement or policy position of the Chinese government can be seen at the 56th Session of the General Assembly of UN on *Item 166 (Measures to Eliminate*

International Terrorism), when Wang Yingfang said that “The Government of China firmly opposes and condemns terrorism in *all* its forms and manifestations. It is China’s basic policy to prevent and combat *all* terrorist activities...The Chinese Government is determined to fight resolutely, together with all other States, against terrorism in *all* its forms and manifestations” (italics added). Further elaborating on this, Wang Yingfang said at the United Nations, Security Council Meeting, held on January 10, 2002, that “international terrorism causes tremendous losses of life and property of innocent civilians and seriously endangers human society and political and economic order of countries, thus constituting a serious potential danger against international peace and security. He added that China supports the United Nations in strengthening its work in preventing and fighting terrorism and favors continued strengthening of cooperation among member states”.²⁵ Here, what is interesting to note is that the PRC’s position in the aftermath of 9/11 has been clear and consistent and moreover, China has begun clearly supporting the UN actions, treaties and conventions on terrorism. As a result, China has given its consent to 12 international conventions against terrorism out of the total 13 conventions (Refer Table-I).

Table-I

CHINA’S STATUS IN UN TERRORISM CONVENTIONS		
CONVENTIONS ON TERRORISM	YEAR OF ADOPTION	STATUS OF CHINA
*Conventions on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed On Broad Aircraft	14 September 1963	State Party
*Convention for the Suppression Of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft	16 December 1970	State Party
*Convention for the Suppression Of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation	23 September 1971	State Party
*Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents	14 December 1973	State Party
*Convention against the Taking Of Hostages	17 December 1979	State Party
*Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	3 March 1980	State Party
*Suppression of Unlawful Acts	28 February 1988	State Party

²⁵ In early January 2002, the Chinese government transmitted the text of the amendments to the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, as an addendum to a report it had submitted to the committee in December 2001 on its implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373(2001).

Of Violence at Airport Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression Of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation	10 March 1988	State Party
*Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation	10 March 1988	State Party
*Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf	1 March 1991	Not Signed Yet
*Marking of Plastic Explosives For the Purpose of Detection	15 December 1997	Signatory
*Suppression of Terrorist Bombings	9 December 1999	Signatory
*Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism	13 April 2005	Signatory
*Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism		

Notes: According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a *State Party* fulfills and implements domestic legislative legal practices to bring about the legal application of the Treaty by the government and other entities to which the Treaty is applicable. A *Signatory State* refers to a State whose competent authority or representative has affixed its signature to a Treaty text thus indicating acceptance of the Treaty and a commitment not to undertake any actions that would undermine the purpose of the Treaty. (Data collected from various sources: *The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Relations* (1998); *The United Nations Disarmament Year Book* (2003); Grenville and Wasserstein (ed.) (2001), Simma (ed.) (1994), Van Krieken (ed.) (2002), Gorman (2001), *Beijing Review*, *China Daily*, *News From China*, www.chinaview.com, www.sina.org.cn, www.fmprc.gov.cn, www.CRIENGLISH.com, *UN Treaty Series* etc.).

IMPLEMENTING AND FOLLOWING UN STANDARDS

After 9/11, the Chinese government has supported almost all the counter-terrorism resolutions and actions adopted by the UN and its Security Council (Please refer the Table I and II). China has stressed that the way to eradicate terrorism was to address the “root causes” under UN auspices than through exclusively unilateral military means. The *Defense White Paper, 2002* says that “the fight against terrorism requires conclusive evidence; clear targets and conformity with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter...The leading role of the UN and its Security Council should be brought into full play” (China’s National Defense, 2002). However, there are 13 major multilateral conventions and protocols related to states’ responsibilities for combating terrorism from the UN initiatives. But many states are not yet party to these legal instruments, or are not yet implementing them (refer UN Actions Against Terrorism). The recent *National Defense White Paper (2004)* also speaks about China’s concern and continuous support to strengthen international counter-terrorism cooperation through UN. The white paper says “the PRC supported

the UN, particularly the Security Council in playing a leading role in this regard, and seriously implemented Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism issues, as was shown by its reports to the Council on the implementation of Resolution No. 1373. It has actively supported and participated in the drafting of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism” (China’s National Defense, 2004).

In another section, clearing its position on a sensitive issue like nuclear terrorism, the paper **“Opposition to Nuclear Terrorism”** released on November 5, 2002, on <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjw/cjkk/2621/t15386.htm>, the Official website, says that “China is firmly against *any* forms of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism” (italics added). This section also states that China supports the IAEA in contributing to preventing nuclear terrorist activities in accordance with the Statute and decisions of the Board of Governors. Further, China is willing to implement the related action plans of the IAEA according to the decisions of the Board of Governors. On the fight against nuclear terrorism within the framework of the IAEA, Zhang Yan, China's ambassador to the United Nations in Vienna, at an IAEA board meeting, said China has been calling for the strengthening of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (*China Daily*, 20 March 2002). Zhang Yan also reiterates that "China is ready to join with other countries in this effort to move cooperation in this area forward...terrorism is the common enemy of humanity and a cancer in the fabric of civilized modern society ... my government is resolutely opposed to all forms of terrorism, including nuke terrorism." Zhang further stressed that it is the unshakable responsibility of all governments to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material, facilities and other radioactive materials in their own countries. As a result, "they should pay close attention to this matter and take practical and effective measures in light of their own conditions” (*People’s Daily*, 19 March 2002). Highlighting the Chinese government’s position with regard to potential nuclear terrorist activities, the Chinese ambassador said:

- Governments should take necessary preventive measures together with the world community "based on a realistic assessment of the possible threat."
- On the IAEA's role in the protection against nuclear terrorism, Zhang said ‘the focus of the agency should be placed in such aspects as organizing and participating in the development of relevant standards, guidelines and recommendations; providing training, technical

advisory services at the request of member states; and cooperation and coordination with other international organizations’.

- On financing anti-nuclear terror programs, Zhang said China favors "voluntary contributions without indicative targets." "We believe it's necessary to find resources for the agency to carry out activities in the protection against nuclear terrorism. However, such funding should not affect the core activities of the agency. Particularly, it should not have any negative impact on the technical cooperation plan" (*People's Daily*, 19 March 2002).

Qian Wenrong in his article "International Counter-Terrorism Coalition" in *Foreign Affairs Journal* of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs writes, 'since 9/11, the world community has witnessed an all-round development of the international anti-terrorism coalition and today, we have seen that three levels of international counter-terrorism coalition have been established, they are: global counter-terrorism within the framework of the United Nations, the regional counter-terrorism coalition and the U.S.-led coalitions' (Qian, 2003:42). He also writes that the issue of terrorism has been on the U.N. agenda for many years and for the first time the United Nations Security Council recognized that the right of military "self-defense" was applicable against terrorist acts perpetrated by non-state actors- applicable not just against the shadowy perpetrators, but against the states harbouring them (Qian, 2003:42) (see UN Resolution 1368).

Supporting Dr. Henry Kissinger's view that an effective anti-terrorism coalition should possess four elements: "common objective, common policy, concrete means of cooperation and appropriate supervision", Qian Wenrong has added few more points to the anti-terrorism coalition.

Those are:

- *First*, 'counter-terrorism should be pursued on the basis of purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and recognized norms of international law, allowing the UN and its Security Council to play a leading role.
- *Secondly*, the fight against terrorism should have concrete evidence and specific targets, avoid harming innocent civilians. Efforts should be made to prevent the arbitrary enlargement of the scope of counter-terrorism campaign, but proven terrorist forces. Full considerations should be conducted on the enlargement of the scope of counter-terrorism campaign.
- *Thirdly*, all kinds of terrorism should be opposed. The UN Security Council Resolution 1377 adopted on November 12, 2001 stresses that all acts, methods and practices of terrorism should be condemned and opposed, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed. The resolution 1373 adopted on September 28, 2001 also affirms the principle that every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards such acts. So, no double standards should be applied by any country under whatever grounds or pretexts.
- *Lastly*, cooperation should be carried out on the basis of mutual help. An effective coalition requires cleared-eyed judgments about priorities, an apprehension of others interests, constant consultations among partners, and willingness to compromise on differences between partners' (Qian, 2003:42).

Highlighting the challenges and debatable issues arise out of the current international anti-terrorism coalition, he has pointed out few factors which should be given importance with regard to the future of fighting against terrorism. They are: the definitional aspect of terrorism, nature of terrorism, proper approaches to effectively fight against international terrorism and lack of an internationally recognized screening mechanism for identifying terrorist groups (Qian, 2003:42).

In another note, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), *China active in global counter-terrorism* (10-09-2002) it is maintained that, China's stance on international counter-terrorism is "clear and persistent". China supports the fight against all forms of terrorism and abides by relevant resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and Security Council. China holds that all actions against terrorism should have solid proof and a clear target and adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. China opposes arbitrarily widening the scope of strikes in the name of fighting terrorism and it also opposes identifying terrorism with any specific country, ethnic group or religion (Permanent Mission of the PRC, Geneva: 10 September 2002). Shen Guofang, the Assistant Foreign Minister of China views that like many other members of the international community, China stresses the multilateral approach and added that "we all call for the leading role of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism and the strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the recognized norms of international law" (Speech of Shen Guofang, 22 September 2003).

During the UN 54th Session of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Professor Chen Shiqiu stressed that "it is necessary for every nation to enhance international cooperation as terrorist organizations worldwide have strengthened their collusion and their terrorist activities and imposed threat upon the international community" (*People's Daily*, 14 August 2002). He also stressed that 'the United Nations and its Security Council should play the leading role concerning coordinative mechanism of justice, neutrality, ration and efficiency in the combat against terrorism'. Chen emphasized that 'the international community should avoid double standards in the fight against terrorism. Every nation ought to treat and deal with all the terrorist activities either domestic or abroad in accordance with the same standard.' Li Wei also believes that the fight against international terrorism should be under the strict guidelines of UN rules and regulations. The Chinese professor also pointed out that while fighting against

international terrorism, it should be borne in mind that anti-terrorism activity should not necessarily be connected with specific ethnic groups or religions.²⁶

The official website of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC further points that ‘UN Security Council should draw up a long-term and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy in line with the UN Charter...China supports a bigger role of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council’ (*Position Paper*, PRC at UN:59th Session). The paper also mentions that “China endorses and has taken an active part in the formulation of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and hopes that all parties concerned will continue consultations on the remaining questions of the two conventions in a constructive and cooperative manner and adopt them as soon as possible” (*Position Paper*, PRC at the UN: 59th Session).

In another section of the above source, *China seeks cooperation worldwide to fight “East Turkistan” terrorists* (15 December 2003), the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland appealed on behalf of the China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for greater international cooperation in combating terrorism after issuing a list of the first identified “East Turkistan” terrorist organizations (Permanent Mission of the PRC at the UN, accessed on 23 February 2006: <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zt/zgfk/t89059.htm>). Responding on the decision of UN Security Council to add “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)” to the UN list of terror groups, the Chinese spokesperson Kong Quan said “The “ETIM” is part and parcel of the international terrorist forces and has carried out a large number of violent terror incidents both inside and outside China and is a severe threat to regional peace and stability. The Chinese side will continue to intensify cooperation with the international community to fight against terrorism in all forms including the Eastern Turkistan Terrorist Organization” (accessed on 25 January 2006: <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zt/zgfk/t89059.htm>). Yet another *Position Paper on UN Reform*²⁷ released on June 7, 2005 carries a substantial section on ‘counter-terrorism’ strategy. Emphasizing multilateralism, promoting democracy and rule of law in international affairs and urging reforms in United Nations,

²⁶ My interaction with Li Wei in Beijing.

²⁷ The paper is detailed in four parts: (a) development, (b) security, (c) rule of law, human rights and democracy, and (d) strengthening the UN. For the full text of China’s Position Paper on UN Reforms, (please refer http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/08/content_449696.htm).

the position paper says, “China stands for and supports the fight against terrorism in *all* forms and manifestations (italics added). International counter-terrorism efforts should give full play to the UN leading and coordinating role, address both the root causes and symptoms and avoid politicization and double standards” (*China Daily*, 8 June 2005).

Table-II
CHINA’S POSITION ON MAJOR UN ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM

* China participated on the UN draft resolution of 1267 and requested that the text be limited to the issue of combating terrorism.

* China voted in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1368 authorizing the use of military force against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan-this is the first time China has voted for the international use of force since its UN entry in 1971.

* Among the thirteen existing anti-terrorism international conventions, China has acceded to nine conventions and signed three, while apparently supporting 1373 UN resolution-considering it as a legal basis for future anti-terror cooperation. China has participated in the whole process of drafting the International Convention on the Suppression of Incidents of terrorist explosions/the Act of Nuclear Terrorism/ funding Terrorism.

* China supports the UN Security Council Resolution 1377 adopted on November 12, 2001 which stresses that all acts, methods and practices of terrorism should be condemned and opposed, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed.

* China participated and adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 on October 8, 2004. Condemning terrorism as one of the most serious threats to peace and security, China called on countries to prosecute or extradite anyone supporting terrorist acts or participating in the planning of such acts.

* China is a state party to most of the important nuclear treaties and agreements such as *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*, *Nuclear Safety Convention and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* and is a signatory of *Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)*.

* China is a State Party to many of the main Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions such as *Chemical Weapons Conventions (CWC)*, *Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions (BTWC)* and *Geneva Protocol*. China has issued a statement indicating its reservations to the BTWC. A number of states, including China, declared upon their accession to the protocol that it would cease to be binding on them if their enemies, or the allies of their enemies, failed to respect the prohibitions of the protocol. A set of voluntary confidence building measures agreed to at the Second Review Conference of the States Party to the BTWC (1986) under article V, and China submitted information on BTWC Confidence Building Measures from 1997-2002. China’s stand is not known in two WMD delivery systems such as International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile and Proliferation Security Initiatives. But China has issued statements of support in favour of Proliferation Security Initiatives.

* China is a member of both *Zangger Committee* and *Nuclear Suppliers Group*. Although China is not a member of *Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)*, but it has shown willingness to adhere to its guidelines, and announced in November 2000 that it would refrain from helping other countries build ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. At the same time, China is not a member of other two Non-Proliferation Export Control Regimes such as *Australia Group* and *Wassenaar Arrangement*.

Sources: Data Collected from various Sources: *Beijing Review*, *China Daily*, *News From China*, www.chinaview.com, www.sina.org.cn, www.fmprc.gov.cn, www.CRIENGLISH.com, *UN Treaty Collections: Conventions on Terrorism: At* <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp>tc.).

Recently, China's top legislature passed a resolution ratifying the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,²⁸ to protect the safety of the increasingly large number of Chinese citizens working overseas. China's Vice-Foreign Minister said that "as China is taking a more active role in UN peacekeeping operations, the accession to this convention is conducive to the protection of Chinese personnel joining UN peacekeeping actions...If Chinese peacekeepers are harmed; China has the right to demand that relevant countries prosecute the suspects or extradite them to China according to the convention" (*Xinhua*, 28 August 2004).²⁹ Another official with the Foreign Ministry said that the protection of ordinary Chinese citizens' safety overseas is also the goal of China's accession to the convention.³⁰ On 19 July 2004, the State Council, China's cabinet, held a special working conference to discuss the safety protection of overseas citizens and organizations. Infact, by May 2004, China had signed just 21 bilateral extradition agreements, which restrained the effort to protect its own citizens overseas, said an official with the Department of Treaty and Law of the Foreign Ministry, "so China is speeding up the ratification of some multilateral treaties to protect its overseas citizens' safety and interest through judicial means," the official said (*Xinhua*, 28 August 2004).

After the September 11 incident, the Chinese government has reiterated on many occasions that it has always been opposed to *all* forms of terrorism. Supporting and reiterating similar views, the Chinese experts and academics also stress the new role of UN to fight against terrorism. During the organization of China's first anti-terrorist force in July 2002 at Shenyang, Professor Wang Jianping at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) described it as demonstrating the Chinese government's resolve to combat terrorism (as cited in Lan, 2002:16). Justifying the formation of the corps', he said that its primary task is to prevent and suppress unexpected terrorist

²⁸ The Convention on the safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, which was formulated by the United Nations and took effect in 1995, has been accepted by 72 countries including Russia, Britain and France.

²⁹ China has sent 2,500 military personnel and 220 civil police to participate in UN peacekeeping operations over the past ten years, with some casualties. The convention provides a legal basis for China to make an extradition request to other signing parties (*Xinhua*, 28 August 2004).

³⁰ According to the report of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in 1978, only 200,000 Chinese citizens went abroad, while in 2003 the figure rose to 20.2 million. "In recent years we often heard news of Chinese citizens overseas being attacked. In Kirghizstan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Chinese diplomats and citizens have been attacked by terrorists," one official said. Since the beginning of this year, 10 incidents have occurred in which Chinese citizens got attacked or killed overseas, with more than 70 wounded or dead, according to rough statistics. The Chinese government has begun to pay great attention to this issue.

and violent activities in the region (Lan, 2002:16). Externally, China has shown active support of all UN counter-terrorism resolutions, including resolutions 1368 (China's first explicit vote in favour of the international use of force) and 1373 (aimed at disrupting terrorist finances) (*US Department Report*, 2001:16). Internally, China has amended the criminal law of the PRC to address terrorism and terrorist financing (Xiong, 2003:5). The Chinese response to the US-led war on terrorism is mixed at best because China is attempting to satisfy both international onlookers by showing support for anti-terrorism efforts and international coalitions like Shanghai Cooperation Organization (*Shenghai hezhu zuzhi*) (SCO), as well as domestic audiences, where the US is often demonized and seldom depicted as a reliable partner. The necessity of involving the UN and channelizing all international responses through the international organization, in "compliance with the international law" (Xiong, 2003:5) has been a major stand in the Chinese approach. They did however back UN Resolution 1373 endorsing the use of force, though it is clear that they would support a prominent UN role, which would ensure the Chinese relevance and influence. But the question that arises immediately is what has been the domestic fallout of this international coalition against terrorism in terms of legal reforms in China. While the objective of this study is to examine the Chinese response and position, some degree of the impact of China's position on the domestic scenario is warranted.

Yang Fan and Zhao Binghui of the China Foreign Affairs University says that the terrorist attacks on the United States have greatly affected the world. The war against terrorism has become a central issue in international politics. It is necessary for us to reassess trends in international situation and changes in China's security environment in these early years of the 21st century. Shen Guofang, in his keynote speech on the sub-item of "the Role of the UN Security Council in Future World Order" at the International Conference of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (21 November 2003) said that the international situation is really undergoing a complicated and profound transformation (Shen, 2003:14-15). *First*, security threats have taken on multiple dimensions. Traditional security concerns such as ethnic or religious conflicts and border or traditional disputes still exist, while non-traditional security threats are quickly growing. Non-traditional security problems such as terrorism, cross-border crimes, environmental pollution, population explosions, drug trafficking and infectious diseases have become the major problems impeding human development. *Secondly*, security threats have a complex nature. Non-traditional security threats have complicated causes and diverse manifestations. Terrorists go after their goals through

violence, their activities are becoming more secretive, and means more brutal. The use of biological and chemical weapons, cyberspace and other high-tech means makes terrorists more and more dangerous. *Thirdly*, security threats have reached global proportions (Shen, 2003:14-15). Today, with the deepening of globalization, countries are more interdependent. Security is no longer a local issue bearing on individual countries or regions, but a global one that threatens to impede peace and development of the world. No country can keep itself out, as a old Chinese saying goes, no individual can simply “clean the snow on his own doorsteps while turning a blind eye to others” (Shen, 2003:14-15).

In the same issue of the *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Major General Pan Zhenqiang, former Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of PLA, University of National Defense citing the importance of fighting against terrorism in terms of UN guidelines, writes that China is of the view that the international community should strengthen dialogue and consultation and develop cooperation, join hands in preventing and fighting against international terrorist activities, and make efforts to eradicate the root causes of terrorism. The fight against terrorism requires conclusive evidence, clear targets and conformity with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter, and the universally acknowledged norms of international law. He too writes that the international community should make common efforts to resolutely condemn and attack terrorism whenever and in whatever form it appears. In fighting terrorism, it is necessary to address both its symptoms and root causes, and adopt comprehensive measures, especially in solving the question of development, narrowing the North-South gap, and ending regional conflicts (Pan, 2003:33).

At the domestic level, China has responded positively to the recent debate on terrorism by bringing some reforms in the legal machinery. On December 29, 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted amendments to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. The stated purpose of the amendments, which entered into force the same day, was to “punish terrorist crimes, ensure national security and the safety of people’s lives and property, and uphold social order” (*People’s Daily*, online: 24 November 2001). The amendment was formulated “to deal more harshly with criminal acts of terrorists, for the protection of national security, social order and safeguard the safety of people’s lives and property” (*People’s Daily*, online: 24 November 2001). Prior to the adoption of the Amendments, the Criminal Law already included provisions punishing some “terrorist” crimes in a section of the law dealing with “Crimes

of Endangering Public Security”. Most of the Amendments adopted in late December 2001 modify existing articles in that section of the law (*Xinhua News Agency*, 24 December 2001).³¹

The amendment has detailed explanations of the criminal responsibility of a variety of terrorist activities, including spreading poisonous, radioactive or contagious material; sponsoring terrorism and executing terrorist activities; manufacturing, trading, transporting, storing, and stealing or robbing, poisonous, radioactive or contagious material; and fabricating threats of explosions, bio-chemical attacks, radiation and other terrorist information, or knowingly disseminating terrorist information of a fabricated nature. It also stipulates that people who organize and direct terrorist activities should be severely punished. In light of the spirit of the amendment, a campaign against ‘separatism, terrorism and extremism’ was launched in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Lan, 2002:17). Professor Wang Jianping said that the adoption of the Third Amendment to the Criminal Law is an important measure of China’s top legislature dealing with the current need to combat terrorism. In addition to the amendment, he stated that China’s Civil Aviation Law also contains clear-cut stipulations regarding the hijacking of aircraft and other related terrorist activities, and the NPC Standing Committee has enacted special statutes on some crimes of a terrorist nature (*Beijing Review*, 12 September 2002:17). However, the main changes brought about by the amendments are:

- **Amendment in Article 120 of the Criminal law:** punishment for those people who “organize or lead a terrorist organization”. Prior to this amendment, it was punishable by three to ten years’ imprisonment, which has been increased by between ten and life imprisonment. Under this provision, “active” participation in a “terrorist organization” is punishable by between three and ten years and “other participants” can be punished by up to three years imprisonment (*Beijing Review*, 12 September 2002:17).
- **New Provisions in Article 114 of the Criminal Law:** the existing provisions of Article 114 which punish “causing fires, floods or explosions, or using other dangerous means that harm public security” added new provisions like to punish the “dissemination”, or “illegal manufacturing, trading, transporting or storing”, or “the stealing or seizing or plundering”, of “poisonous or radioactive substances or contagious-disease pathogens” (*Beijing Review*, 12 September 2002:18).
- **Article 191 of the Criminal Law** speaks about the punishments of illegal financial operations or gains related to a range of crimes, including narcotics and smuggling crimes,

³¹ In early January 2002, the Chinese government transmitted the text of the amendments to the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, as an addendum to a report it had submitted to the Committee in December 2001 on its implementation of Security Council resolution 1373, 2001.

and now it has added “terrorist crimes” to this range of crimes (*Beijing Review*, 12 September 2002:18).

Recently, during the China-ASEAN workshop for senior police officers at Beijing, a senior counter-terrorism official Zhao Yongchen said that China will draft a counter-terrorism law to strengthen its fight against terrorist activities. Zhao, the deputy director of the counterterrorism bureau of the Ministry of Public Security said that “the law will define what kind of activities are terrorist activities and measures to be taken in fighting terrorist activities” and for this “preparations for formulations of law are underway” (*PLA Daily*, 17 June 2005). He called the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces the number one terrorist threat to China, saying they have carried out more than 200 terrorist activities in China’s Xinjiang in the 1990s. Adding to this, he also said that China now faces a threat from international terrorist forces, mainly to China’s interests abroad. 2004 records show that Chinese citizens were sabotaged by terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To crackdown on terrorism, he said that it is important to cut the financial links that fund them, a tactic that requires close international cooperation (*PLA Daily*, 17 June 2005). Even in 2005, top Chinese leader Luo Gan urged law enforcement officers and armed police in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to crack down on criminals to create a safer environment for economic growth and social progress. The Ministry of Public Security said that “in the last two decades; more than 266 terrorist acts have been committed in Xinjiang, causing 160 deaths and 440 injuries” (Sun, 2005). The Ministry labeled “East Turkistan” as the main terrorist threats to China. Luo urged armed police to “keep improving their abilities of dealing with emergent events and fighting against terrorism as well as increasing combat and defense capabilities” (Sun, 2005). The PLA in Xinjiang must push forward modernization and shoulder the responsibility for safeguarding stability in the region, said Luo, who is a member of the standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee (Sun, 2005).

Does China Have a Consistent Counter-Terrorism Policy?

Terrorism comes from the Chinese word *Kongbu*, which is composed of the characters *Kong*, which translates as “terror”, “fear”, or “dread” and the character *bu*, which translate as “fear” or “be afraid of”. But the Chinese have rarely articulated as to what specific action constitutes terrorism and this is true in China’s criminal code amendments made in December 2001

establishing terrorist offences and their penalties (Amnesty International Index, 2002).³² Though the Chinese government has responded to the issue of international terrorism from time to time, the government has rarely articulated as to what specific action constitutes terrorism or a way to define the term *terrorism*. Chen Lianbi defines “terrorism (as having a) distinct political objective to create widespread terror by launching fully organized plans of indiscriminate attack on common citizens including women, children and old people as well as executive and legal institutes of the government through brutal means, namely, explosion, abduction, plundering, poisoning and assassination, and thus realize evil political goals by spreading their political message among wider mass” (Chen, 2002:58). From the official point of view, on a rare occasion, Zhao Yongchen, deputy director of the counter-terrorism department of the Ministry of Public Security in a news conference on December 14, 2003, defines “terrorists” instead of “terrorism”. He defines *terrorists* as “those who have established links with terrorist organizations and who engage in terrorist activities which harm state security or the lives and property of people (whether they are Chinese or foreign citizens)” (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003). In addition to this, they must:

- Organize, lead or belong to a terrorist organization;
- Organize, plan, instigate, propagate or incite the implementation of terrorist activities;
- Fund and support terrorist organizations and terrorists to assist them in the conduct of terrorist activities;
- Receive funding or training from the above-mentioned terrorist organizations or other international terrorist organizations to engage in terrorist activities (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003).

By this definition, China includes any group or individual it perceives to be a threat to the regime including Muslim separatists, Tibetans, Falun Gong, and political and religious dissenters. While the Chinese government has provided a detailed list of terrorist organizations and individuals in its official paper titled *East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity*, it provides no concrete definition of the term “terror”, or “terrorism”. It has been noticed that potentially it has given the authorities a free hand to interpret such crimes in a sweeping rather than a narrow sense. It is interesting here to mention that the Chinese government’s use of the term “Separatism” (*fen lie zhuyi*) refers to a broad range of activities, many of which amount to no more

³² Amnesty International reports on “the lack of definition of ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist organization’, and ‘terrorist crime.’” The standing committee of the National People’s Congress adopted these amendments on 29 December 2001, and they entered into force the same day.

than peaceful opposition or dissent, or the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of religion (Amnesty International Index, 2002). As there is no internationally accepted legal definition of the term “terrorism”, the above mentioned attempt of the Chinese officials to define such terms at the national level are unconvincing. The above Chinese interpretation or definition of “terrorists” does not at all fall under the parameters of the most recent definition of “terrorism” given by UN. Article 2 (b) of the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* (May 5, 2004) defines “terrorism” as “any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (Permanent Mission of the PRC at the UN).

Jia Duqiang, Associate Research Professor of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CASS, has slightly different opinion on defining terrorism. He defines that “terrorism is in general a kind of extreme criminal activities that endangers freedom, property and even people’s lives and stirs up social horror by means of using or threatening using violence. When terrorism crosses national boundaries, it becomes international terrorism” (Jia, 2005:122). He too believes that there are four types of extremist forces in China: terrorism, religious extremism, national separatism and cult. By defining each concept in a different ways, he writes that “extremism refers to all organizations or actors that harm the human society and nation-state in various radicals’ ways such as radical theory, violence and terrorist activities usually and mainly for the sake of its political agenda..... terrorism, however, is only one of extremist forms...”(Jia, 2005:121). He has also differentiated between the two most contested concepts: “Religious extremism” and “National separatism”. For him, ‘Religious extremism refer to the forces that using religion as an instrument to facilitate and fulfill its particular radical political goals usually affiliated with violence and terrorism and in a narrow sense it refers to Islamic fundamentalism’ (Jia, 2005:122). Whereas “national separatism appertains to the type of extremist nationalism that seeks secession of an ethnicity or area it inhabited from a multi-national country via extremist means and operations” (Jia, 2005:123). Generally, two kinds/forms of national separatism can be seen in the 20th Century:

- An ethnic minority demand for autonomy or independence from a unitary country;
- An ethnic minority that was currently “divided into several parts subjecting to different countries” because of various reasons sought secession and reunion to build a new nation-state (Jia, 2005:122).

Jia also writes that “national separatism and religious extremism are often associated each other in their operations and both increasingly tend to use violence and terrorist tactics for particular political gains; often, combined with various extremist forces, which resulted in a variety of variants of terrorism such as religious terrorism, national separatist terrorism and cult terrorism” (Jia, 2005:125). For example; Al-Qaeda has the features of both international terrorism and Islamic extremism; the East Turkistan Islamic Movement as well is a national separatist organization combined with Islamic extremism and international terrorism (Jia, 2005:125-126).

Professor Jin Canrong, Deputy Dean of the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China, writes: “One of the characteristics modern terrorism exhibits is that terrorists are good at maneuvering mass media. The wider the attention their attack claims, the more likely their goals can be achieved. For terrorists, mass media can be an important way to draw public attention” (Yan, 2004:14). According to Dong Guanpeng, Assistant Dean of the School of Journalism & Communication of Tsinghua University, for one thing, they understand that terror can spread faster than any other kind of news, and for another, they understand that the U.S. media, is focused on terror. Over the past years, Chinese security experts and international relations specialists have had lively discussions on various aspects of the terrorist attacks and their implications. There are in-depth analyses of a whole range of significant issues which mirrors mainstream Chinese thinking on the world after 9/11 and on international terrorism. Most authors of these publications are prominent scholars and influential analysts whose views are likely to attract the attention of Chinese leaders and senior government officials.³³

Chinese analysts invariably regard the 9/11 incident as a terrorist act. They argue it is of an extreme and evil nature, which will have negative effects on both the US and the world. While Chinese security specialists disapprove of many aspects of US foreign policy, they maintain that nothing can justify such barbaric acts (Shi, 2002:45). They argue that international terrorism is rooted in an unjust international political and economic order, which is largely dominated by a hegemonic power, namely, the US. Yang Yunzhong has argued that 9/11 should be seen as an extreme form of struggle between hegemonism rather than a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West (Yang, 2002:5). Tang Zhichao in his article ‘Why America is hated by the Arabs’ in

³³ For a discussion of the advisory role of Chinese policy analysts and security specialists in China’s foreign policy-making process (see Rex, 1999:116-118).

Global Times argued that 9/11 makes it more urgent to promote ‘democratization of international relations’ (Ni and Wang, 2002:22-26). Given the plethora of challenges in a globalizing world, some Chinese scholars such as Pang Zhongying believe it is essential to establish a new global order based on equality, justice and mutual respect (Pang, 2001:29-31). Guo Xiangang, Director of Comprehensive Research Room of China Institute for International Studies in his article “Terrorism and the Impact of Counter-Terrorism Struggle on the International Situation” writes that “Nontraditional security issue has become the main factor bearing on international relations” (CISS and HIIS, 2004:210).

A clear picture on China’s policy on terrorism and counter-terrorism strategy is mentioned in Gunagkai Xiong’s *presentation paper* titled “The Global Counter-terrorism Campaign: Its current Situation and Future Prospects”, at the Munich Conference of International Terrorism on *The Global Challenge of International Terrorism*. This is the first paper, which discuss in details about the Chinese policy framework on counter-terrorism. Emphasizing and linking national security with foreign policy and counter-terrorism policy of China, the paper argues that “...ways to prevent and fight terrorism have become new and prominent items high on the national security agenda of major countries” (Xiong, 2003). The paper also reiterates China’s “new security” concept. This concept features “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation” as the guiding principles of China “in formulating counter-terrorism policies and conducting international counter-terrorism cooperation” (Xiong, 2003). The new security concept has been incorporated as an important adjacent to China’s foreign policy. It also constitutes the guiding principle in China’s formulations of counter-terrorism policies and its participation in international counter-terrorism cooperation. The paper identifies the essential elements of China’s counter-terrorism policy based on the new security concept as follows:

- “We condemn and oppose terrorism of (sic) all forms and manifestations;
- We must address both symptoms and causes of terrorism;
- We must take an integrated approach to combat terrorism;
- We must give full play to the leading role of the UN in coordinating international counter-terrorism campaign” (Xiong, 2003).

However, this paper is the first paper after 9/11, which very precisely clarifies China’s conceptual policy on counter-terrorism initiatives at the global level.

Fu Mengzi, Director of the Institute of American Studies under the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in a recent major international symposium on East Asian

security has said that ‘in future, China will follow a peaceful development policy where a comprehensive security concept is an essential’. The content of the “security concept” can be summarized as follows:

- ‘Security is a comprehensive concept and not limited to one area. A country’s development expands its internal and external national interests. Security in one area, such as no outside invasion, does not guarantee the essential security of a country. In other words, a strong military force cannot fully guarantee a country’s security. The September 11 events are such examples.
- Security should be mutual while not one-sided, multilateral while not unilateral, and comparative while not absolute. There is no absolute security. While people in one country maintain absolute security, those in other countries must feel unsafe. This makes security hard to realize.
- Security should be based on mutual trust. A country’s role should be evaluated objectively and one country should not seek confrontation with another country through exaggerating its threats. Cooperative security should be pursued.
- There are traditional as well as non-traditional aspects of security. During peacetime, it is more important to cope with threats to non-traditional security’ (*Beijing Review*, 23 May 2005).

In addition to this, Fu Mengzi also stressed that China’s security concept in military and at national strategic levels includes the following three pre-requisites:

- ‘First, is to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Though no large-scale military invasion occurred after the Cold War, China still has tough tasks to maintain border security. With the development of its economy, China will naturally increase its military expenditure, but China’s military strategy is totally defensive.
- Second, China is willing to properly solve border disputes with its neighbors on the basis of equal negotiation and mutual trust.
- Third, China should also have the ability to cope with traditional threats...Terrorism, transnational crime; environmental deterioration and the spread of diseases have become important aspects of national security environments. These challenges are beyond the ability of one country and form the basis of full cooperation among different countries’ (*Beijing Review*, 23 May 2005).

Another important stand and appeal of Chinese government in response to the 9/11 incident is the position of the government at the 56th General Assembly First Committee meeting. The Chinese representatives urged ‘every government to seriously reflect upon its security strategy and priorities’. The Chinese group argued that establishing a new concept of security based on international cooperation had become a pressing task (*Press Release*, GA/DIS/3199).

Yang Huanning, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Security, PRC views that based on its understanding of terrorism and the common wish of all the people in the world, the Chinese government stands for:

- “The aim of counter-terrorism or measures, steps and approaches taken by the international community in this regard should be conducive to safeguarding the long-term interests of regional and world peace;
- Counter-terrorism should not only aim at solving the present problems but should also keep an eye on the long term solution to this issue;
- The Security Council is the nucleus of the international security mechanism. The Chinese government supports all the relevant resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and by the Security Council. China stands for bringing terrorists to justice and supports the move of cracking down on the terrorist organizations” (CIISS and HIIR, 2004: 183-184).

Following the above mentioned principles, Vice-Minister Yang also writes that China has laid down the counter-terrorism policy of “prioritizing prevention”, taking initiative to strike out, handling with high efficiency, and promoting international cooperation”. With this policy as the framework, “China will constantly enhance the legislative work in terms of anti-terror, improve and perfect the anti-terror mechanism, build up the professional anti-terror forces, reinforce counter-measures, work hard to crack cases involving terrorism, and energetically support and take part in international cooperation on counter-terrorism” (CIISS and HIIR, 2004:184).

PART-III

9/11, CHINA AND THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER

9/11 has greatly affected the world in many ways and the most striking element of this incident is that it has really brought into question the nature and characteristics of international relations. According to Yang Yan Li, ‘in face of the ongoing complex and profound changes in the global security situation, the debate over whether 9/11 has changed everything or has not really changed anything is still underway and has been further heated by the war on Iraq’ (Yang, 2003:17-19). It might be worthwhile to take a closer look once again at China’s perception, understanding and policy on the emerging world order.

Fei-Ling Wang, an associate professor and director of the China Summer Program at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, argues that two facts of today’s international relations appear to be now widely accepted in China. *First*, ‘the world is organized as an anarchic nation-state political system and as an international market economy, quite unlike the “Chinese world order” of the Middle Kingdom or the promised utopian land of world communism. *Second*, China

needs the Western capital, technology, and markets to pursue its dream of being equal to the west. Economic development is viewed as the key national objective; and conforming to, rather than challenging; the existing international order becomes the strategic choice' (Wang, 2005:23-24). Wang says that 'the incident of 9/11 and the subsequent "war on terrorism" changed international relations and also affected Chinese views. Without a fundamental change of its domestic incentive structure, China's strategic assessment in the post-September 11 era has remained unchanged' (Wang, 2005:24). However, it can be argued from the Chinese point of view that the United States is less a direct challenge for China, since US is heavily preoccupied with the task of fighting international terrorism and is expected to do so for some time to come.

Speaking in early 2003, some Chinese security analysts argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, China now "enjoys the best international and neighboring environment since the establishment of the PRC" (Wang, 2005:26). The main objectives of Chinese foreign policy remain "to seek a long-term peaceful environment for our nation's economic construction; and to promote our economic development through opening to the outside world" (Wang, 2005:25). More specifically, China "no longer stresses establishing a new international order; rather, it is joining the existing international order" as it "realizes more and more the importance of participating in international affairs, including international organizations (Wang, 2005:24).

With such strategic thinking, Deng Xiaoping's famous twenty-eight-word guidelines of "keeping a low profile", proposed first in late 1989, still seems to be guiding China's foreign policy. The same goes for Jiang Zemin's sixteen-word guideline for China's US policy, "Enhance trust, reduce trouble, develop cooperation, and avoid confrontation"-which was first proposed in 1993 (*Xinhua*, 30 December 1996). However, the pre-September 11 nationalist aspirations, concerns, and anxieties over US as a super power still remain in China. For them, "we must see not only that the US needs cooperation from the major powers in its war against terrorism, but also the fact that the US strategic objective is world hegemony...The United States still treats China as a 'potential threat' and has never given up on the policy of containing China" (Wang, 2005:25). Hence, China must "unequivocally oppose hegemonism while upholding the banner of anti-terrorism" (Liu, 2003:54). Some experts also argue that China must "watch out for the United States, which may take advantage of the war on terrorism and increase strategic pressure on China while seizing the opportunity presented by the war on terrorism to promote Sino-American

relations” since “the United States is the main executioner of hegemonism but also is irreplaceable in the international community” (Liu, 2003: 54-56).

A senior Chinese diplomat stressed that that “the United States continued to relentlessly pressure us politically, even after 9/11 on human rights and other political issues...especially the Taiwan issue. Its basic assessment and hatred of China remains unchanged... Washington does not trust us at all and is still demonizing China and trying to contain China” (Wang, 2005:30). Jiang Zhongren in his article “Changes and Non-Changes in the post-September 11 International Situation” in *Foreign Affairs Journal* writes that the ‘9/11 has changed both the world and the United States and the following changes can be observed: *first*, the myth of the US immunity from harm has been shattered, which compels the United States to readjust its strategic security deployment. *Secondly*, the 9/11 events aggravated the US economic recession and caused negative impact on the world economy as well. *Thirdly*, to prosecute the war on terror so as to clear potential dangers and threats to its security, the United States has no alternative but to solicit international cooperation, thus leading to improved relations among the big powers’ (Jiang, 2002:12).

Jiang Lingfei, Professor of International Relations at the University of National Defense says that the aftermath of 9/11 has highlights three basic trends in the globalization process. These are:

- ‘The first trend is the closer connection and increased interdependence among various countries.
- The second trend is the integration of the world. The September 11 incident was the reason why the United States launched a global anti-terrorism war, and also gave it an opportunity to achieve political globalization.
- The third trend is the global conflicts. Transnational terrorism was in fact an extremist reflection of the sharp differences in the worldwide distribution of wealth and East-West cultural differences. These trends actually include the globalization of world politics, such as the issue of global security; global threats to security; and global peacekeeping actions- a future world development resulting from the September 11 terrorist attacks. In other words, 9/11 has ushered in an era of global politics (Jiang, 2002:7).

Yan Xuetong in his article titled “Global Security Environment is not Optimistic” in *Beijing Review* writes that after 9/11, all major countries including China, Russia, Japan and major European countries, strengthened or improved ties with the United States, particularly China and Russia. Relatively speaking a cooperative attitude is common among countries and governments concerning international anti-terrorism and other political issues (Yan, 2002:11-13). At the same

time, Yang Chengxu, Director of China Institute of International Studies holds of the opinion that ‘the 9/11 attack has not weakened America’s superior role in the world dynamics; the US has not given up its demand for world hegemony or its progressive tendency toward geo-politics due to its fight against terrorism, and dealing with threats from other countries is another big challenge it faces’ (Yang, 2002:9-10). Qian Wenrong is of the view that 9/11 ‘dramatically altered the international landscape on terrorism and made the entire world aware of the fact that terrorism has become one of the most serious threats to the world peace and stability and the combat against terrorism has become a pressing task without delay’ (Qian, 2003:41). Furthermore, it is clear that terrorism can not be effectively dealt with without effective cooperation. There is no doubt that the impact of 9/11 has brought a sea change in the mode of thinking and behaviour pattern of various countries decision-makers in the world. It is a catalyst which is directly or indirectly making the major powers to readjust their foreign policy and redefine their respective security concepts in the emerging world order. In this context, it is quite demanding to examine vividly the response and position of China to the major cases related to terrorism in the world. China as an important power and partner deals with these major terrorist challenges which the world is facing today. It is therefore necessary that we have an in-depth look at the Chinese perceptions and frameworks, and the factors, which shape their response to it.

As mentioned in our introduction, this study is designed to take up three particular cases to examine the Chinese response and policy patterns on international terrorism and they are: SCO, Kashmir, and the 9/11. Our next chapter which is the first case study of China’s response to international terrorism is SCO, will examine how China has used this organization and deal with terrorism in the Central Asian region. This proposed case study would therefore examine and analyze China’s role and effort to organize and build the SCO as a useful mechanism to raise its influence in Central Asian regions and at the same time to fight against terrorism.

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Chapter-II

China's Response to Terrorism in Central Asia: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states have become increasingly important in the foreign policy strategy of the PRC. While relations between China and Russia have been good since the early 1990's, the newly created states in the Central Asian region have presented new and unique challenges for Chinese security. China's response to this region has been to be the driving force behind the development of the SCO (Lanteigne, 2005:115).

This chapter takes the SCO (*Shenghai hezhu zuzhi*) as a case study to examine China's position, response and strategy to counter terrorism at the regional level. The SCO was created, largely at China's initiative, to define mutual borders and to examine threats to state security in Central Asia. The following arguments make SCO as a strong case to be studied from the Chinese perspective:

- First, China has played a paramount role in the organizations development, and it may be argued, has made use of the group to advocate its own specific foreign policies in addition to those shared by the organization as a whole. The SCO represents one of the first cases of China taking the lead to develop a regional regime to counter terrorism, separatism and extremism;
- Secondly, the SCO has allowed China to refine and develop its National Security Concept (NSC), multilateral security cooperation based on community building rather than formal alliances and has created positive atmosphere regarding China's role in counter-terrorism at the international level (Lanteigne, 2005:117). This has also provided China plenty of opportunities to build an image of a responsible and responsive power at global level;
- Thirdly, notwithstanding China's comparative lack of experience in participating in the shaping of multilateral institutions, it has succeeded in helping to develop and shape the SCO into a body which addresses strategic issues which no country could reconcile unilaterally (Lanteigne, 2005:117).

The study of SCO is therefore an essential test case for analyzing Chinese counter-terrorism approaches at the regional level. In the context of Chinese interests, initiatives and actions to deal

with terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*), separatism (*fen lie zhuyi*) and extremism (*jiduanzhuyi*) within the SCO framework, there will also be some discussion of the Chinese bilateral (*Shuangbiau*) initiatives with Russian and Central Asian countries.

PART-I

China and Central Asia in the Post-Cold War Era

As discussed in the previous chapter, the current global concerns regarding terrorism are decade old and a relatively recent phenomenon. However, the PRC's problem related to it at the domestic level had begun as early as the late 80's when strange incidents of unrest and terrorism in its largely Uyghur Muslim-inhabited frontiers region of Xinjiang started to occur. These concerns have become heightened since 9/11, and Chinese has attempted to link Uyghur separatism to international jihadist groups. After denying the problem for nearly a decade, official reports and the state-run media began in early 2001 to detail terrorist activities in the region officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (China's State Council, 2002: *White Paper on Xinjiang* and *People's Daily*, 10 October 2001). The objective of this thesis is however not to go into the domestic aspects but to establish the linkage between the domestic concerns and the formation of the SCO.

The first major violent incident China faced is in Baren township of the northwest of Kashgar in April 1990 (China State Council, 2002: *White Paper on Xinjiang*). This incident can be said the starting point which led China to launch a long-term strategy to assert tighter control over Uyghur society (Pan, 2004:531). For China, this challenge to the state was the turning point in its policies not only towards the Uyghurs but also to the entire Xinjiang region. It can be argued that the Chinese reaction to this region was linked to major changes in regional and world politics: the loss of control by Moscow of its eastern European neighbours and the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of the new central Asian republics. Also it can be said that China feared that Uyghur "ethno-nationalist" aspirations in Xinjiang could be stirred up by the example of—and possible support from—the newly independent central Asian people across its Borders (Starr, 2004:107-118). China then launched an ambitious plan to accelerate the integration of Xinjiang with China by stepping up ethnic Chinese migration to Xinjiang. At the same time, it

committed major resources to economic growth in Xinjiang, chiefly through the exploitation of Xinjiang's natural resources, above all oil and gas (Starr, 2004: 163-167).³⁴ *Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document, Central Committee* (1996, No.7) also reveals the problem of “Xinjiang” which China is facing since a long time and moreover, the official record of that meeting is a clear indication that China had reasserted central leadership control over the region.

Since 9/11, it is noticed that the Chinese leaders began to term these Uyghurs in the Xinjinag region as terrorists having a global connections. Although China’s experience with international terrorists beyond its borders has not been extensive, still it has been important from the Chinese government perspective. Looking at the nationals living outside of their country, Chinese have been targeted in comparatively small-scale incidents. Though Chinese civilians have not been targeted abroad in ways similar to attacks on Israel, America, Europe, Saudi Arabia, or even South Korea, many Chinese have been killed and wounded during indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The following incidents can be taken as major highlights:

- Four Chinese workers, for example, died in suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in 2002, and several Chinese were wounded during the August 5, 2003, bombing of the Marriott in Jakarta (*Xinhua News Agency*, 7 January 2003).
- Two Mainland Chinese were killed abroad American Airlines flight 77 during the attack on the Pentagon. In addition to these causalities, Chinese officials and businesspeople have been direct targets of assassination abroad. On July 1, 2002, for example, a Chinese diplomat Wang Jianping posted in Bishkek and his driver was reportedly assassinated (Shao, 2002).
- On January 5, 2003, one Chinese was killed in Israel in a suicide bombing (*China Daily*, 7 January 2003). After one month, on February 6, 2003, another Chinese was killed in Laos in a bus attack (*New York Times*, 7 February 2003).

³⁴ These policies coincided with impressive economic growth in China, which made it possible to commit the capital and labor to carry them out. This led to tremendous changes in Xinjiang, as new roads, industries, cities, and waves of new migration ensued. The political calculus in Beijing was straightforward: in the 1990s many Chinese policy makers took the view that economic development reduces local nationalism and aids national integration. The transfer of ethnic Chinese labor was and is still seen widely in Chinese policy making circles as aiding political integration and ultimately removing reasons for political unrest. These policies in fact may have exacerbated political tensions because of a predictable local reaction to mass migration and the fact that many of the economic gains were unevenly distributed and favored the Han segment of the population. Uyghurs felt increasingly marginalized and left behind (Starr, 2004:3-26).

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MAP

Table-III
RECENT TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVING
CHINESE CITIZENS OUTSIDE CHINA

DATE	PLACE/COUNTRY	INCIDENT	CHINESE CASUALTIES
January 29, 2004	Israel	Suicide Bombing	One Seriously wounded
April 11, 2004	Iraq	Kidnapping	None (All seven hostages were released)
May 3, 2004	Pakistan	Car Bombing	Three killed
June 10, 2004	Afghanistan	Shooting	Attack 11 killed and five wounded
September 24, 2004	Pakistan	Shooting	Attack One slightly wounded
October 9, 2004	Pakistan	Kidnapping	One killed and one wounded
February 5, 2003	Israel	Suicide Bombing	One killed
February 6, 2003	Laos	Bus attack	One Killed
August 5, 2003	Jakarta	Bombing	Several Chinese were wounded
July 1, 2002	Bishkek	assassinated	Chinese Diplomat Wang Jianping and his driver was killed
2002	Jerusalem	Suicide Bombing	Four Chinese workers died
May 25, 2000	Tel Aviv Kyrgyzstan	Shooting Attack	work team of the Xinjiang People's Government: one death and two injured
May 2000	China	Kidnapping	One murdered
March 5, 1998	Istanbul	Bomb Attack	In front of Chinese Consulate-general
March 1997	Istanbul	Fire at the Chinese Embassy in Turkey	None

Data collected from Various Sources: *Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, New York Times, News from China, Beijing Review*, various years.

Looking at the above incidents, both inside and outside China, it can be said that China's experience with terrorism has been somewhat different and not as severe compared to some other Asian states. Internationally, Chinese have not often been the specific targets of major terrorist acts but some have been killed during bombings and assassinations (refer table III). As we discussed briefly earlier that domestically, China is facing a complicated mix of ethnic unrest, minority separatism, political dissidence, and sporadic terrorist actions- though the lines delineating these categories are difficult to draw. Many of the ethnic and separatist problems are

centered in Xinjiang. Located in the vast northwest corner of China, Xinjiang has been termed by some observers “the scene of the most violent internal threat faced by Chinese government” (*Associated Press Worldstream*, 9 September 2000). The true extent of this threat, and whether it can broadly be equated with terrorism, is a matter of debate.

As Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr pointed out in their report *The Xinjiang Problem*, there are a variety of viewpoints among Muslims in Xinjiang: ‘those who seek greater autonomy from Beijing within the framework of China, and out-and-out independent seekers, some of whom are predisposed to use force and others who seek their goals nonviolently. Given these categorical differences, USA’s inclusion of a Uyghur group on its terrorist list can either be seen as a victory in the war on terrorism or a defeat in the battle to protect civil liberties’ (Fuller and Starr: 2003:5-67). Ahmad Lufti in “Seek Jihad as far as China” argues that “for China, the war on terror began after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, at a time when the then newly independent Central Asian states were being formed....since the 9/11 incident; China has been forced to reverse its approach due to repeated terrorist attacks” (Lufti, 2004:506). Dru C. Gladney in his paper “Responses to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang: Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition” writes that “...since early 2001, due to the desire to receive international support for its domestic war on terrorism, China’s foreign ministry and the *People’s Daily* have documented an on-going series of incidents of terrorism and separatism since the large riot in the Xinjiang town of Yining of February 1997, with multiple crackdowns and arrests that have rounded up thousands of terrorist suspects, large weapons caches, and printed documents allegedly outlining future public acts of violence (Gladney, 2004:540).

On the eve of the 50th anniversary of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Wang Lequan, secretary of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) Xinjiang committee, said that ‘the regional government has "reliable" evidence showing a Uyghur fugitive, who was freed on bail and fled to the United States, had close connections with foreign terrorists³⁵ and after going abroad, he conspired with separatists and religious extremists "to plan terror attacks and jeopardize the region's 50th anniversary," which will be marked on National Day, 1st October 2005, but he did not say what evidence had been collected’ (*China Daily*, 26 August 2005). However, paper titled

³⁵ Rebiya Kadeer, once a wealthy businesswoman, was jailed for eight years in 1999 on charges of endangering national security by giving State secrets to foreigners. She was released on medical parole on March 17 this year (Starr, 2004:382).

East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity issued in January 2002 by the Chinese State Council Information Office, disclosed that various terrorist activities have been underway in Xinjiang since the 1990s (State Council Information Office, 21 January 2002). The paper argues that “over a long period of time-especially since the 1990s-the "East Turkistan" forces inside and outside Chinese territory have planned and organized a series of violent incidents in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China and some other countries, including explosions, assassinations, arsons, poisonings, and assaults, with the objective of founding a so-called state of "East Turkistan." These terrorist incidents have seriously jeopardized the lives and property of people of all ethnic groups as well as social stability in China, and even threatened the security and stability of related countries and regions”.

It has been observed that since 1991, the Chinese leaders worked assiduously to secure boundaries, curb terrorism and transnational crime, and incrementally advance Chinese influence with countries along China’s border with Central Asia. Prof. Pan Guang has pointed out that there are many principles that guide China relations with the Central Asian countries and those are:

- ‘To support independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, economy and political reforms and to oppose any attempt by any country to control or dominate the region;
- To develop China’s relations with Central Asian nations on the basis of new security concept based on equality and mutual benefit;
- To soften borders with Central Asian nations on the basis of confidence-building measures and disarmament ground the border region;
- To deal with common issues such as terrorism, separatism and extremism, and national crimes like drug trafficking and illegal immigration, etc.
- To safeguard peaceful measures to resolve various regional conflicts, including border issues with the Central Asian nations;
- To endorse Uzbekistan’s proposal to make Central Asia a nuclear and weapon free zone to prevent nuclear proliferation and arms race;
- To promote economic and trade relations between China and Central Asian nations, especially in energy and transportation sectors;
- To promote cultural collaboration between China and the Central Asian countries’.³⁶

However, the disintegration of the USSR resulted in the creation of new states, reduced Russia’s influence, and opened opportunities for spreading Chinese interests. Many foreign policy experts

³⁶ Pan Guang’s talk on “China and Central Asian Countries: SCO” at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi on 31 March 2004.

believe that the collapse of the USSR also created a power vacuum that posed problems for Chinese security (Blank, 2003:51). Gradually, Chinese authorities showed an interest in improving relations with newly independent Central Asian states as much for defensive reasons of expanding Chinese influence and interests. So it can be said that with the disintegration of Soviet Union, it was essential for China to avoid being left behind in the scramble during the 1990s to secure good relations in Central Asia, especially in light of the region's borders on China's fragile and isolated western frontier (Starr, 2004:4). In addition to Russia, China's western border lies opposite Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (refer map), as well as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan (via the disputed territory of Kashmir). It has increased China's sensitivity to separatist leanings with China's Muslim minority, and hastened the requirement for China to recognize the new states and acknowledge their borders. Some other reasons can be cited for the promptitude of China's overtures to Central Asia:

- *First*, China wished to continue the process of rebuilding its international linkages after the repercussions of Tiananmen Square in 1989. The former Soviet states provided rich diplomatic opportunities to demonstrate China's commitment to regional peace and stability (Li, 1996:8-9).
- *Secondly*, China was determined to block Taiwan's attempt at securing diplomatic gains in Central Asia by cajoling the republics into recognizing Taipei rather than the People's Republic (Melet, 1998:236-237).
- *Thirdly*, it was also observed that throughout the 1990s, China was keenly interested in getting Central Asian governments to take stronger actions against pan-Turkic, Islamic, and other radicals who were linked to bombings, instructions, and other parts of China. At the same time, China wished to benefit from economic, military, and political exchanges, and took several notable steps to advance cooperation in joint ventures to exploit Central Asian oil resources (Li, 1996:8-9; Sutter, 2005:249).

In the aftermath of 9/11, China continued to expand its ties across Central Asia to stabilize its western frontier, gain access to the region's energy resources, and balance Western influence in an area China traditionally viewed as Russia's reserve (Sutter, 2005:250). The most important thing in this context that goes in favour of China that an improved relations with the Central Asian countries will help all of them to tackle the problems of terrorism arising from the linkages of religion and politics, can shield Xinjiang province and its ethnically Turkic population from outside Muslim and pan-Turkic influence (Gill and Oresman, 2003: viii-ix). Although at regular intervals, Central Asian leaders have assured China that they will not tolerate separatists groups targeting China, the Chinese on the other hand suspects its neighbours may lack sufficient resolve to eradicate the threat. In this context, Russian, Chinese and Central Asian countries efforts to

support anti-terrorist initiatives at the regional level has given enough dynamism to the SCO (*Shenghai hezhu zuzhi*).

In Central Asia, China's initial apprehension ranged from ideological isolation to cope up with transnational ethnic resurgence. Over the years, China was concerned with the events unfolding in Central Asia, nevertheless describing them as "internal affairs". They in fact, took defensive postures, to forestall any adverse effect on China. Chinese Vice-President, Wang Zhen's instruction in August 1991 to People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Xinjiang to "form a steel wall to safeguard socialism and the unification of the motherland" was seen in response to the Soviet collapse (Garver, 1993:96-110). Although there are several dimensions of China's Central Asian policy, this thesis would limit itself to discussing issues relating to the Shanghai Five or the SCO, the linchpin of China's regional policy response to terrorism vis-à-vis Central Asia. While the Central Asian states offer vast economic opportunities - a hub for energy distribution and new regional cooperation schemes, the region is still rife with enormous threats to China. Chinese foreign policy follows the earlier discussed approach "cooperative security" and more importantly, "trend of cooperation and partnership in China's foreign relations in the present, must be understood as a logical consequence of its perceptions regarding the shift from cold war and alliance politics- and here regional networks, coalitions and groupings become significant" (Acharya, 2006: 28).

PART-II

Formation of SCO and China

On 26 April 1996 Presidents of five states, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China, gathered in Shanghai, China, to sign the Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area. The five presidents decided then to continue meeting together once a year successively in the five countries. This summit had widely reported in the West, as the "Shanghai Five" because of the location of the summit where the presidents of the five participating states. The Shanghai Five, the precursor to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, was related first and foremost to security motivations, although the concept of "security" has had various meanings. The Shanghai Five traces its origins to the bilateral negotiations on border problems between China and Russia that were resumed in November 1989.

After the historic visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to China in May 1989, China and Soviet Union renewed negotiations on their 7300-kilometer borders. Then the five states reached the

consensus that the border negotiations should be continued between China, as one side, and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, as the other side. From 1998 the five countries began cooperation in the framework of the Shanghai Five as five independent states. Before the Almaty Summit that was held in 1998 in Shanghai, the main concern had been the security and stabilization of the border areas between China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Among the other factors, in the mid-1990s, a significant event happened in Afghanistan. The Taliban, an extreme Islamic movement took control of the country. Although the Taliban and its emergence had not been one of the main concerns of the Shanghai Five summit at that time, it caused serious concern among the five countries and sent out alarm signals. China was seriously worried about separatists in Xinjiang, Russia, had plunged into an extended war in Chechnya, and the Central Asian states were suffering from internal terrorism and extremism. Thus, it was not surprising that anti-terrorism soon turned out to be the main topic and task for the Shanghai Five. From 1998 the main concern for Shanghai Five summits had shifted from border issues to anti-terrorism. The Almaty Declaration of the Shanghai Five, which was published on July 4, 1998, points out that confronting international terrorism, national terrorism and religious extremism comprise the main tasks for the Shanghai Five.

From 1998, the summit meetings of the Shanghai Five began to expand the scope of its agenda to include other security issues, such as the three “evil forces” (terrorism, separatism and extremism), alongside non-security issues such as economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. Each summit resulted in a signed agreement or statement dealing with major security issues in the region as well as evolving common positions on major international issues. At the Fifth summit, held in July 2000, the joint statement explicitly stated that all parties would work to turn the Shanghai Five into a regional mechanism to conduct multilateral cooperation in all areas.

Eventually the Shanghai Five mechanism evolved into a formal regional organization- the SCO (*Shanghai hezhu zuzhi*), on 15 June 2001, at the Sixth summit meeting. Uzbekistan was admitted as the new founding member of SCO, thus expanding Shanghai Five to Shanghai Six. Since then, SCO has emerged as “an intergovernmental international organization...and according to the SCO charter and the Declaration, the main purpose of the SCO are: strengthening mutual trust and good neighbourliness and friendship among member states; developing their effective cooperation in political affairs, the economy and trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection and other fields; working together to maintain

regional peace, security and stability; and promoting the creation of a new international political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality”(Beijing Review, 29 July 2004:16). From bilateral to multilateral, from informal to formal, and from security to a comprehensive framework- China and other members identified a core set of issues of common interest territorial disputes, three evil forces, economic cooperation, and so forth through SCO. Thus, SCO provides an interesting case from which to study the change and continuity in Chinese multilateral diplomacy to counter-terrorism at the regional level by taking various initiatives with its Central Asian neighbours and Russia.

SCO is the first regional multilateral cooperative organization born in the 21st century. The SCO is the world’s “first organization to clearly put forward the idea of combating terrorism, separatism and extremism” (Beijing Review, 29 July 2004:17). But more important, it is the first multilateral security organization largely promoted by China and one in which China has played a leading role from the very beginning (Yu, 2003:28). In addition, the permanent body of SCO-the secretariat- was set up in Beijing. A Chinese diplomat was appointed as the first secretary-general of the organization. All of these are remarkable and unprecedented events in China’s foreign policy in general and its multilateral diplomacy in particular.

Traditionally, China preferred bilateralism to multilateralism, in its diplomacy. It has been particularly skeptical about multilateralism in security fields. In its Southeast Asian multilateral diplomacy, the Chinese often argued that it is unnecessary and undesirable to establish a formal and institutionalized security regime in the Asia-Pacific region. Multilateral security dialogue and consultation will be sufficient to address countries security concerns. That China would more so swiftly to embrace a formal security-oriented organization with its former enemies in Northeast Asia was indeed a surprising development. Indeed, the Shanghai Five was initially designed to be bilateral rather than multilateral. The first two CBM agreements were signed between China as one of the contracting parties and Russia and three Central Asian countries as the other. The first meeting of the Shanghai Five was initiated by China on April 26, 1996. This meeting was proposed by China to tackle, address and stabilize the nearly 7,000-kilometer border that China shares with the former states of the USSR. The “treaty of deepening military trust in border regions” signed at the summit, called on the signatories to invite the others to observe military drills and inform about any military activities within 100 kilometers from the border. It also forbade attacks on each other and restricted the scope and frequency of military maneuvers in border areas (*China Daily*, 5 June

2001). In 1997, the “treaty on reducing military forces in border regions” was signed in Moscow. This agreement proposed to reduce the total number of military forces along the border to less than 130,400 (*China Daily*, 5 June 2001). At a 1999 Shanghai Five summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, both the 1996 and 1997 agreements were seen as successful and the borders were said to be secure and stable (Bakshi, 2001:4).

Since 9/11, China and Russia and other SCO members have made an effort to offset the adverse effect of the US global war on terror. Among other things, they attempted to make SCO more relevant in the war against terror. Indeed, the Shanghai Five is among the earliest regional multilateral organizations, calling for cooperative action against terrorism in Central Asia. SCO took on international terrorism as its major objective and the Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism signed on 15 June 2001, foresaw an intensified struggle against terrorism in Central Asia and laid down a legal framework for member states to combat terrorism (SCO Convention: 2001). Immediately after 9/11, the delegates were attending the Prime Ministerial conference of SCO at the Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, issued a joint communiqué on 14 September in which they denounced the terrorist attacks while expressing sympathy and condolence for the American people. The joint communiqué declared that the SCO was ready to closely unite with all countries and international organizations and effective measures would be taken to wage an unremitting struggle for eradicating all global risks brought about by terrorism (*Kazakhstan News Bulletin*, 14 September 2001). Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji made two points at the conference: (a) the drafting of “the Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization” should be speeded up; and (b) the proposed anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek should begin operation as soon as possible (*Xinhua News Agency*, 14 September 2001). No unitary or military actions were emerged. As Pan Guang explained:

- First, ‘the 9/11 attacks were directed against the US, and it is natural that the US initially played a dominant role in the consequent war on terrorism. It is impossible and unrealistic for the SCO to play any other role than that of a cooperative partner;
- Secondly, the SCO is by no means a military alliance that demands unitary actions are taken by its members. Moreover, no SCO member state was then under any direct terrorist attack from Afghanistan that called for joint actions of all SCO members;
- Thirdly, the permanent secretariat of the SCO had not come into operation yet and the anti-terrorism center in Bishkek was still under preparation. Consequently, the SCO lacked capabilities to make quick responses or unitary actions;

- Fourthly, SCO countries were respectively also members of other organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Dushanbe Group (comprising Russia, India, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the North-Alliance of Afghanistan), and even NATO's Partners for Peace. This means they had obligations to coordinate their actions with their fellow members in other institutions hence the different degrees of involvement in the unfolding anti-terrorist campaigns;
- Fifthly, the requirements made by the US on individual SCO members differed. For instance, the US required military bases and territorial space from Uzbekistan, while more information sharing and diplomatic coordination was needed from China and Russia' (Pan, 2003: 100-101).

In short, it would have been illogical and premature for SCO to take the lead in the US-led anti-terrorist campaigns considering the nature and status of the organization as well as the US policy stance at that time. At the same time it can be said that because of the lack of a coordinating mechanism, SCO was unable to take more forceful and concerned actions against terrorism. SCO proposed to establish an antiterrorist centre long before 9/11 and as early as 1999. But the mutual progress of this initiative was stalled due to the different interests of member states. Some SCO members did not want to see too much militarization of the organization, apprehending the reaction of the United States and other Western countries (Pan, 2002:40). The 9/11 attack gave this antiterrorist initiative new momentum. China pushed hard for the institutionalization of a regional antiterrorism center. In early 2002, Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared it "the most urgent thing at present" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 2002). The agreement signed in June 2003 to establish the SCO Regional Antiterrorism Structure in Bishkek materialized China's intention (*Muslim Uzbekistan*, 6 September 2003). The location of the centre was later moved to Tashkent of Uzbekistan. The agreement stipulates that this centre should become operational no later than January 2004.

The founding of the SCO signaled both a desire to deepen the structure of regional cooperation and also to expand its mandate beyond purely security matters. The meeting was important from the point of view that a number of legal documents were signed, including the declaration of the SCO and the Shanghai Treaty on Cracking Down on Terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*), Separatism (*fen lie zhuyi*) and Extremism (*jiduanzhuyi*). According to the declaration, the SCO's mandate was to encourage regional cooperation in the strategic, economic and cultural spheres and to call for peace and a just international order (SCO Summits and Declarations, Refer Appendix-I). Another result of this summit was to hold meetings of foreign ministers and defense ministers

once a year to coordinate activities to consolidate regional security and stability. The summit reaffirmed the countries intention to speed up signing documents to ensure the establishment of an anti-terrorism centre and its immediate operation. It is believed that with the intensification of the battle against the “three evil forces” and closer cooperation among the Central Asian countries, China and Russia, the security situation will improve continually and social stability and economic development be further promoted in the region” (*Beijing Review*, 5 July 2001).

At the time the 9/11 incident occurred, the SCO was in the process of drafting its charter; its planned anti-terrorism centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, was yet to be established; the Shanghai Treaty on Cracking Down on Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was waiting for ratification from the respective parliaments of the six countries; and the SCO’s organizational setup had not been completed. However, heads of state of SCO’s six member countries immediately issued special statements, strongly condemning the 9/11 attack.

The Foreign Ministers of the six members countries (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) of the SCO held a meeting in Beijing on 7 January 2002- the first such meeting since the organization was found in June 2001 (For a chronological chart on SCO summits, refer Appendix-I). In this meeting, the foreign ministers exchanged views and reached a consensus on various related issues, the situation in Afghanistan which was of special concern, the international anti-terrorism campaign, the crackdown on the “three evil forces” and the organizational structure of the SCO. The one-day meeting ended successfully with a joint statement and the principle of a contingency mechanism endorsed. The joint statement that emerged from this meeting stressed how, “as close neighbours of Afghanistan, the member countries had long been subject to direct threats of terrorism and drugs originating from Afghanistan, prior to the 11 September terrorist attacks” (Zhao, 2002: 11).

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, while attending the first SCO prime minister’s conference, in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, in 2001, suggested that SCO should put its emphasis on two tasks: finish drafting the SCO charter as soon as possible and step up the establishment of the antiterrorism centre (Pan, 2003:40). To make the SCO more functional before the charter and permanent agency of SCO have been put into place, SCO foreign ministers agreed, in January 2002, to some traditional measures during the SCO foreign ministers meeting. The joint statement issued after the meeting established a contingency mechanism that included the emergency meeting of foreign ministers to express the common position of the SCO members (Pan, 2003:41). The first step was

to draft various legal documents to bind member states together and increase the normative stake for possible defection.

The next successful summit meeting at St. Petersburg in June 2002 suggests to some extent that SCO regained a prominent status under a new situation. Jiang Zemin noted in his meeting with Kazakh president Nazarbayev that SCO has relevance in that it conforms to the practical needs of the region, the interests of the SCO member countries, and the trend of development of history. As Kyrgyz President Akayev put it, SCO has withstood the test over the years (*Xinhua News Agency*, 8 June 2002). At the Moscow summit in May 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao emphasized that institutional building was the top priority of SCO. He urged member states to work even harder to make sure that the secretariat could be operational by 2003 and that the anti-terror center should be created as soon as possible (*People's Daily*, 30 May 2003). Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the summit marked the first time the SCO has become an international cooperation organization “in a real sense” (Xu, 2003:27).

To provide more substance to antiterrorist cooperation, China pioneered a joint military exercise among SCO members. The Chinese troops conducted joint military exercise with the Kyrgyz forces in October 2002. The first multilateral antiterrorist military exercise of SCO was thus conducted in August 2003. The drill had two phases, which carried out, respectively, in Kazakhstan and China and included war games against terrorists and a hostage-rescue operation. For China, the significance of this military exercise went beyond SCO. It was the first large-scale multilateral antiterrorist exercise that the Chinese army has participated in, and it was also the first time that China invited foreign armies into its territory. The Chinese military subsequently set a precedent for conducting missions in other countries during peacetime when they participated in the China-Kyrgyzstan bilateral antiterrorist drill (Xu, 2003:42-43).

The next major SCO leadership summit was held during May 2003 in Kremlin. In this summit, the Chinese ambassador to Russia, Zhang Deguang was been confirmed as the first executive secretary of the SCO. The declaration of this summit also reads, “The chiefs of states have approved documents regulating the activities of the SCO bodies, namely the permanent institutions- the Secretariat based in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Centre with headquarters in Bishkek, as well as documents on the SCO emblem and flag” (*Interfax*). This summit was important from regional security point of view. The document says that an international order featuring democracy, development and security would ultimately become the

choice of mankind (*Xinhua*, 29 May 2003). The SCO members, 'who bear the brunt of terrorism, have been actively involved in international anti-terror efforts while joining hands to combat terrorism in their own region', said the declaration (*Xinhua*, 29 May 2003).

According to the declaration, the SCO 'will closely cooperate with the sponsored programme of the Counter-terrorism Committee of UN' (*Xinhua*, 29 May 2003). It would support for the drafting of a comprehensive anti-terrorism treaty and a pact to deal with terrorist attacks using nuclear weapons. The declaration also stressed that the fight against terrorism should be based on the principles of international law, and shall not be taken as a campaign against any particular religion, country or ethnic group. Smuggling of drugs and chemicals which can be used to produce narcotics is a serious threat to the world. The endorsement of the SCO regional antiterrorist mechanism was part of China's push for the further institutionalization of SCO. China was convinced that "internal institutional building is an important way to strengthen cohesiveness and enhance the validity of organization" (Xu, 2003:27).

On 15 January 2004, SCO secretariat was formally launched in Beijing. At the same time, the SCO's Regional Antiterrorism Centre was opened in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The two organs have an annual budget of \$3.5 million. China and Russia each pays 24 percent of the budget (*Xinhua News Agency*, 16 January 2004). Another way to sustain SCO is to add the economic dimension to the organization. Economic and trade relations among SCO members have been underdeveloped compared with the security relations. Even before 9/11, the Chinese had been of the view that for SCO to become a viable regional organization, security multilateralism was insufficient. The economic benefits from SCO are particularly needed by the four Central Asian countries. They are actually more interested in economic, rather than security or military, cooperation. It is predicted that promoting economic cooperation will constitute a new growth point to increase the coherence of SCO. Compared to Southeast Asia, the level of economic integration in SCO is much lower.

The Tashkent Declaration signed by the presidents of SCO states on 17 June 2004 marked the commencement of a new stage of multifaceted cooperation. After considerable delay, and a location change from Bishkek to Tashkent, the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structures (RATS) centre was formally launched during this summit. RATS was given the mandate of cooperating with both the SCO's membership and other international organizations in combating terrorism, separatism

and extremism as well as creating an information nexus and think-tank dedicated to the study of terrorism (*Xinhua*, 17 June 2004).

Commenting on the significance of this SCO summit, Du Wei, Assistant to Secretary General of the SCO Secretariat said that “the Tashkent Summit is a starting point for the SCO to enter a new stage of full-range cooperation” (*Beijing Review*, 29 July 2004). In response to a query as to the role of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in the world anti-terrorist campaign and whether it would contribute to shaping the global anti-terrorist structures, Du Wei replied, “...RATS is a significant step forward and it will provide an excellent tool and cooperation platform for the six member countries in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism.... We will use the structure to conduct cooperation among the six member countries, especially the intelligence exchanges. However, at least at present, the SCO has no plan to establish a rapid response force or conduct other military actions. Its current role is to promote the intelligence exchanges between member countries and with related international and regional organizations regarding anti-terrorist activities. It may also propose suggestions and work plan for the SCO to crack down on terrorism and helps coordinate actions of the six member countries in this field” (*Beijing Review*, 29 July 2004). However, the significant of the summit arose from the presence of the participation of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai to boost the cause to fight against Al Qaeda through the RATS (Zhang, 2004:11).

The 5 July 2005, Astana Summit signed a Declaration of heads of SCO member states, which contains a deep analysis of current international and regional conditions and outlines common position and prospects of the SCO member states towards the international order. While addressing at the plenary session of the Council of Heads of SCO member states, Zhang Deguang, Secretary General of SCO in his speech said that “...Central Asia have once again shown that terrorism, separatism and extremism still remain to be the most serious threat to peace, security, stability and development in the region. Maintaining peace, security and stability is a matter of top priority to the Central Asia” (Zhang, Speech: 5 July 2005). Moreover, what is important here is to look at the speech delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Li Zhaoxing at the reception on the occasion of SCO day, 15 June when he said that “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an essential part of China’s diplomatic policy. China will continue to attach high importance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and contribute to its progressive development as it has done before” (Li, Speech: 15 July 2005). But before really going to assess

the Chinese diplomacy of using SCO in its counter-terrorism strategy, this study would try to explore that to what extent the definition on “terrorism, separatism and extremism” given by SCO is acceptable to China. Then it would be interesting to examine how China is going to use this definition in its own favour to curb terrorist activities in the Central Asian region.

PART-III

Defining Terrorism:

SCO and China

The Shanghai Convention of SCO defines the three principal threats: terrorism, separatism and extremism differently. Article 1 of the Shanghai convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism defines the concepts in the following manner:

- 1) "Terrorism" (*kongbu zhuyi*) means:
 - a. “Any act recognized as an offence in one of the treaties listed in the Annex to this Convention (hereinafter referred to as "the Annex") and as defined in this Treaty;
 - b. Other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to organize, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, violate public security or to compel public authorities or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance with the national laws of the Parties;
- 2) "Separatism" (*fen lie zhuyi*) means any act intended to violate territorial integrity of a State including by annexation of any part of its territory or to disintegrate a State, committed in a violent manner, as well as planning and preparing, and abetting such act, and subject to criminal prosecuting in accordance with the national laws of the Parties;
- 3) "Extremism" (*jiduanzhuyi*) is an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through the use of violence or changing violently the constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above purposes, of illegal armed formations and participation in them, criminally prosecuted in conformity with the national laws of the Parties” (Shanghai Convention, 15 June 2001).

The Shanghai Convention of SCO states that ‘terrorism, separatism, and extremism defined by the convention are under no circumstances justifiable, and that whoever commits terrorist acts would be punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature. The above definition would not hinder any international treaties or the domestic law of member states to include any other definitions with wider scope’ (*Special Press Summary Report*, 7 January 2002). So, it would be useful to see as to what extent the definitions laid down in the SCO approximate with the official position or definition of the PRC government.

During the news conference, in which he introduced the list of alleged "terrorists" in December 2003, Zhao Yongchen, deputy director of the counter-terrorism department of the *Ministry of Public Security* laid down the following criteria in 'defining' terrorist organizations:

- “An organization or organizations that engage in terrorist activities endangering national security or social stability, and harm life and property through violence and terror (regardless of whether it is based in or outside of China);
- Possessing established organizational leadership and division of labour or systems for division of labour” (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003).

And in addition to the above two criteria:

- ‘Currently or previously involved in the organization, planning, instigation, conduct or implementation of terrorist activities;
- Funding and supporting terrorist activities;
- Establishing bases for terrorist activities or organizing, recruiting and training terrorists;
- Collaborating with international terrorist organizations by receiving funding or training from these organizations or engaging in terrorist activities with them’ (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003).

He went on to define "terrorists" as:

- “Those who have established links with terrorist organizations and who engage in terrorist activities which harm state security or the lives and property of people (whether they are Chinese or foreign citizens)” (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003).

And in addition to this, they must:

- “organize, lead or belong to a terrorist organization;
- organize, plan, instigate, propagate or incite the implementation of terrorist activities;
- fund and support terrorist organizations and terrorists to assist them in the conduct of terrorist activities;
- receive funding or training from the above-mentioned terrorist organizations or other international terrorist organizations to engage in terrorist activities” (*Xinhua*, 15 December 2003).

If one looks closely at this detailed list of categories, one thing gets clear that there is no concrete definition of the terms "terror", "terrorism" or "terrorist", and this has probably given the Chinese authorities a free hand to interpret various crimes in their own way and treat it as a terrorist incident. *Article 103* of the Chinese Constitution says that ‘whoever organizes, plots, or acts to split the country or undermine national unification, the ringleader, or the one whose crime is grave, is to be sentenced to life imprisonment or not less than ten years of fixed-term imprisonment; other

active participants are to be sentenced to not less than three but not more than ten years of fixed term imprisonment; and other participants are to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights. Whoever instigates to split the country and undermine national unification is to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights; ringleaders or those whose crimes are grave are to be sentenced to not less than five years of fixed term imprisonment' (*Xinhua News Agency*, 24 December 2001). However, the definitional aspect of both China and SCO on this issue remains unclear as the term terrorism lacks a clear definition at the global level. But it is noticed that China is consistently using this opportunity to crackdown on terrorists, separatists and extremists in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region by using SCO as a tool. As a result, China is trying to organize and build the SCO as a strong tool to fight against terrorism. In this context, it would be very interesting to have a critical analysis of China's role and strategy in SCO to counter-terrorism.

PART-IV

SCO and Counter-terrorism:

Role of China

There are divergent opinions on the orientation, prospects and development mode of the SCO. According to Pan Guang, 'the development of the SCO has made it possible for the first time in history to involve China, Russia and the Central Asian states in a multilateral mechanism of regional security and economic cooperation. Within its framework, China and its SCO partners have resolved, in a matter of several years, their border issues leftover from the past two centuries impeding the development of good relationships' (Pan, 2003:99). Miao Huashou, a research fellow at the Development Research Centre of the State Council in *Beijing Review* writes that 'since its founding, the "Shanghai Five", the predecessor of the SCO, has attracted worldwide attention for its effective cooperation in the realm of regional security. He is of the view that due to the infiltration of international forces into Central Asia and the regions special ethnic and cultural conditions, regional security has always been an important issue faced by the governments of China and Central Asian countries and here SCO is playing a vital role for regional security in this area' (Miao, 2002).

On the other hand, Taiwan scholars do not hold the same opinion like their Chinese counterparts about the development of SCO. Professor Parris H. Chang, former chairman of the

Committee of Foreign Relations of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) is of the opinion that ‘China is using SCO as a tool to protect from the international media the human rights violations, repressions in Xinjiang’.³⁷ Vincent Wen-Hsien Chen of the Graduate School of Taiwan History, National Chengchi University also says that “SCO is primarily a Chinese strategy to counter US pressure in the Central Asian region. It is also to some extent an effort by the Chinese government to counter NATO”.³⁸ Western writers and specialists like Marc Lanteigne feel that the founding of the SCO signaled both a desire to deepen the structure of regional cooperation and also to expand its mandate beyond purely security matters (Lanteigne, 2005:122). Since it is of recent origins, its consolidation and development are the primary tasks confronting the SCO. As a matter of fact, the SCO appears to be facing more challenges after its development as a formal regional organization. Hence, the challenges to SCO also raise some new challenges for Chinese security policy.

The SCO possesses great potential for further development, but some real and underlying restraining factors should be taken into consideration as well, though they need not necessarily be seen as insurmountable. They are:

- *First*, disparities among state members of the SCO in political, economical, historical and cultural background. Disparities among SCO member states are not necessarily going to be serious problems for cooperation, but the contrast should help them see things differently;
- *Secondly*, the rising instability in the political conditions and internal politics of the Central Asian countries are some potential source of instability for SCO (Qian, 2002:221);
- *Thirdly*, in Central Asia, there exist at least three or four formal or informal security mechanisms, including the SCO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the “Partnership of Peace” program of NATO, and the commitment of the United States to the Central Asian states, especially to Uzbekistan. How to coordinate these mechanisms and make their roles and functions complementary rather than over-lapping or confrontational is a problem that the SCO must deal with (Qian, 2002:222);
- *Fourthly*, the difficulty in economic cooperation among the Central Asian, Russian and Chinese is another potential hindrance in front of SCO. Thus, difficulty in economic cooperation is one of the hardest problems for the SCO.

However, despite the above difficulties, the SCO is very important compared to other related organizations. It is important to mention that the SCO had to deal with an abrupt change in Central

³⁷ My discussion with Prof. Chang in New Delhi.

³⁸ My interview with Prof. Vincent Wen-Hsien Chen in Taipei, Taiwan on 16 August 2005.

Asian affairs after 9/11. How to cope with the changing situation, and especially the emergence of a powerful and competitive US presence in the region, has been a big challenge for the newly established organization.

Less than three months after the establishment of the organization, the viability of SCO was put under a serious test as a consequence of 9/11. It was observed that after 9/11, many smaller members of SCO took a pro-western stand, for example; Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, allowed the United States to establish military bases and deploy military forces on their territories. The three countries strengthened their antiterrorist cooperation with the United States through bilateral channels rather than through SCO. It is possible that these temporary anti-terror arrangements with the Central Asian states may evolve into a formal US- dominant regional security mechanism, thus making SCO irrelevant (Zhao, 2003:115). Consequently, China's strategic position "has eroded substantially" in Central Asia (Sands, 11 January 2002). There are contrary views as well. China would prefer Central Asian regional cooperation with the US, conducted in the framework of SCO, where they would be in a position to monitor such cooperation. Some Chinese analysts argue that the SCO plays a particularly important role in the U.S. anti-terrorism strategy and that such a role cannot be entirely replaced by any other organization. Therefore, it is necessary for the US to cooperate with SCO to deal with international terrorism.

The presence of US forces in Central Asia after 9/11 even caused some analysts to raise doubts about the SCO's viability, considering that the SCO (as an institution) did not react in any direct and practical way to the terrorist forces in Afghanistan, and that the Central Asian member states established close contact with the US. Western observers thus predicted a possible early demise of this infant multilateral organization.³⁹ In response to these increasing doubts about SCO's credibility, Chinese experts like Zhao Changqing wrote that "as a regional organization, the SCO is also unlikely to remain unconcerned about changes in the internal situation of Afghanistan that affect the security and stability of Central Asia" (*Beijing Review*, 31 January 2002). Miao Huashou writes that "as close neighbours of Afghanistan, the SCO members had, on

³⁹ Here are some descriptions about SCO's state of affairs after the September 11 attacks: "The SCO has cracked at the first serious test". The SCO went into cardiac arrest". "SCO stood as exposed as irrelevant". SCO is a "stillborn" organization, and "the SCO will lose viability as a regional security and political forum". See (Yom, 2002; *Monitor*: 27 November 2001, *Russia's Week*: 16 January 2002).

many occasions before September 11, warned the international community of the harm of terrorism and drugs originating from Afghanistan” (Miao, 2002: 12). According to Pan Guang, the SCO was not playing its role against terrorism unitedly. Several factors were contributing to this situation:

- ‘In the case of Afghanistan, while Russia is providing material support to the US directly as it has the experience of waging a war against Afghanistan, countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have provided military bases to the USA. Thus they provide independent support to the US bilaterally. This is understandable since the USA is the direct victim of 9/11 terrorist attacks.
- SCO is not a military alliance, which demands unilateral action by its members.
- There was no permanent secretariat for SCO at the time of Afghanistan war and the discussions on anti-terror mechanism were in the initial stages’.⁴⁰

However, the SCO member countries are located in the same regions, facing the same security situation, fighting the same enemies (extremist, separatists and terrorists), and sharing many of the same concerns. At this point of our discussion, the focus is on the nuances attached to China’s role and effort to organize and build the SCO as a useful mechanism to raise its influence in Central Asian regions and at the same time to fight against terrorism. In addition to this, it would also trust on how SCO is one of the important directions and a vital component of Chinese foreign and security policy.

China’s Role in SCO

As in the case of its participation in Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), SCO reflects China’s interest in establishing a norm- and rule-based security order in the region. Just like any other international organization, SCO does have its instrumental function, either to manage border disputes in the narrow sense or offset the US influence in Central Asia in the broad sense. The western media described SCO as China and Russia’s attempt to establish a condominium in Central Asia and a mini-NATO to counter-balance US dominance (Oresman, 2003).⁴¹ There is some truth in such an argument, but

⁴⁰ Talk by Prof. Pan Guang, see footnote 36.

⁴¹ Some alarmists even see the SCO as China’s Warsaw Pact. Western intelligence circles describe the SCO as merely a synergistic tool and framework for Russia and China to court Central Asian countries and to establish the strategic Sino-Russian condominium over Central Asia against NATO (Oresman, 2003).

it is hardly the only or even the most important motivation. Indeed the initiation of the Shanghai Five mechanism has nothing to do with external balancing; thus, the Shanghai Five and the SCO point to the gradual evolution from an instrumental order to a normative-contractual order in this specific sub-region (Alagappa, 2003: 41-52).⁴² Chinese President Jiang Zemin made it very clear in 2000 that the purpose of SCO was not just to find a way to promote friendly cooperation among member countries, but more importantly, it was an experiment to explore “new interstate relations, new security concept and new model of regional cooperation” beyond the Cold War mentality (Yu, 2003: 29).

In terms of the nature of the organization, China has advocated that SCO follow the principle of nonalignment, not targeting against any third country or region, but opening to all, including nonmembers (SCO Declaration, 15 June 2001). In terms of norms governing the relationship among member states, China emphasized that SCO is underlined by the so-called Shanghai Spirit. At the St. Petersburg summit in June 2002, Jiang Zemin defined the Shanghai spirit in the following terms: “mutual trust, mutual advantages, equality, joint consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and the desire for common development” (*China Daily*, 8 June 2002). It was summarized by a Chinese scholar as the “five Cs: confidence, communication, cooperation, coexistence, and common interest” (Lu, 2002:10).

These norms are consistent with the new conceptions of security discussed earlier. As Jiang Zemin indicated China wants to use SCO as a catalyst to promote a new type of international relations, based on these new concepts of security. These norms, needless to say, are still closely attached to the Westphalian international system as well as to the realist framework. But it could be argued that the realism embedded in SCO is at least not the hard-core Hobbesian version as described by some scholars as “particularly acute” in Chinese foreign policy (Lanteigne, 2005: 135-141).

It has become fashionable to invoke Rudyard Kipling’s notion of the ‘Great Game’ to describe the renewed political and economic interest in Central Asia. Essentially, this game is played for two prizes. The tangible prizes are the immense energy resources of the Caspian Sea and the possibility to transport them via pipeline to the markets of South and East Asia, instead of

⁴² For a detailed discussion of instrumental and normative-contractual order, see (Alagappa, 2003).

moving them westward. The Caspian Sea has proven oil reserves of up to 32.8 billion barrels and a potential of up to 218.8 billion barrels. With 232 trillion cubic feet, its proven gas reserves are comparable to those of Saudi Arabia.⁴³ The intangible prize lies in Southeast Asia's geo-strategic significance. Even in the information age, geographic proximity remains relevant to project power (Gray, 1996: 247:260; and Libicki, 1996: 261: 273). If we see it from the regional hegemony point of view, three reasons can be said to motivate China to bargain of mutual accommodation with Russia rather than to challenge it. They are:

- *First*, Central Asia's energy resources can help satisfy China's ever-growing energy needs.⁴⁴ A benign Russian posture makes it easier for China to pursue the active energy diplomacy in Central Asia that it has begun several years ago.⁴⁵
- *Secondly*, Central Asia's geo-strategic significance has not been lost on Islamic armed non-state actors either. These groups are establishing a network of mutual support (e.g. for training, arms procurement, and intelligence) in order to more effectively challenge governments from the Caucasus to South Asia. China is currently experiencing this in Xinjiang, where it is confronted with a Uyghurs self-determination movement (Yuan, 2003:128).⁴⁶ If the Uyghurs managed to secede from China they would not only take one-sixth of China's territory with them, but also China's bridge to the energy resources of Central Asia, its nuclear testing grounds and the oil reserves that Xinjiang itself is presumed to harbor (McNeal, 2001).
- *Third*, stability in Central Asia combined with secured access to the region allows China to concentrate on Taiwan and the South China Sea (Yuan, 2003:129).

⁴³ Figures according to United States Energy Information Administration, *Caspian Sea Region: Key Oil and Gas Statistics*, August 2003, accessed on 5 June 2005 at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspstats.html>.

⁴⁴ Having recently surpassed Japan, China is now the second biggest oil importer in the world after the U.S. See BBC, *China fears over Siberia pipeline*, 24 February 2004, accessed on 5 March 2006, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3516129.stm>.

⁴⁵ In 1997, for instance, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought 60 % of Kazakhstan's Aktyubinsk Oil Company for US\$ 4,3 billion. In 2003 both countries signed an agreement to build a pipeline of 3000 km linking Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, See (Yuan, 2003:128).

⁴⁶ What is today Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has only become part of China in 1884 when Qing Dynasty troops finally overcame the fierce resistance of the Uyghurs living in what was then East Turkestan. Since 1949, the Chinese government has systematically resettled ethnic Han Chinese to Xinjiang in order to gradually incorporate it into the Chinese heartland. This strategy has only exacerbated tensions resulting in an upward-spinning spiral of Uighur separatist violence countered by Chinese repression (McNeal, 2001).

There is no doubt that SCO is one of important direction and a vital component of China's foreign policy strategy. Determination of China's interests in the SCO, on the one hand, depends on the possibility the organization itself can offer and, on the other hand, depends on the objectives and tasks of China's overall foreign strategy. On these grounds, it can be said that China's main interests in the SCO or China's orientation of the organization should be as follows in the current stage: economic interests and strategic importance to China;⁴⁷ SCO as a main link between China and the Central Asia;⁴⁸ SCO as a mechanism for cooperation between China and Russia.⁴⁹ But apart from the above three important orientations to the organization; China's most important interests in recent years regards to SCO is security perspective and to respond to the threat posed by extremists, separatists and terrorists in the Central Asian regions particularly in the Xinjiang Autonomous region.

It can be said that China's security interests in the SCO fall into three categories: *first*, is to guarantee China's territorial integration and national unification; *second*, is to crack down on transnational crimes and to stabilize China's northwestern areas and *third*, is to strengthen security in border areas and build a good peripheral environment. Safeguarding China's territorial integration and national unification is the core (*White Paper on China's National Defense: 2000*). Here, safeguarding China's territorial integration and national unification refers to crackdown on

⁴⁷ Energy import concerns China's long-term economic development. With the expansion of China's economic scale, a rise of energy import will be unavoidable. Reliable energy guarantee has been a strategic issue playing an important part in China's future economic security. Central Asia is one of the most important sources of energy in the world and adjoins China. This is a rare convenient condition to China. If it enables Central Asia to become its reliable energy supply base through the SCO, that will be a great achievement (MacNeal, 2001).

⁴⁸ In view of the important position of Central Asia in its national and energy security, China needs to hold its ground, take root and expand and consolidate its presence steadily and sustained in the region. Central Asia is very close to China geographically and has had close contacts with the latter in history. But it was part of Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union in over 100 years and in this region independent country only emerged in recent 10 years. So, in a sense, direct connections between China and the Central Asian region has just begun again. The SCO has offered a unique framework for cooperation between China and Central Asian countries. Within this framework, China can develop long-term, extensive and all-round cooperation with Central Asian countries in fields such as politics, security, economy and humanities. Through this kind of cooperation, it can resume and develop close relations with the Central Asian region they had in history. China and Russia both have immediate interests in Central Asia (MacNeal, 2001).

⁴⁹ To Russia, Central Asia is its backyard. Russia has special interests and influences in the region, which occupies the primary position in Russian foreign strategy. After Putin assumed office, Russian determination to resume its special position in the Central Asian region and intensity has increased. To China, Central Asian countries are its neighbors. There is an over-3000-kilometers-long border between them. China cannot but develop close relations with Central Asian countries, enter this region and increase its influence there. So, it is unavoidable for China and Russia to meet in Central Asia (Blank, 2003; Gray, 1996).

terrorism, separatism and extremism. As to China, the three evil forces have mainly appeared in its Xinjiang ethnic separatist activities. The SCO provides a more active and realistic way to crack down on Xinjiang ethnic separatist forces.

Li Wei writes that 'in recent years, "East Turkistan" terrorist forces in Xinjiang area of China have been rather active in Central Asia and South Asia. They have close links with extremist religious forces and terrorist organizations in Central Asia like Taliban, Wahabi, "Islam Baathist Party" of Tajikistan and "Islam Movement of Uzbekistan" and have got funds directly from bin Laden and Al-Qaeda' (CIISS and HIR, 2004: 332-334). He too writes that "in Xinjiang, China pursues the policy of autonomy of minority nationalities. In accordance with the stipulations of the constitution, Uyghurs as the principal ethnic group in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region enjoy a wide range of rights to autonomy....In the course of cracking down on the terrorist crimes committed by "East Turkistan", our law-enforcement organs have firmly carried out the policy of ethnic equality, ethnic unity and common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups and have protected the legitimate rights and interests of the people of all nationalities" (CIISS and HIR, 2004:334-335).

Recently, China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has taken many repressive measures against the "three forces" of separatism, terrorism and religious extremism to protect its economic development. In response to the rise of terrorist activities, Chinese government has actively sought the cooperation of both the SCO and non-SCO members. As one might expect, the Chinese government has been especially successful in gaining such support by conducting joint military drills with the other neighbouring countries and mutual security guarantees. The following cases can be cited.

On 23 August 2003, a successful anti-terrorism exercise was conducted in a mountainous area in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, with the participation of the PLA units, the Armed Police Force, civilian police, militia and local governments (Su and Li, *PLA Daily*: 3 September 2003). Even, 27 military observers from 15 countries including the U.S, Russia, the U.K, France, Germany, Israel, South Africa and Pakistan came to watch and participate in a combined tactical exercise in Zhurihe base in Inner Mongolia performed by the armored brigade from the Beijing Military Area Command. The exercise was the first of its kind to be open to foreign military observers (Su and Li, *PLA Daily*: 3 September 2003). The Foreign Affairs Office

of the Ministry of National Defense feels that the invitation to the foreign military observers to watch the exercise was designed to increase military exchanges and cooperation between China and the rest of the world, to adjust to new military changes in the world and to build up friendship and mutual confidence. The First Anti-terrorism Drills Symposium was held in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The symposium was aimed at finding solutions for the army with respect to the task, nature, and operational command, employment of strength and basic operational methods of anti-terrorism operation and enhanced the anti-terrorism capacity of the officers and men (Shi and Su, *PLA Daily*: 26 August 2003).

“Coalition-2003” was the first multilateral anti-terrorism military exercise within the framework of the SCO and resulted from the efforts of the heads of the SCO countries in fighting international terrorism. Cao Gangchuan, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, state councilor and minister of national defense, signed the "Memorandum on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States Armed Forces Anti-terrorism Exercises" with ministers of national defense of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan at the summit meeting of the SCO member countries in Shanghai on 29 May 2003 (Liang and Du, *PLA Daily*: 14 August 2003). It is equally important to mention that "Coalition-2003" was a result and success of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter" and the "Shanghai Convention on Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism and the Memorandum". It evolved in two phases: one was from 6 August to 8 in Ucharal, Kazakhstan and the other was from 11 August to 12 in the Ili area, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China. The first phase involved exercises against hijackers that held a passenger plane and eliminating terrorists across the borders. The second phase involved hostage rescue operation and destroying terrorist camps. In both phases, the SCO member countries carried out joint command and live ammunition exercises (Gong and Du, *PLA Daily*: 13 August 2003). Commanders from the five countries commanded their joint forces to encircle and annihilate the terrorists by using special anti-terrorism equipment, information technology, helicopters, tanks, infantry combat vehicles and self-propelled artilleries. Soldiers from different countries virtually became integrated in the exercise in terms of thinking, organization and actions. Through the exercises they enhanced their friendship, strengthened their confidence and promoted their cooperation (Gong and Du, *PLA Daily*: 13 August 2003).

The special features of this joint exercise were: *first*, the plan of the exercise was simply aimed at fighting regional terrorism; *second*, in the exercise, a small number of special elite troops

were employed, high-tech means and modern weapons displayed unrivalled prowess; *third*, principles of psychological warfare and strategic concepts were also applied; and *finally*, different arms, military police, public security police, militia and local governments all took part in the exercise. The troops from different countries in the exercises were under the same command system, and they shared information, intelligence and communications systems and coordinated their actions (Gong and Du, *PLA Daily*: 13 August 2003). Overall it can be said that "Coalition-2003" was designed to improve the joint performance of the SCO member countries in military anti-terrorism maneuvers and explored ways for future cooperation. On 14 November 2003, Lhasa joint Counter-terrorism exercise, code named "Himalayas 03", was held by "thousands" of forces of the PLA and armed police and in 24 November 2003, Nanning in Guangxi province counter-terror joint exercise with about 2,000 personnel was held (*PLA Daily*, 25 November 2005).

Another landmark joint exercise was the "Peace Mission 2005". It was an unprecedented event involving 10,000 servicemen from China and Russia, was launched in the Russian port city of Vladivostok on 18 August and moved to the Chinese soil the day after (*Xinhua*, 22 August 2005). The main purpose of this *Peace Mission 2005* was to deepen the Sino-Russian mutual understanding, mutual trust, enhance mutual friendship, strengthen cooperation and coordination between the two countries, especially between the two militaries in defense and security fields, carry out drills and training them against the evil forces like *international terrorism, separatism and extremism*, and to meet various international crisis (Panda, 2005). The relevance of this mission should be seen from the view of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also, which was initiated by the Chinese and Russian leaders to check the rising separatists, extremists and terrorist activities in the Central Asian border areas and moreover to check the growing US influence in the region.

These above mentioned joint military exercises corresponds with SCO's list of priorities which includes such tasks as to develop more profound cooperation in safeguarding peace, strengthening of regional security as well as acting counter to the threats of terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trade, and organized crimes and future crisis. In his article to the Russian magazine *Foreign Economic Relations*, Secretary General of SCO, Zhang Deguang writes that the significant result of SCO can be seen from its external links and contacts. From the moment of its establishment, the SCO attaches the great importance to the establishment of close connections with the United Nations Organization and considers it as priority direction in the field of external

contacts of the SCO. In December 2005 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been granted an observer status in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

With the growth and success of SCO since 2001 in countering terrorism, questions were raised as to whether and how the group would expand its membership. The only former Soviet Central Asian Republics outside of the SCO, Turkmenistan, has opted for a largely neutral role in regional affairs and has no immediate ambitions to join the group. But other major countries in the Asian regions like India and Pakistan have shown interest to SCO since 2000 (*ITAR-TASS*, 26 February 2003; *Asia Africa Intelligence Wire*, 9 February 2003).⁵⁰ Facing constant threats from the Islamic extremist groups, India has strong strategic interests in creating stability in Central Asia and it wants its burgeoning population to have secure access to Central Asia's energy resources. The present SCO members have signaled however, that they currently do not intend to admit new members "until [the SCO] stands on its own feet" (*ITAR-TASS*, 3 March 2003).⁵¹ But the true reason in connection to India's entry as a full-fledged member lies in the diametrically opposed policies of both Russia and China to South Asia.

In January 2001, Pakistan made a formal request for admission to the Shanghai Five and the head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt-General Mahmud Ahmed, contacted China directly to gauge China's support for Pakistan's request (*Dawn*, 4 January 2001). Responding to the question put by *Beijing Review* reporter that 'China and Russia have intensified cooperation on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism under the framework of SCO, will you brief us the latest developments?', the Russian Ambassador to China replied, "we have already established an anti-terrorism body under the framework of SCO, and the urgent task for us now is implementation. We are working on a shred information database which can be provided to various countries. On this basis, we can fight terrorism more effectively....Meanwhile, other important countries-Iran, India and Pakistan will join SCO as observers. These countries are expected to bring their important roles into full play in attacking terrorism" (*Beijing Review*, 2005:12). However, recently both India and Pakistan have been granted an observer status by the SCO members, but doubts still prevails from the China's perspective regarding the inclusion of Pakistan

⁵⁰ On January 3, 2001 Pakistan formally requested observer status to the SCO. India-friendly Tajikistan opposed this and despite strong Chinese lobbying the request was not granted (*ITAR-TASS*, 26 February 2003, *Asia Africa Intelligence Wire*, 9 February 2003).

⁵¹ Quoting Russian national coordinator Vitaly Vorobyov (*ITAR-TASS*, 3 March 2003).

and/or India. Clearly it would create more problems for China and SCO: *first*, including both countries would present an entirely new set of security issues, centering on the conflict in Kashmir, which both SCO and China would initially be ill-prepared to address; *second*, including these two sizeable regional powers would potentially dilute China's now-extensive influence within the SCO, especially since both India and Pakistan have been anxious to improve ties with the Central Asian Republics; *third*, admitting Pakistan and not India would heighten the international perception the SCO was developing a partisan strategic organization, an impression which China has consistently attempted to dispel.

From Russia's perspective, Pakistan is always seen as a nation who support the rise of Islamic extremism and as a result Russia feels that Pakistan would support Islamic extremism on the territory of the former Soviet Union just like it had done in Afghanistan. But Russia might therefore be willing to support Pakistan's membership bid, if India can also join. From China's perspective, India's membership as a full fledged member in SCO would create enough chance for India to check the terrorist incidents in the Kashmir valley. So the point which gets interesting to be examined in our next case study is the stand of the Chinese government on the issue of terrorism in the Kashmir valley vis-à-vis South Asia.

Apart from the issue of terrorism, which is a common threat for the entire region, the tense India-Pakistan relationship over the Kashmir issue, the nuclear status of both countries and USA's military presence in Asia, have made the situation very complex. The next chapter intends to examine how all these factors more or less have also had an impact on China's perspectives and relations with the region. However, what makes the next case study "China's stand on terrorism in Kashmir vis-à-vis South Asia" more interesting is that after 9/11, South Asia has become an important part of the international fight against terrorism. The anti-terrorism war led by India in this region has become complicated by two factors particularly: the first relates to the conflict over Kashmir and, the divergent positions on cross-border terrorism by India and Pakistan; and the second relates to the ambiguous and debatable pro-Pakistan stand of China on the issue of Kashmir as well as terrorism. The PRC's approach to terrorism in South Asia therefore would have to be examined in the context of triangular politics, China's strategic objectives vis-à-vis the South Asian region as well as the emerging contours of a normalizing India-China relationship.

ICSSR

Chapter-III

China's Stand on Cross-border Terrorism in Kashmir

ICSSR

South Asia has been in focus for many strategic issues over the last decade, and most of these issues directly and indirectly have influenced China in terms of its perspective on and relations with the region. The reason is simple: most of the countries in the region are important neighbors and shares borders with China. South Asia entered a new period after 9/11 and has acquired strategic importance in the global war against terrorism. A Chinese expert, Xu Changzhi,

Associate Research Fellow of China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CISS), writes that ‘in terms of the area of terrorist attacks, the activities of international terrorist forces have extended to the whole world...in recent years, most of the major terrorist incidents has taken place in West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia, and there has emerged the trend of extending to Europe and even the whole world’ (Xu, 2004: 196). Moreover, the anti-terrorism war has been further compounded with the conflict between India and Pakistan, leading to a continued tension in the South Asian region particularly over the issue of cross-border terrorism over the years.

In the Chinese perspective, the late 1990s saw a gradual shift in the regional balance of power in South Asia with the steady emergence of India and the gradual decline of Pakistan after a series of important events unfolded in the subcontinent (Zhang, 2003: 164). The Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s of the view that “the international community should encourage direct dialogue between India and Pakistan in a more balanced and fair manner, which is the most effective way to lead South Asia towards peace and stability, and these issues have to be resolved one-by-one” (cited in Zhang, 2003: 164). For Zhang Guihong, three factors which are closely interlinked in this region are: terrorism, Kashmir and nuclear/missile proliferation. Li Wei, the director of the Centre for the Counter-terrorism Centre of the CICIR believes that ‘three basic factors are responsible for the terrorist incidents in the Kashmir region and they are: economic backwardness, the geographical history of Kashmir and the religion of the Kashmiri people’, though there are other external influences from international terrorist groups like Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden’.⁵²

Looking from a larger perspective, except Maldives, South Asian countries are multi-national and multi-religious. Most of them have serious ethnic and religious contradictions. In recent years, the political situations in South Asia have been characterized by turbulence and violence. Conflicts between religious factions, ethnic contradictions, strife between party factions, terrorist activities and separatist’s movements have risen one after another. The region has been regarded as the place with the highest rate of political, ethnic and religious violence in the world which have often been in the news as the origin of terrorism (Du, 2002: 137). As races and religion in South Asia are usually distributed across the national boundaries, ethnic or religious issues in

⁵² My interaction with Li Wei in Beijing.

one country often spread to others and has even caused various separatists and terrorist incidents and intensified contradictions between relevant countries (Du, 2002: 133-140). These terrorist incidents have not only hampered thousands of lives in the region and blocked social progress and economic development of South Asian countries, but also has severely jeopardized the relations between relevant countries like India, Pakistan and China and exerted extremely unfavorable effects on regional peace and security.

Today South Asia remains one of the most disturbed regions in the world not only due to the problem of terrorist incidents in the Kashmir region but also due to the constant tensions between India and Pakistan (both have nuclear weapons) on the Kashmir issue. Terrorism (*kongbu zhuyi*) has emerged as a “low cost option with a high cost-benefit ratio” (South Asia Assessment: 2003: www.satp.org) which is further compounded by the shared border with Afghanistan, which is generally accepted as the base for international terrorism by many countries. According to Shireen M. Mazari, ‘in the post-9/11 incident, three types of terrorism within the South Asian region can be observed: *first*, transnational terrorism, which has linkages across national borders and subscribing to an international agenda; *second*, local and sub-national extremist groups that are prevalent across most South Asian states; and *third*, state terrorism’ (Mazari, 2004: 352-356). Apart from the issue of terrorism, which is a common threat for the entire region, the tense India-Pakistan relationship over the Kashmir issue, the nuclear status of both countries and USA’s military presence in Asia after 9/11, have made the situation very complex.

Few Chinese experts also voice similar opinions. Zhao Gancheng, Senior Fellow and Director of India-South Asia Studies of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies opines that the 9/11 event has dramatically changed the situation in South Asia. According to him, the following changes can be seen:

- *First*, ‘the practical need for striking Islamic extremists in the region has made the US reexamine its policy towards Pakistan;
- *Second*, as a non-traditional threat, the issue of terrorism has become an important priority for nearly all major nations...the interactions among the relevant nations in South Asia have thus added new complexity to the disputed focus on Kashmir;
- *Third*, as an outcome of the 9/11, the collapse of the Taliban should help establish a new order in the region, in which the Islamic extremists’ activities would have to go underground. This should be a positive development with regard to stability in the region if India and Pakistan would utilize this opportunity to look for new approach to the Kashmir dispute;

- *Fourth*, the US victory over the Taliban and its continuous presence in the region may help establish a new framework for security, provided that the superpower would take into account the fundamental interests of South Asian nations, rather than only its own interests;
- *Fifth*, arguably, there are hawkish elements in the policy establishment of both India and Pakistan, who try to use the development following the 9/11 to agitate more violence in the region for various purposes' (Zhao, 2002: 17-19).

A senior South Asian scholar, Wang Dehua is of the opinion that 'South Asia is one of the birth places of terrorism and both China and South Asia share this common threat just by virtue of sharing their borders with Afghanistan, the state of Osama bin Laden's bases of international terrorism. Having a common threat can also be a positive thing because cooperation by like-minded nations can help in combating the common adversary and strengthening future ties' (Wang, 2002: 44). He also writes that "...after the war against Osama bin Laden and Taliban in Afghanistan won the phased victory greater attention has been drawn to terrorism in South Asia, people are increasing worried about a new war between India and Pakistan caused by divergent views over terrorism" (Wang, 2002: 44-45). Zhang Guihong writes that 'post-9/11 South Asia has witnessed changing US-Pakistani and US-Indian relations but unchanged India-Pakistan tensions, and these would undoubtedly influence China's interests and goals in South Asia' (Zhang, 2003: 165).

Cheng Ruisheng, a former Chinese Ambassador to India and Myanmar writes that 'South Asia has entered a new period after 9/11 and became an important site of the anti-terrorism war. The anti-terrorism war was further compounded with the conflict between India and Pakistan, leading to a continued tension between the two countries in 2002....China, together with other major outside countries, has tried hard to promote peace between India and Pakistan, thus playing a positive role in South Asia' (Cheng, 2003: 34). Cheng also writes that though the anti-terrorism alliance on the question of Afghanistan led by the United States has won a preliminary victory, with the fall of the Taliban regime and the founding of the Karzai government, this anti-terrorism war will be a long drawn one due to the following reasons:

- 'The Karzai government is facing a number of difficulties and the separatist warlord regimes will not end within a short period...with still quite a few places for the hiding of terrorists;
- A large number of terrorists have crossed into Pakistan and, divided into groups, they are active in many places with support by religious extremist forces of Pakistan;

- The natures of the terrorist incidents are very unpredictable and also it is very difficult to guard against them. The sudden attacks on Indian Parliament, Indian army barracks in Kashmir and on a Christian school and a Christian hospital in other cities of Pakistan in 2002 are some of the examples;
- In South Asia, there are sensitive issues like Kashmir, communal conflicts, ethnic problems and sharp disparity between the rich and the poor, offering soil for long-term existence of terrorism (Cheng, 2003: 34).

Undoubtedly, the developments in the South Asian region in the aftermath of 9/11 have also had an impact on China's perspectives and relations with the region. With the escalation of India-Pakistan conflicts, South Asia has become the focus of worldwide attention. Big powers have been engaging in frequent diplomatic activities in this region, indicating that they are striving for a bigger say in international affairs and for an expansion of their influence after the 9/11 incident (*Beijing Review*, 7 February 2002:10). Moreover, the anti-terrorism war led by India in this region has become complicated by two factors particularly: the first relates to the conflict over Kashmir and, the divergent positions on cross-border terrorism by India and Pakistan; and the second relates to the ambiguous and debatable pro-Pakistan stand of China on the issue of Kashmir as well as terrorism.

From India's perspective, it is clear from the incidents of many years that India continues to be a victim of cross-border terrorism that has been sponsored by Pakistan for a long time. Indeed, time and again international attention has been attracted, but not to the two countries' different position on Kashmir where cross-border terrorism is a potential problem, but to the fact that the two countries are nuclear states and to the potential disaster that could potentially follow. It thus turns out to be in Ehsan Ahrari's words the "waiting game" (Ahrari, 2002).⁵³ Du Youkang writes that 'the South Asian subcontinent has become "the region where a nuclear war is most possible to break out" as a result of increasingly acute nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan' (Du, 2002: 133-136). He further writes that the post-9/11 geo-strategic situation in Central Asia and its fall out on South Asia would certainly add to China's concern regarding US influence in the South Asian region (Du, 2002:134-136).

⁵³ Ahrari argues that so far, the game favors Delhi, but South Asian politics have their own perverse logic, which may turn against one actor and favor another.

In the backdrop of US's 'war on terror', some important geopolitical developments have emerged in Central Asia. The Chinese scholars have linked this development in their Central Asian periphery to the South Asian periphery where there are widening Indo-US relations as also strengthening of US ties with China's long trusted ally Pakistan. While there continues to be a strong US military presence in East Asia, the geopolitical developments in Central Asia and its fall out on South Asia are perceived by China as geopolitical encirclement (Lin, 2002: 10). In addition, as pointed out by Wang Baofu, '...as combating international terrorism became a top priority of US foreign policy after the 9/11 incident, Pakistan's position in the US security strategy has risen' (*Beijing Review*, 7 February 2002). In the opinion of Wang Guoqiang, another expert of the same university opines that 'with traditional interests in South Asia, China is worried about falling victim to problems caused by tensions and conflicts between India and Pakistan. On the one hand, China and India have significant contributions, such as the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", on the other hand, China and Pakistan have formed close relations of strategic cooperation in the long-term struggle against hegemonism. Therefore, China hopes that its relations with both will not be damaged due to conflicts or a war between India and Pakistan, nor does it want to see the India-Pakistan conflict turning into a war by extremist religious forces, which will affect the internal stability of China' (*Beijing Review*, 7 February 2002: 11).

Undoubtedly, the tense situation in South Asia has had a great impact on China at both decision-making as well as public levels. Although over the years it has been observed that the priority of Chinese foreign policy is to improve its economic cooperation with the South Asian countries particularly with India but at the same time China has adopted a policy of developing separate relations with other countries too especially Pakistan from strategic perspective. However, to maintain a stable economic momentum with the South Asian countries, the challenge before the Chinese government has been to react and respond to the crisis that prevails in the south Asian region particularly the disputed issues between Indian and Pakistan. In this regard it is clear that responding to the ongoing conflict situation in the Kashmir region particularly to the issue of cross-border terrorism between Indian and Pakistan has been a great challenge for the Chinese government.

This chapter intends to study China's role, position and response to these acts of terrorists, separatists and other violent activities which have grown with terrorism over the years in the Kashmir valley. This study carries the relevance for examining China's position in the region due

to Xinjiang and Tibet's geographical proximity with both South Asian and Central Asian countries and tries to examine whether there is a linkage in the Chinese response to terrorism taking into consideration the network and connection between the terrorist groups in Kashmir with the separatists groups in Xinjiang. The further proceedings of this chapter would be divided into two major parts: part I would look after China's stand on Kashmir as a disputed area; while part II will discuss China's stand on the cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.

PART-I

China's Stand on Kashmir

South Asia is one of earliest regions with which China has a history of exchanges. The former Chinese Ambassador to New Delhi, Sun Heping once quoted a famous Chinese phrase: "go to the west heaven for scriptures", and by it he meant that 'someone who wants to upgrade his learning must go to the west heaven and that is South Asia' (Sun, 2004).⁵⁴ From geographical point of view, China shares more than 3000 kilometers of border with some South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, and enjoys friendly relations and cooperation in economic, trade and other fields with South Asian Countries. Sun Heping further argues that "China and South Asian countries enjoy long-standing friendly relations and cooperation. The Chinese government is ready to work together with the governments of all South Asian countries to promote the cause of peace and development" (Sun, 2004).⁵⁵

China's policy towards South Asia falls within the framework of its periphery policy and its bilateral relationship with major actors in the region like; India, Pakistan, Bangladesh etc. Since the end of the cold war, the security situation in South Asia had undergone great changes. These changes in the South Asian security situation not only relate directly to the stability and security in the border areas in Southwest China, but also having considerably important impact on China's peripheral environment as a whole in the circumstances of involvement of external big powers (Du, 2002: 126). Undoubtedly China shares a common interest in the South Asian region. In this

⁵⁴ The phrase is derived from the legend of Master Monk Xuanzang in China's Tang Dynasty more than a thousand years ago, who became a well-known scholar in ancient China after learning Sanskrit scriptures during his visit to Nepal and India (*The Telegraph*, 18 June 2004).

⁵⁵ These are the excerpts of the address by the Chinese Ambassador at the Nepal Council of World Affairs on 28 May 2004. For more details, please refer (Sun, 2004, also see, *The Telegraph*, 18 June 2004, South Asia Media Net: China and South Asia, at http://www.southasianmedia.net/index_opinion4.cfm?id=36592, accessed on 27 August 2005).

context, it would be pertinent to examine China's special interest in Kashmir. Before embarking on the Chinese position on Kashmir, the India-Pakistan dispute and the problem of cross-border terrorism, it would be useful to state the facts that led to the current problem as well as the situation that prevails.

It can be said that the 1962 Sino-Indian border war remains one of the most critical point in the formulation of China's policy on Kashmir vis-à-vis South Asia. From bilateral perspective, there is still no mutually agreed Line of Control (LOC) between China and India. From the Indian perspective, the true boundary between the two countries is the one made known by it in September 1959.⁵⁶ From this period, it is seen that the Chinese government formally put forward claims to over 128,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. On the other hand, India contended that China has occupied about 50,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, Aksai Chin-Ladakh in the western sector and in the middle sector. In addition an area of about 5,000 square kilometers of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) has been ceded to China in 1963 (Kondapalli, 2002: 135). These disagreements between the two countries have gradually shaped China's distinct policy and position on Kashmir over the years.

The most important aspect of this 1962 war which is very relevant from our thesis point of view is the Western sector boundary between China and India. The Indian side continuously argues that China occupies about 38,000 square km. of territory in this sector (Gupta, 1981: 51-54). But from the Chinese side, the entire Western sector commences from Karakoram Pass in the north down to the area in the south of the Ari district of Tibet, Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh (Wang, 1998:119). The Aksai Chin and other contiguous areas cover about 30,000 sq km. in this sector which offers a strategic inroad into China's Western region Xinjiang (Easen: *South Asia Media Net*). In 1951, the Chinese army started to construct a road linking Xinjiang and Tibet, which goes through the Akshai Chin, an area claimed by India. Most important thing to mention here is that India was not aware of this road construction till a Chinese magazine published a map in 1957 showing the road connection between Xinjiang and Tibet (Jones, 2002:72, and Wang, 1998: 119-120).

⁵⁶ See the *White Paper* issued by the Government of India during the 1962 war with China on the Indian official position on the boundaries.

From overall perspective, China's stand on Kashmir is a result of China's bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. John W. Garver argues that China's policy towards Kashmir has evolved from an "agnostic position in the 1950s", to a "distinctly pro-Pakistan position in the 1960s and 70s, to an increasingly neutral position" since 1978 (Garver, 2004: 1). The most interesting part of China's stand can be seen during the India-Pakistani war over Kashmir when the Chinese demonstrated their support for Pakistan's national security with military assistance. Moreover, from 1964 to 1980, China's stand on Kashmir went in favour of Pakistan by acknowledging the fact that the people of Kashmir are entitled by various UN resolutions in 1948 and 1949 "an exercise of self-determination" to join freely either with India or Pakistan. (Garver, 2004:2).

China's stand on Kashmir began to change in the late 1970s as both China and India started the normalization process with the visit of Indian foreign minister A.B. Vajpayee. China's neutral position on the Kashmir issue says Garver, can be evident from Deng Xiaoping's June 1980 statement that 'the Kashmir issue was a bilateral issue left over from history between India and Pakistan, and should be resolved peacefully' (cited in Garver, 2001:228). By 1990, China's position was more open and neutral towards India during the Kashmir crisis, when its leaders started slowly ignoring to refer the UN resolutions on Kashmir (Yuan, 2005). Jiang Zemin made an important speech after praising the Sino-Pakistani relations in the Pakistan senate that "...South Asian countries will treat one another as equal and live harmoniously, thus becoming exemplary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in practice; and that they will settle their differences and disputes peacefully in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences, mutual understanding, and mutual accommodation" (cited in Graver, 2001: 20).

Nevertheless, another relevant fact in this context is how China has occasionally made policy reversals by endorsing Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue, when it intended to check India. During the May 1998 nuclear test, Zhou Gang, Chinese Ambassador to India in an interview said "China's position on Kashmir has been consistent. The Kashmir dispute is a historical legacy, over which India and Pakistan have had difference sine 1947. The UN has adopted several resolutions on the Kashmir issue. India and Pakistan have come to an understanding on the basis of Simla Agreement. The Chinese side sincerely hopes that India and Pakistan will resume dialogue that is open and frank in order to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully" (cited in Ranganathan and Khanna, 2000: 144-145). The most interesting statement comes after the Pokharan test from Qin Huasun, China's Ambassador to UN, when referring to the Security

Council meeting on Kashmir: India and Pakistan, he said that "...should look for a solution....in accordance with the principles of the relevant UN resolutions and the Shimla Agreement and through peaceful negotiations" (*UN Security Council*, 6 June 1998). For Garver, China's reversal yet again, in its stand on Kashmir to refer the UN resolutions is a part of its policy to check India on nuclear and other programmes. But the real change in China's stand on Kashmir can be seen in response to the Kargil conflicts.

If we take Zhou Gang's view on the question that whether *China recognize Kashmir as a part of India?*, he replied that "The Kashmir is an issue left behind by history, over which India and Pakistan have had differences since their independence. The United Nations has adopted several resolutions on the Kashmir issue and India and Pakistan have reached the Shimla Agreement. China's position on the Kashmir issue is consistent and known to all. We sincerely hope that India and Pakistan would talk to each other in a frank and candid manner and resolve the issue peacefully through consultations". This statement though is very similar to the other above mentioned statements but there is a specific reference here to international norms as part of the Chinese overall assessment and position.

The Chinese stand was perhaps most aptly summarized in a statement by China's foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan, which he reportedly made during his meeting with his Pakistan counterpart Sartaj Aziz, during the latter's visit to Beijing on 11 June 1999. To quote him;

"The Kashmir issue is a complicated affair with a long history and should be, and could only be, solved through peaceful means. China hopes Pakistan and India will find an effective approach to bringing about a *political solution* to the Kashmir issue through negotiations and consultations" (italics added) (*Xinhua*, 11 June 1999).

On 30 June 1999, in another major statement the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said that "we sincerely hope that stemming from a desire to safeguard peace and stability in the South Asian region, India and Pakistan earnestly respect the Line of Control in Kashmir and seek, according to the spirit of the Lahore Declaration, a just and reasonable solution on this issue and other disputes" (Bhattacharya, 2001: 457).

Traditionally, compared to East Asia, South Asia has often been a secondary priority in China's foreign policy. Zhang Guihong views that 'the emergence of India-coupled with the decline of Pakistan since the late 1990s and the changes after 9/11-launched South Asia into an important aspect in the Chinese foreign policy making. In regards to South Asia, China has two

major interests in the region: regional balance and stability in South Asia and Pakistan's healthy development, but on the Kashmir issue, "China should ask both India and Pakistan to resume direct dialogue and develop more flexibility positions with an eye toward solving the issue" (Zhang, 2003: 164-166). Jing-dong Yuan writes that by the early 1990s, "China's position became unequivocal that the Kashmir issue is a bilateral matter to be solved by India and Pakistan through peaceful means" (Jing-dong, 2005). He also views that China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader context of its South Asian policy in general and where this policy fits in China's global strategies and its individual relationships with India and Pakistan in particular (Yuan, *Asian Research Article*: 2005). It is also argued that 'the conflict between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a "near-irrational insistence on territory", but other factors like Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Islamism also promote these quarrels and disputes' (Acharya, 2005:70-71).

Former Chinese Ambassador to India, Cheng Ruisheng in his recent *Foreign Affairs Journal* article "On the Peaceful Resolution of the Kashmir Problem" writes that "...Kashmir issue should be resolved only through talks and through peaceful means...theoretically, this is already settled. The Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration both clearly stipulated that both parties must use peaceful means to resolve differences" (Cheng, 2005: online). He too believes that 'in regards to the disputes and conflicts between India and Pakistan, China has followed the policy of "urging peace" and "promoting dialogue" and in future this policy of China will contribute to peace and stability in the South Asian region' (Cheng, 2005: online).

Du Youkang is of the opinion that the policy orientations of big powers towards South Asia will not only lead to changes in their relations with relevant South Asian countries, but also play a role in this region's balance of power, thus affecting the future security pattern in the region. He is of the opinion that incidents like Kargil conflict, nuclear tests, enlarged scale of Kashmir conflicts and increasing terrorist activities in the region will make the following impacts on China:

- 'South Asian nuclear tests and arms race pose potential and indirect threats to China's military security;
- The Kashmir conflict and internationalization of Afghan civil war have made China's western border areas face two "hot spots";
- The Kashmir issue remains a sensitive issue involving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

- Proposals for speedy resolution of Sino-Indian border issue have emerged in India after its nuclear tests' (Du, 2002: 143-149).

As Zhao Gancheng points out, 'since the outbreak of Kargil conflict, China has been increasingly aware of the danger of a potential large-scale conflict that would deal a severe blow to China's strategic goal of maintaining a stable periphery' (Zhao, 2002:17). More importantly, 9/11 has shifted the focus of the world to this region. The US-led war against the Taliban regime has also necessitated the South Asian nations clarify their position on terrorism (Zhao, 2002: 17).

From Chinese perspective it can be argued that the emerging situation in this region especially after 9/11, provides both opportunity and challenge for China. As terrorism and religious extremism remain a major problem for nearly all the South Asian nations, a strong anti-terrorism stand by these countries could be very useful specially for China in the Xinjiang region. In addition to this, from strategic point of view, South Asia is a region with increasing importance in China's periphery. At the same time, as an independent observer we can say that the international community is likely to encourage such efforts. Clearly a positive development in domestic politics could help bring about good atmosphere for relevant parties over the Kashmir issue. A comprehensive South Asia policy, would require a two-track approach on the part of China: on the one hand, improving China-India relations by adopting positive approach to the existing problems between the two countries, on the other hand, doing what it can on the basis of balancing posture to prevent large-scale conflicts breaking out in the region.

From analytical and academic perspective, questions centre on whether China should get more involved in the region, and if so, what role China could really play. These are some problematic aspects because of both historic legacy and *Realpolitik* considerations. But scholars like Zhao Gancheng believe that large-scale conflicts over Kashmir or anywhere in South Asia would never benefit China's fundamental interests, and no doubt, they would enormously harm conflicting parties (Zhao, 2002:17). As former Chinese President Jiang Zemin said with reference to the problem in South Asia that "some problems that may not be addressed for the moment can be suspended and this would affect normal state to state relations in general" (cited in Cheng, 2005: online). Cheng Ruisheng writes that South Asia as a region has entered a new period after 9/11 and has become an important site for the anti-terrorism war, where China has extended its full cooperation on the issue of international terrorism (Cheng, 2003: 39).

From the above discussion an important thing emerges clearly from the Chinese side, ‘the recent period has witnessed that China is gradually distancing its relations from smaller states of South Asia and becoming increasingly neutral in intra-South Asian affairs. At the same time, it is also witnessed that China finally coming round a full circle and adopting a relatively neutral and, therefore, a pro-India vision on the new South Asian affairs (Singh, 2003: 330). Moreover, it is clear that two issues which shape China’s policy to South Asia are: India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir and nuclear issue. Both these issue more and less links with the issue of cross-border terrorism in the region. But questions that arise in this context are how is China’s response to “terrorism in South Asia” different from its original strategic policy to South Asia? What are the divergent factors that shape China’s policy response to the cross-border terrorism in Kashmir? This second part of this chapter will try to analyze the Chinese government’s stand on the most sensitive issue of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.

PART-II

China’s Position on Terrorism in South Asia: Special Reference to Kashmir

China’s position on terrorism in the South Asian region especially in Kashmir can be discussed under two categories: (1) China’s response to various ethnic, religious, violent incidents in the pre-9/11 period (2) China’s response to terrorism after 9/11.

As we discussed in our previous part that one of the most important reason for China’s interest in Kashmir has been China’s ‘restive Islamic population in its Xinjiang Autonomous region bordering Kashmir which creates both a geographical and Islamic connection linking China’s internal security with both India and Pakistan’ (Jing-dong, 2005). Historically, it can be said that this larger region had been at the cross-roads of the evolutionary flow of Islamic influences amongst Central-South-Western Asian Islamic cultures. To understand China’s position on terrorism in Kashmir particularly, we have to look briefly at the historical background when China termed the Kashmir people’s war as self-determination.

Through out the 1960s, China endorsed the Kashmir people’s war of self-determination. The notable example of this Chinese support can be seen in the article published on 5 September 1965 in *Renmin ribao* (People’s Daily) which reads, “the Chinese people deeply sympathize with the just struggle of the people of Kashmir for their right to self-determination...” (cited in Garver,

2005:3). In another editorial in the same newspaper, it was published that “the Chinese government and people...resolutely support...the Kashmir people’s struggle for national self-determination...the Kashmir people will surely realize their desire for national self-determination” (cited in Garver, 2005:3). Peter Van Ness of the views that ‘China refused to declare the war in Kashmir a “war of national liberation” in 1960s, which implies that it denied full revolutionary legitimacy under Marxist-Maoist theory’ (Van Ness, 1971:228). By doing so, it can be argued that China ignored to take a stand on whether Kashmir should be a part of India or Pakistan in future.

By the end of 20th century, with the Kargil conflict and Afghan civil war, the people’s war of self-determination in Kashmir (what the Chinese called in 1960s) had gradually resulted in a turbulent situation, fraught with possibility of large-scale armed conflicts which has bothered China very much. This has brought China’s western border areas in contact with two “hot spots” of regional conflict with serious implications for China’s internal security. The Chinese concerns can be seen in two ways:

- First, ‘the weapons have flowed into China via Afghanistan and the Kashmir region;
- Second, a large quantity of drugs produced in Afghanistan have flowed into Xinjiang via Afghanistan, its neighbouring Central Asian countries and the Kashmir region and entered China’s interior areas by train, thus bringing social evils such as crimes, corruption and drugs-taking to these areas’ (Du, 2002:145).

Earlier, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji made a similar kind of statement when he commented on China’s reaction to Kargil during his visit to Pakistan, ‘Kashmir is a historical issue involving territorial, ethnic and religious elements which requires to be solved only through peaceful means’(Aneja, 2002: *The Hindu*, online).⁵⁷ But there is slightly difference in the new generation scholarly opinion on Kashmir, where an expert Hu Shisheng views that the activists in Kashmir should be called as “extremist militia”. By this he meant that ‘these militant activists so called “extremist militia” in Kashmir are confronting with the government and where the targets are being the common people’.⁵⁸ Du Youkang argues that the more serious aspect is that “with support of some South Asian religious extremist forces and terrorist organizations (including international

⁵⁷ Atul Aneja, *The Hindu*, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/stories/2002011401030100.htm>

⁵⁸ My interview with Hu Shisheng in Beijing.

terrorist Osama bin Laden), China's minority separatists have colluded with them to conduct wantonly terrorist activities" (Du, 2002:145). In August 1999, a band of Xinjiang national separatists were captured for the first time by anti-Taliban union troop. Reportedly, according to their confession, after they sneaked into the Kashmir region, they first received military training in the Peshawar area of Pakistan and then fought shoulder to shoulder with Taliban in Afghanistan to accumulate experience in actual combats and slipped into Xinjiang to conduct terrorist activities (cited in Du, 2002:145). Some Taliban personages openly claimed that, Afghan tribal tradition forced them to provide sanctuaries for Xinjiang "fugitives" and the so-called guests like Osama bin Laden (Du, 2002:145).

Recently, Chinese Deputy Director of Public Security Ma Mingyue told a group of visiting Pakistani journalists that some members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) have hidden in two Pakistani cities Lahore and Rawalpindi.⁵⁹ Jia Duqiang writes that at present, there are no less than ten separatist organizations operating in the Kashmir area which can be roughly divided into two categories:

- 'One is represented by Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front who seeks complete sovereignty and independence;
- The other represented by Islamic Promoting Association advocating the mergence of the area with Pakistan' (Jia, 2005:137).

Jia Duqiang also pointed out that on 12 January 2002 following the terrorist incidents in India, Pakistan government banned several Islamic extremist organizations such as Justice Army, Muhammad Army (JEM), Saint Follower Army (SSP) and Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Law (TNSM) and these banned organizations have long been conducting terrorist activities in Kashmir Area since 1980s with the thriving of Islamic fundamentalism in the world (Jia, 2005:137). Jia also writes that the national separatism and religious extremism are very closely related each other in South Asia (Jia, 2005:134).

The above mentioned Chinese perception on cross-border terrorism in Kashmir makes this topic more interesting and this chapter rightly place to understand and examine the complexity of

⁵⁹ Citing the case of Hasan Mahsun, who is accused by the Chinese government in connection with bombing a building in Kashgar on 17 June 1996, allegedly escaped to Pakistan using a fake passport and stayed there with the people of Xinjiang before being introduced to Osama Bin Laden. He decided to move to Afghanistan where he remained in a terrorist training camp. Later he was "bumped off by the Pakistani police" (Malik, 30 May 2004).

the policy of Chinese government after 9/11. Under this imperative, it would help us to draw a link between China's pre-9/11 and post-9/11 approach on the issue of terrorism and also we would try to examine to what extent China's position and stand differs from its earlier position on Kashmir and is there any particular pattern of Chinese response to the issue of terrorism. Before 9/11, China did not make any observation on the spurt in terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir. It is predicted that China fears that any statement on Pakistan's militant activities would hurt China's own national interests in the already restive areas like Xinjiang in the north-west which shares its border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. But 9/11 brought in many changes of perception and stance. The Communist Party newspaper *People's Daily* wrote that 'the 9/11 and its aftermath changed the whole trend and triggered a rapid downslide in India-Pakistan relations and the strategic situation in South Asia' (*People's Daily*, online: 16 December 2001). The newspaper also writes that 'disappointed at the U.S. turning to Pakistan for help in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan and worried about reinforcement of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir with possible U.S. support, India lost no time in urging Washington not to forget its suffering from "Pakistan backed cross-border terrorism", an Indian reference to the decade-long militancy in India controlled Kashmir which Pakistan vehemently denied. In return, Pakistan has seized the opportunity to accuse India of exercising "state terrorism" in Kashmir and also trying to take advantage of its domestic crisis' (*People's Daily*, online: 16 December 2001).

Wang Baofu writes that "the United States, considering its own security interests, readjusted its policies toward South Asian countries and started paying more attention to the important role of Pakistan in the anti-terrorism war" (Wang, 2002:13). Wang criticized India for "defining resistance activities in Kashmir as terrorism by taking advantage of the US anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan, thus putting more pressure on Pakistan through the United States," and praised General Musharraf for his "clear-cut attitude toward fighting against international terrorism" (Wang, 2002:13). Such a stance was not unexpected. For almost a decade, China had rejected India's proposal to issue a joint declaration against terrorism lest it be interpreted as a condemnation of Pakistan (*Indian Express*, 27 May 2002:1). But what is significant that the Chinese government in recent times has repeatedly and condemned various terrorist incidents. Especially since 9/11, a number of terrorist attacks has taken place in India and it is interesting to review China's reaction and response to these incidents.

China and the Incident of 13 December 2001; Attack on Indian Parliament: Tensions between India and Pakistan rose sharply after the terrorist attacks at the Jammu and Kashmir assembly in October 2001 and the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001.⁶⁰ *China Daily* writes that “There was no immediate indication of the reason for the attack in a country plagued by a separatist revolt in the disputed state of Kashmir, intermittent political unrest in the rugged northeast and the south and occasional religious unrest” (*China Daily*, 13 December 2001:online). As the crisis unfolded, Pakistan President General Musharraf made three trips to Beijing in less than a year (in December 2001, January 2002, and August 2002) for urgent security consultations with PRC Defense Minister and Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission Chi Haotian, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji and reportedly obtained “firm assurances of support in the event of a war” with India. Chi Haotian declared that Sino-Pakistan friendship was “time tested and “all-weather”. He also said that the strong bond between the armed forces of the two countries would continue further (*Xinhua*, 21 December 2001).

Answering a reporter’s question that *the US and UK have demanded a clear anti-terrorism position from President Musharraf, Does China support them?*, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman said on 8 January 2002 that “...we are against terrorism in whatever form.... We hope that Pakistan would strengthen its cooperation with the international community in this regard.... Otherwise it will not be in the interests of the international endeavor against terrorism.” Replying to another question that whether China concerns with President Musharraf’s definition of “cross-border terrorists as freedom fighters”, the foreign ministry spokesman avoided the question and said “you have touched upon the complicated question of Kashmir... The Kashmir question is left over from history” (Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Press Conference: 8 January 2002).

On an official visit in April 2002 to Iran, Jiang Zemin openly repudiated the US stance against the Iranian and Iraqi regimes, saying, "Our opinion [on terrorism] is not the same as the United States"(Chan, 17 May 2002). In Germany, he told that “We all want to fight terrorism. But the states involved in the fight against terror each have their own specific viewpoint” (Chan, 17 May 2002). Another major response can be seen when answering a question from a reporter during the press conference of the 5th session of the 9th NPC that what role China can play to reduce the

⁶⁰ The attack on the Indian Parliament triggered a major deployment of Indian troops along the border with Pakistan, with Islamabad responding in kind. India warned of retaliatory, punitive military strikes against terrorist camps inside Pakistani-controlled Kashmir (*China Daily*, online: 14 December 2001).

tension in the South Asian region and to solve Kashmir issue, China's Foreign Minister Tang Jianxuan said that "...we always adopt the policy of advising and encouraging peace to both parties...as far as their disputes such as the problem of Kashmir are concerned...it is China's hope that India and Pakistan will continue to work to bring about a political settlement of the problem peacefully and resolve their disputes" (Press Conference, 7 March 2002).

Another major incident of 14 May 2002 terrorist attack on a military base in Jammu resulted with high tensions and tough talk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. On 15 May, a Chinese official accompanying Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan during his visit to Islamabad told Pakistani journalists that China would back Pakistan in any conflict with India (Joseph, 2002:1). Concerned over the "one-sided nature of public appeals" from Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and Tokyo to General Musharraf to halt "cross-border terrorism" into Kashmir, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 27 May 2002 that "the international community should encourage direct dialogue between India and Pakistan in a more balanced and fair manner, which is the most effective way to lead South Asia towards peace and stability" (Joseph, 2002:1). Apparently, the growing threat of nuclear war and the prospect of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic terrorists have made the US lean heavily on Pakistan. In contrast, China repeatedly asked India to do more to end the military stand-off while publicly calling for restraint by both sides and claiming to be even-handed. China continued to covertly side with its long-term ally, however, and is providing military wherewithal to Pakistan.

Cheng Ruisheng is of the opinion that there are deep reasons why the confrontation between India and Pakistan had become so serious this time:

- 'Terrorists intended to provoke a war between India and Pakistan;
- India intended to use the opportunity of the international anti-terrorism struggle to press Pakistan to stop "cross-border terrorism", so that the Kashmir question could be resolved in accordance with India's idea and to realize India's intension to turn the Line of Control in Kashmir into an international boundary;
- Pakistan intended to use the international community for war between India and Pakistan to press India to negotiate the substantial question of Kashmir and to try to internationalize the Kashmir question;
- both India and Pakistan intended to exploit the tension between the two countries to win more support from the masses in their own country' (Cheng, 2003:35-36).

Although China has traditionally supported Pakistan against India, but now in the post-cold war era the Chinese have distanced themselves somewhat from Pakistan in order to cultivate better relations with India. Nevertheless China has a strategic interest in the survival of Pakistan and it will not want to see it drawn into a war which will bring more troubles to China strategically. Scholars like Ma Jiali, expressed confidence that ‘the leaders of both India and Pakistan are not likely to resolve the Indo-Pak dispute by means of a war, and the outbreak of a fourth war between the two South Asian countries is even less likely’ (*Xinhua News Agency*, 3 June 2002).

On the above incidents, *People’s Daily* writes that ‘according to the U.S. intelligence officials and diplomats, Al-Qaeda and Taliban members are helping organize a terror campaign in Kashmir to foment conflict between China and India’ (*People’s Daily*, 29 May 2002). The Chinese daily also writes that “Al-Qaeda’s ability to coordinate terrorist activities in Kashmir worries U.S. officials because it indicates the war in Afghanistan hasn’t put the group out of business. The shift of Pakistani troops to the Indian border leaves U.S. operatives in Western Pakistan without crucial allies to pursue Al-Qaeda leaders that might include Osama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind in the September 11 attacks”. Prior to this incident, on the occasion of the China-India first meeting on Counter-Terrorism dialogue mechanism, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan said that the consultations and cooperation between China and India against terrorism will promote understanding and trust, which is in the interests of both countries (*China Daily*, 24 April 2002).

In this context, China’s relations with Pakistan in counter-terrorism initiatives also started to get shape. In an effort to build confidence with Pakistan China proposed to establish bilateral anti-terrorism consultative mechanism. Referring the existing counter-terrorism consultation mechanism between China and India, which is very conducive to the further bilateral understanding and cooperation, Kong Quan said ‘a similar mechanism between China and Pakistan could be established without any difficulty if needed’. He also added that ‘China and Pakistan enjoy very good relations, and they have maintained close consultations and cooperation in various fields. The Chinese side has noticed the measures taken by Pakistan President Musharraf and the Pakistan government in fighting against terrorism and religious extremists’ (*People’s Daily*, 28 April 2002).

Cheng Ruisheng is of the opinion that a large-scale war between the two countries did not break out because; *first*, the military strength of both India and Pakistan was much greater than that in early 70s of last century when the third war between them was fought; *second*, nuclear

deterrence succeeded in preventing a large-scale conflict between them; *third*, the mediation by the international community had some effect (Cheng, 2003:36). Where John W. Garver is of the opinion that China's opposition to an India-Pakistan war over Kashmir stems from two facts: *first*; China can't afford to allow a war in South Asian region which will hamper China's growth in the region and *secondly*; such a war would endanger two fundamental elements of China's South Asian strategy of maintaining Pakistan as a balance to India and moreover improving relations with *all* the states of South Asia (Garver, 2004:16).

At the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia held in Kazakhstan in early June 2002, Chinese President Jiang Zemin praised Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee for entering into direct talks with Pakistani President Musharraf to prevent the Kashmir conflict from exploding into a full-scale war. On the otherhand, many Chinese strategists believe India is using the war on terrorism as a pretext to militarily subdue Pakistan or to destabilize and dismember the country. Pakistan is the only country that stands up to India and thereby prevents Indian hegemony over the region, thus fulfilling a key objective of China's South Asia policy (Zhang, 10 July 2002). It is pointed out that the US and China share many common interests in South Asia after 9/11, such as maintaining regional stability in South Asia and helping in Pakistani national construction. This also includes trying to jointly keep the *status quo*, to persuade India and Pakistan to resume direct dialogue and to cooperate on counter-terrorism and social transformation in Pakistan (Zhang, 2003: 162). China's Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou warned the United States against using the war on terrorism to dominate global affairs by saying "counter-terrorism should not be used to practice hegemony" (*Agence France-Presse*, 16 January 2002).

As the terrorist attacks against India continued into 2002, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) routinely condemned them. The attack on civilian dependants inside an Indian army base in the Jammu region in July 2002 produced a Chinese statement of condemnation, deep sympathy for the victims, and condolences for the families of the victims of the attack (*Xinhua*, 15 July 2002). To the November 2002 attack on a Temple in Jammu, China's official response was not any different from its earlier response. Condemning the attack, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao in Beijing said that 'China was shocked by the terrorist attack...China opposed all forms of terrorism and China expressed its sympathy for the relatives of the dead and injured (*Xinhua*, 28 November 2002). Hua Junduo, Chinese Ambassador to India in his speech at the Defense College of India said that "anti-terrorism is a contest between peace and violence rather than conflict between

nationalities, religions and civilizations...as terrorism is committed by very few extremist elements, we should in no way confuse it with any specific nation or religion” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Junduo’s Speech).

Another major incident which happened in India on 29 October 2005 is Sarojini Nagar (New Delhi) blast. *People’s Daily* in its headlines “Delhi Blasts: Militant Group Claims Responsibility” writes that a little known Kashmiri militant group claimed responsibility for Delhi blasts which killed at least 59 people (*People’s Daily*, 31 October 2005: online). President Hu Jintao sent a message of condolences to his Indian counterpart on the heavy casualties caused by the explosions. Even Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing sent letters of condolences respectfully to their Indian counterparts. *People’s Daily* also reports that ‘security experts and analysts of the opinion that it was probably a front for a larger Pakistan-based group *Laskar-e-Taiba* behind the attack in an attempt to derail the peace process between India and Pakistan’ (*People’s Daily*, 31 October 2005: online). Rohan Gunaratna, a Singapore based expert on terrorism, agreed the blasts were almost certainly carried out by groups from the subcontinent but inspired by the methods of Al-Qaeda (*People’s Daily*, 31 October 2005: online).

The year 2005 has seen growing China-India counter-terrorism meetings and initiatives. The Union Home Minister of India, Shivraj Patil, paid a five-day official visit to China as part of the process of continuing high-level bilateral exchanges. Stepping up efforts against terrorism, India and China have decided to exchange experiences on anti-hijacking, hostage situations and other terror-related crimes. They have also decided to coordinate positions on anti-terrorism endeavours at regional and multilateral levels as part of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on information sharing and counter-terrorism signed between the both countries. The MoU signed between the Ministry of Home Affairs and China's Ministry of Public Security entails for the first time closer cooperation between the security agencies of the two countries in "controlling" and "containing" international terrorism (*The Tribune*, 10 September 2005). *People’s Daily* reported that ‘Chinese and Indian officials vowed to enhance law-enforcement cooperation, especially on anti-terrorism, drug control and combating cross-border crimes and illegal border-crossing’ (*People’s Daily*, 9 September 2005: online).

Despite the above condemnation of the terrorist incidents in India and growing Sino-Indian cooperation, the most interesting thing to notice here are the beginnings of Sino-Pakistan anti-terrorism cooperation. In recent years, both Pakistan and China have been cooperating in the field

of counter-terrorism. But they have intensified their efforts after the 9/11 incident. A *Daily Times* article writes that “to give concrete shape to this counter-terrorism cooperation, the Foreign as well as Interior Ministers of the two countries met in 2002 and discussed counter-terrorism issues. Recently when President General Musharraf visited China, an extradition treaty was signed between the two countries.” “Pakistan has declared on many occasions that it will not allow its soil to be used to destabilize Xinjiang, the Chinese province that neighbours Pakistan’s Northern Areas” (Piracha, 17 January 2004). On 15 December 2003, the Chinese government has sent a list of the first batch of identified of East Turkistan terrorist organizations to Pakistan to investigate them. The recent list sent to Pakistan noted various aspects of at least two terrorist organizations, Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) as well as terrorists attached to these organizations. It also claims that these organizations and terrorists are well connected to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda outfits and receive training as well as funding etc (Piracha, 17 January 2004).⁶¹

Meeting the Pakistani counterpart Shaukat Aziz in Beijing, Premier Wen Jiabao said that ‘China will enhance cooperation with Pakistan in anti-terrorism and economic activities’ (*People’s Daily*, online: 16 December 2004). In addition to this, Wen Jiabao too said that terrorism and extremism were directly endangering the security of China and Pakistan, as well as regional peace and stability. So the two countries should enhance their anti-terrorism cooperation. Further he added that “China welcomes the constant improvement of Pakistan-India ties, and “China will play an active role in promoting peace, stability and development in South Asia” (*People’s Daily*, online: 16 December 2004). But what is interesting to observe is the Sino-Pakistan military cooperation for anti-terrorism. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Forces of Pakistan held an anti-terrorism exercise in the first half of August. The exercise was held in Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, northwest China’s Uygur Autonomous Region, which is

⁶¹ The Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) is also known as the Eastern Turkistan National Party. It is said to be working for the founding of an Eastern Turkistan State in Xinjiang, China, by means of violence and terror. “The ELTO was founded in Turkey with its headquarters in Istanbul. The founder of the organization is Muhametemin Hazret and its main leaders include Kanat, Dolqun Isa and Ubul Kasimu”, says the Chinese document. The ETIM, also called as the East Turkistan Islamic Party or the Eastern Turkistan National Revolution Association, has been described as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations among the Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces. “In 1993, Muhammad Tuhit and Abudu Rehman, both natives of Hotan, Xinjiang, founded the ETIM but it disintegrated later the same year. However, in 1997, Hasan Mahsum and Abudukadir Yapuquan ganged up with other East Turkistan activities to restore this organization. On 11 September 2002, the ETIM was put on the list of global terrorist organizations by the United Nations” (Piracha, 2004: online).

located on the Pamirs at over 4,000 meters, bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The exercise is aimed to further strengthen cooperation between the two countries and armies, improve the capacity of jointly combating terrorism, and contain and crack down on the forces of separatism, extremism and terrorism. From China's perspective, Cheng Ruisheng writes that 'for the anti-terrorism struggle in South Asia, China has extended its full cooperation to the international community' (Cheng, 2003: 39).

Looking at the above discussions and statements from the Chinese authorities, it is quite safe to argue that there are clearly different calculations in China's stand on the Kashmir issue, evidenced in its strategy of keeping equidistance from both India and Pakistan. Another point also to be noticed that while the repeated terrorist incidents since the last decade in the Kashmir valley has attracted constant condemnation from all major international bodies, China as a P-5 nation has taken no direct position on the issue of cross-border terrorism. Whenever China has talked about terrorism, it has taken the entire South Asian perspective. So in this context, the next chapter would study the position of the Chinese government as regards some major terrorist incidents in the world, beginning with 9/11.

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CHAPTER-IV

Response to 9/11 and Counter-terrorism Strategy

Like many other global events, the U.S.-led war against terrorism brings different sets of Chinese interests into conflict. China's declared solidarity with the global coalition against terrorism after 9/11 can be examined on the basis of two interrelated objectives: *first*, because of China's own fears of separatism and terrorism in the Central Asian region; *second*, its attempt to build an image of a "responsive and responsible" power at the global level. However, supporting the U.S.-led war against terrorism was a hard choice and challenge for the Chinese leaders, and what is interesting to mention that on the one hand, China's immediate response and participation in the US-led war against terrorism was impressive, on the other hand, China was very concern and posed its reservation on the sensitive issue like Iraq.

This chapter explains the policy that has evolved from China's initial reactions to the U.S.-led war on terrorism, and analyzes the dangers and opportunities involved in China's decision, examining the several potential threats to Chinese interests created by the antiterrorism campaign. It considers the consequences of China's decision to support the global coalition against terrorism, identifies which Chinese interests are furthered and which are sacrificed by China's policy. It can be said that China's initial policy required it to subordinate several important Chinese values, such as, demonstrating the high priority it accorded to good relations with US and on nurturing a favourable Chinese image among the non-Muslim countries (Szonyi, 2002: online).

While it seemed in the days following 9/11 that the world had been completely transformed, it has since become clear that for many aspects of international security, the real analytic challenge posed by 9/11 is to distinguish clearly between what has really changed and what has not. This is certainly true of analysis of Chinese policy and interests both in terms of its domestic politics and its foreign policy initiatives (Szonyi, 2002: online). In many ways, China's policy adjustments have allowed it to achieve many unexpected gains. At the same time, the Chinese reaction to 9/11 assumes great significance because China is an important Asian power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC). As a result, this chapter will be divided into two main parts: Part I would assess China's immediate response to 9/11 whereas part

It would try to cover and find out China's counter-terrorism strategy and preparations. This chapter will cover a wide range of Chinese government official's statements and comments as a reaction to the 9/11 incident.

PART: I

CHINA'S REACTION TO 9/11

In this part, the first section would cover the statements and comments of the officials while the next section will cover the mixed public response to 9/11. Section three will examine how China has taken various diplomatic initiatives and supported the global coalition against terrorism whereas the last section would examine the impact of 9/11 on Sino-US relations.

I. Official Statements and Comments

China's official response was cautious (Li, 2003:210). The Chinese President was among the first to send immediate condolence messages to the US President. The wording of the message on the behalf of the Chinese government expressed "sincere sympathy...to the U.S. government and people and condolences to the family members of the victims", adding that it also mentioned that "the Chinese government consistently condemns and opposes all manner of terrorist violence" (cited in *People's Daily*, 12 September 2001: online). In another exclusive message to the US President, Jiang Zemin wrote that:

"I am greatly shocked by the severe attacks on New York and the Washington D.C. on 11 September, which has caused huge human casualties and wound. On behalf of the Chinese Government and people, I wish to express to you and, through you, to the U.S. Government and people our deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims. The Chinese Government condemns and opposes, as always, all violent activities by terrorism" (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China, 11 September 2001: Ministry of Foreign Affairs website).

The Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan as well sent a telegram to the U.S. Secretary of state Colin Powell by expressing his deep sympathy to the U.S. government and its people (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China, 11 September 2001: Ministry of Foreign Affairs website).

On 12 September, permanent representative of UN, Ambassador Wang Yingfan in a statement said that:

"The Chinese government has always condemned and opposed all forms of terrorist violence. The terrorist attacks against the United States...are an open challenge to the entire international community. We support the United Nations to strengthen its work of preventing and combating terrorism and approve of continued and strengthened cooperation among Member States in a concrete effort to implement international anti-terrorist conventions and bring the perpetrators of terrorism to justice...the Security Council should play

its due role in this regard” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 12 September 2001: Ministry of Foreign Affairs website).

The most important statement or policy response of Chinese government can be seen at the 56th Session of the General Assembly of UN on *Item 166: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*, when the Chinese ambassador to UN said;

“The Government of China firmly opposes and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It is China’s basic policy to prevent and combat all terrorist activities. ... The Chinese Government is determined to fight resolutely, together with all other States, against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 12 September 2001: Ministry of Foreign Affairs website).

Apart from the above mentioned high-level government reactions, there were also mixed reactions from both official and non-official agencies. Official Chinese agencies were at least tacitly backing the war on terrorism and it was noticed that while the coverage didn’t include headlines directly supporting US operations, they do include unswerving calls for anti-terrorist action. More importantly, it can be said that all levels of the Chinese government have called for efforts to fight against terrorism; however, the underlining theme is not to jump to conclusion directly on any US actions, but rather of joint international efforts. *People’s Daily*, commenting on Li Peng’s statement that joint international efforts were needed to solve global issues such as terrorism and separatism, pointed out that ‘since 9/11, the world situation has become even more complicated, coupled with an increase of unstable factors...the terrorist attacks manifested again that the world is still far from tranquility and the human being’s common cause of peace and development is faced with a lot of threats and challenges’ (*People’s Daily*, 5 November 2001: Online). In fact it is hard to find an official news story that directly criticizes U.S. anti-terrorist actions. Conversely it is equally difficult to find stories that applaud U.S. anti-terrorist actions. Chinese leaders carefully controlled the official press to guide public opinion into the direction that they feel will best suit their goals.

II. Public Reactions

Information on public opinion on the 9/11 incident is scarce in China. Many reports have suggested that Chinese citizens had mixed feelings about the terrorist’s attacks, but were horrified by the scale of damage and the huge loss of life. A student at the Beijing University said; ‘Terrorism is wrong but I personally think this was a lesson for the USA. From now on, the USA wouldn’t be so arrogant and reckless’ (FlorCruz, 2001: online). Another commented that ‘Now they know how it feels to be bombed’ by referring to NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese

embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Some even went further to say that ‘Heroes, brave men who liberated the world...America under attack-it deserved it’ (FlorCruz, 2001: online).

Wang Dan who was one of the leaders of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 and is currently studying at Harvard University, wrote in *Taipei Times* that reactions to the 9/11 events in China was worrying. Although it strains credulity, in the wake of this devastating human tragedy, the *Qiangguo Forum*, an official website run by China’s state-run national newspaper, *The People’s Daily*, displayed dozens of postings from visitors to the site hailing the attacks. According to media statistics, about two hours after the tragedy, the *Qiangguo Forum* displayed a total of 47 postings, including 20 praising the attacks. Only seven messages urged people not to take pleasure in the tragedy. It is noteworthy, that foremost among those who regularly visit the *Qiangguo Forum* are young Chinese students and scholars, as well as people who are concerned about, interested in, or eager to discuss current issues in world affairs. Such people are by no means weak or neglected. Nor are they people without influence in Chinese society. Rather they form a key part of the group at the heart of China’s current social development and economic progress. “The Americans”, one wrote, “who have betrayed themselves, deserve this!”. Their posting on the website also turned a blind eye to the fact that the victims involved in the tragedy were civilians like themselves. One posting even read: “After watching this, Wang Wei may rest in peace!” Seeing the message posted at the *Qiangguo Forum* and realizing how much this form of Chinese nationalism resemble the ways of thinking of the terrorists, Wang Dan writes, I couldn’t help but worry more than ever about China’s future (*Taipei Times*, 23 October 2001: Online).

Chinese scholars invariably regard the 9/11 attacks as terrorist acts. They believe that they are of an extreme and evil nature which will have negative effects on both the US and the world. While Chinese security specialists such as Shi Yinhong do not approve of many aspects of US foreign policy, they maintain that nothing can justify such barbaric acts (Shi, 2002:45). Some other security analysts argue that international terrorism is rooted in an unjust international political and economic order which is largely dominated by a hegemonic power, namely US. The wealth gap between the North and South, according to Chinese analysts, has widened in recent years. The situation is exacerbated by the process of globalization which has led to further economic marginalization of the South, creating a political climate conducive to the growth of global terrorism (Niu, 2001:41-44 and Yang, 2001:55-57).

Yang Yunzhong has argued that 9/11 should be seen as an extreme form of struggle between hegemonism and anti-hegemonism rather than a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West (Yang, 2002:5). Tang Zhichao contends that the anti-American sentiments in the Arab world are the result of a failure of US policy in the Middle East and continued American military presence in the region (Tang, 2002:5). While at the same time, other Chinese analysts argue that 9/11 makes it more urgent to promote 'democratization of international relations' (Ni and Wang, 2002: 22). Given the plethora of challenges in a globalizing world, some Chinese scholars such as Pang Zhongying believes that it is essential to establish a new global order based on equality, justice and mutual respect (Pang, 2001: 29-31). Yang Jin with other scholars like Wang Tingdong maintains that any international campaign against terrorism should be led by the UN and conducted in accordance with international law. They also insist that the national sovereignty of independent states should not be violated in the name of fighting terrorism (Yang, 2001:57 and Wang, 2002:53).

There appears to be a kind of consensus among Chinese security analysts that US is the major source of global instability. The tensions between the US and other countries, they assert, lie in Washington's ambitions to build a unipolar global system in an increasingly multipolar world (Li, 1999: 115-149).⁶² They believe that America's desire to dominate the world has not been deterred by 9/11. On the contrary, according to Yang Yunzhong the tragic events have provided the USA with an opportunity to expand its spheres of influence which has increased through the development of its anti-terrorist coalition (Yang, 2002:10-11). Some scholars have also discerned some adjustments in US foreign policy since the terrorist attacks. For a short period of time, Chu Shulong observes, the Bush administration appeared to be willing to abandon its unilateralism. But he points out that the flexibility in American policy is a reflection of pragmatic considerations rather than a fundamental change in US global strategy (Chu, 2001:5-8). Despite its seemingly less unilateralist stance, America's basic strategic thinking is thought to be based upon the pursuit of hegemonism (Chu, 2001:8). A Chinese analyst claims that 'realism' has dominated US foreign policy thinking since 9/11 (Feng, 2002:4).

Looking at the above mentioned response, one can clearly see a shared apprehension among Chinese scholars about rising US global influence. They seem to have different opinions, however, on the effects of 9/11 on international politics. Some analysts are more optimistic about the

⁶² For a detailed examination of China's security perceptions of the United States, see (Li, 1999:115-149).

prospects for great power cooperation. Others believe that the USA would be more assertive in safeguarding its self-interest with or without the consent of other states.

III. China's Diplomatic Initiatives

In addition to both official and public response, it is important to mention that after 9/11, Chinese diplomacy over the next few months was quite active. In the case of the post-9/11 anti-terrorism campaign, China's attempts to exert diplomatic influence were early and intense.⁶³ Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhu Bangzao on the occasion of 9/11 said that "the Chinese Government always condemns and opposes any violent activities by terrorism" (Statement of Chinese Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>). On the same night, the Chinese Government asked the Chinese Embassy in the US, the Consulate-Generals and China's Permanent Mission to the United Nations to immediately adopt measures to provide all necessary assistance to the victims of 9/11. At this point, it may be pertinent to enumerate and cite selections from statements and papers released by Chinese government officials, spokespersons and policy practitioners to examine Chinese government's initiatives and reaction to 9/11 and how it has been reflected in China's foreign policy actions.

Statement by H.E. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of Delegation of The People's Republic of China, At the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly, 11 November 2001 (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>). The following texts I have quoted from Tang Jiaxuan's statements at UN.

"China has always been opposed to all forms of terrorism. No matter when, where or in what form terrorism strikes, and no matter against whom it is directed, it should be met with condemnation and counterstrikes by the international community taking a unified position thereon...In addition to joining most international conventions against terrorism, China has ratified the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism concluded by the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization."

"...China stands for a primary role by the United Nations and its Security Council in the international efforts against terrorism...China strongly believes that military actions against terrorism should have clearly defined...all such actions should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms of international law..."

"China believes that terrorism is a tiny fringe of extreme evil, representing neither any ethnic group nor any religion...The "Eastern Turkistan" terrorist forces are trained, equipped and financed by international

⁶³ In September, Jiang Zemin spoke by telephone with President Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, French President Jacques Chirac, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga; and even Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji spoke with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.

terrorist organizations. The fight against the “Eastern Turkistan” group is an important aspect of the international fight against terrorism.”

Statement by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan at the UN Security Council Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, 12 November 2001 (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>).

“...China is in favor of fighting terrorism in all forms and supports the relevant resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council....”

“China opposes the double standards on the question of counter-terrorism. No matter when or where terrorism strikes, or in what form, against whom, with the participation or assistance of whom, the international community should take the common stand, condemn it in unison and carry out a resolute fight against it...”

On 13 November Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan submitted to UN Secretary-General China's Instrument of Accession to the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>). Though the convention took effect in China after thirty days to its accession at the UN by the Chinese government, with this international convention, China had joined all 11 out of the 12 international conventions against terrorism. In addition to this, Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang, Acting Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Meeting on Terrorism on 18 January 2002 was very important in the context of China's position on terrorism (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>):

“...The Security Council should support regional efforts to combat terrorism. We therefore hope that the Counter-Terrorism Committee will also make relevant efforts in this regard.”

In addition to this, Shen Guofang emphasized on the following:

“*First*, the Counter-Terrorism Committee should base its work on resolution 1373 (2001) and the guidelines it has itself adopted. It should also treat all Member States equally and avoid double standards; *Secondly*, the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, should play a leading role in the international fight against terrorism. In that regard, the Counter-Terrorism Committee is the only body mandated by Member States to monitor the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) ...”.

Another important paper can be seen is China's Position Paper against International Terrorism which was released on 25 September 2001. (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>). This position paper

was released in immediate response to the 9/11 incident. This paper clearly can be taken as a substantial document of Chinese government's policy stand on terrorism:

“China supports all efforts aimed at strengthening anti-terrorism conventions within the framework of United Nations...China encourages all states to become parties to the existing international anti-terrorism conventions as soon as possible and to effectively implement such conventions.”

The most significant paper was released on the behalf of the Chinese government is “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity”, (21/01/02), released by the Information Office of State Council, People's Republic of China (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>), which states that:

“After the September 11 incident, terrorist activities have become discredited worldwide and the "East Turkistan" terrorists in Xinjiang have gone underground temporarily...The situation in Xinjiang is stable, and the people there live and work as usual...”

This paper is clearly an evident of the Chinese government's diplomatic strategy to use the threat of terrorism to justify its suppression of Uyghur separatists who are allegedly involved in organizing various separatists and terrorist activities in the Xnjiang region. In addition to this, the US government's reference to the ETIM as a terrorist organization had lent additional support for China's claims that the ETIM is linked to Al-Qaeda and that it is aiming to establish an independent state of East Turkistan in Xinjiang. In this context, three important issues can be taken: Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Afghanistan to examine the Chinese government's position in the US-led war against terrorism.

Before 9/11, China had not identified specific groups among the Uyghurs, rather stating that “splittists” (separatists) were found among this ethnic group. After 9/11, the Chinese government “sought to legitimize” its suppression of Uyghur oppositionists by depicting them as “Muslim extremists and allies of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden” (Lev, 2002). However, it was also believed that substantiating strong ties between groups in China and the Taliban and Al Qaeda is difficult. Experts argue that although China paints a picture of close relations, aid, and training between Uyghur separatists and Al Qaeda, this is uncertain, and the links are probably looser. Conservative Wahhabi mosques have increased in Xinjiang, and two Chinese Uyghurs members

of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were found fighting with Chechen forces (Gladney, 2003). Former vice Premier Qian Qichen asserted that 1,000 Chinese Uighurs might have received training by the Taliban prior to Operation Enduring Freedom (Pan and Pomfret, 2001: A-20). Chinese authorities have said they arrested more than a hundred Xinjiang “terrorists”, who allegedly surreptitiously entered China to plan attacks, though evidence substantiating this has not been offered (as reported in *Chicago Times*, 22 January 2002).

It is also seen that from time to time, the foreign media is providing enough evidences of China’s record of past dealings with the Taliban regime (Rashid, 1999, Pomfret, 2001, Bristow, 2001, Gertz, 2002:1, Macleod, 2001:1).⁶⁴ But repeatedly in different times, the Chinese have described such media reports as “false”, “absurd” and “anti-Chinese propaganda”. The Chinese position on military action against Al-Qaida and Afghanistan was fairly consistent immediately after 9/11. Somewhat surprisingly, given China's previous uncompromising stand on US military action abroad, China did not condemn US plans in advance.⁶⁵ However, the following instances

⁶⁴ Some of the important connections are: in December 1998, following the escalation of separatists violence in Xinjiang, contact was facilitated by Pakistan between China and Taliban at the request of Pakistan’s long regional ally China. Five senior Chinese diplomats held talks in Kabul with the Taliban’s Deputy Chairman Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Interior minister Mullah Abdur Razzaq, and Deputy Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Zayef and obtained their assurance that the Taliban would not allow Afghan territory to be used against China. The Taliban also transferred two unexploded U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles to China for \$20 million each. In return, the Chinese agreed to start direct flights between Kabul and Urumuchi, open formal trade ties, increase Chinese food aid to Afghanistan, institutionalize military-to-military contacts, and provide arms and spares for Taliban’s aging military equipments. October 1999: Annual felicitations conveyed by Mullah Omar on the occasion of China’s National Day from 1999. December 2000: A delegation led by China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, met with Mullah Omar, following the Taliban’s plea to veto U.S.-Russian moves to tighten U.N. Security Council sanctions (including travel restrictions against Taliban officials). By late 2001, China had become the biggest investor in Afghanistan, with “legitimate” investments running to several tens of millions of dollars. A Taliban delegation, led by their Commercial Attache to Pakistan, spent a week in China as guests of the government. The Chinese Commerce Ministry facilitated their interaction with some Chinese industrialists and businessmen. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with a Taliban delegation whilst visiting Pakistan, and agreed to consider the Taliban’s position on U.N. sanctions against Afghanistan. August 2001: Osama Bin Laden called for cultivating closer Taliban-China ties to reduce U.S. influence. September 2001: A new protocol on Sino-Taliban commercial relations was linked on September 11: the day of the World Trade Centre attacks (Rashid, 1999, Pomfret, 2001, Bristow, 2001, Gertz, 2002, Macleod, 2001).

⁶⁵ After the 9/11 incident, foreign media drew attention to China’s record of past contact with the Taliban regime, including the recent cooperative agreements between Afghanistan and the PRC. In 2000, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, for example, had met with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, who rarely received non-Muslim visitors. These contacts might have fit the “China threat” paradigm—that is, Chinese collaboration with an anti-Western group in support of a common goal of undercutting America’s position as a global power. But the Chinese Foreign Ministry moved quickly to distance itself from the Taliban. Premier Zhu Rongji said on September 15 that “reports in some US newspapers of connections between China and the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan are false”. Zhu Rongji asserted that China had maintained no diplomats in Afghanistan since the Chinese Embassy in Kabul closed in 1993 (as reported in *Times of India*, 18 September 2001). On September 18, He Yafei, a senior Chinese diplomat in Washington, stated that China, though always interested in peace and development in Afghanistan, had “never established any kind of formal relationship with the Taliban” (Ying, 2001: *China Daily*). In fact, both claims are

can be seen how the Chinese government has reacted on various issues like Taliban, Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda from time to time:

Statement by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan of China at the High-level Meeting of the Group of "6+2" on Afghanistan, 12 November 2001(Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>):

“...China maintains that there should be a political solution to the Afghan issue through negotiations and dialogues. ...The Chinese side is of the view that the Group of “6+2” is an important and effective mechanism for us to discuss and facilitate a political settlement of the Afghan issue...China stands ready to continue working with all the other parties and contribute its due share to the political solution of the Afghan issue.”

In addition to this, Tang Jiaxuan said that as for ways to achieve a settlement under the current situation for Afghanistan, China believes that a number of principles need to be followed:

- *First*, ‘the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan should be ensured according to UN Charter and international law;
- *Second*, the Afghan people must be allowed to independently decide on a solution;
- *Third*, the future government of Afghanistan should be broadly based, embody the interests of all ethnic groups and live in harmony with all countries, particularly its neighbours;
- *Fourth*, the solution must be conducive to peace and stability in the region;
- *Fifth*, the United Nations should play a constructive role more actively for the future of Afghanistan’.

Another Statement by Ambassador Wang Yingfan, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan on 26 March 2002 (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>) states that:

“As a neighbour of Afghanistan, China has always been committed to the full settlement of the Afghan question, and we actively support the Bonn process”.

dubious. Prior to 9/11, there was little basis for an anti-US alliance between Beijing and the Taliban. China had clearly sought to establish a friendly relationship with Kabul with a view toward cutting off external support for Muslim insurgents inside the PRC. In December 1998 agreements, for example, the PLA agreed to provide training, equipment repairs, and infrastructure improvements to the Taliban armed forces in exchange for the Taliban’s commitment not to train Chinese Muslims from Xinjiang (*Rediff.com*, 12 February 1999).

Commenting on a news story carried in the *Christian Science Monitor* quoting an Afghan intelligent agent as saying that Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaida was seeking air defense missiles from China, and it was possible that China was involved in supporting some Al-Qaida camps in Pakistan and making commitments to provide them with missiles, on 15 August 2002, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan said that "China has never had any contact with the al-Qaida terrorist network, and certainly not military relations" (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>). Clarifying China's stand on this issue, he too said that "some media had played up the relationship between China and al-Qaida and claimed that China supported al-Qaida, which completely confused right and wrong and started rumors with evil intentions." On the issue of terrorism, he again said that "China's position on this issue was consistent and clear-cut" and "the Chinese government firmly opposed terrorist activities of any form and supported stronger cooperation in the international community in the fight against terrorism." He even went to the extent of saying that how in the past both Al-Qaida and Taliban had helped "East Turkistan" terrorists training and provided financial help for violence in Xinjiang and other parts of the region.

Further clarifying China's position on Iraq, Middle East and Afghanistan, China's Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan commented on 9 September 2002 in an exclusive interview to China's leading daily, *People's Daily* that the Iraq issue "should be properly settled through political and diplomatic means based on the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council" (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>). On the Middle East issue, while opposing violence against innocent civilians, Tang said "China maintains that the Middle East problem should have a comprehensive, fair and permanent solution based on the relevant UN resolutions and the "land-for-peace" principle." Touching the other two sensitive issues of Afghanistan and terrorism, Tang reiterated that China's stand on both the issues is clear. On the Afghanistan issue, the Foreign Minister said that "...China supports the United Nations continuing to play an important role in Afghanistan..." and on the issue of terrorism, Tang emphasized that "terrorism should not be lumped together with any specific nation or religion. Anti-terrorism action needs to be based on solid evidence and should not be used wantonly." Few days after this remarks from the Chinese Foreign Minister, on 12 September 2002, Kong Quan said that "this is also a positive achievement in anti-terrorism cooperation between China and the US and other relevant countries. The "ETIM"

is part and parcel of the international terrorist forces and has carried out a large number of violent terror incidents both inside and outside China and is a severe threat to regional peace and stability. The Chinese side will continue to intensify cooperation with the international community to fight against terrorism in all forms including the Eastern Turkistan terrorist organization” (Permanent Mission of the PRC at UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/c10020.html>).

From academic and scholarly perspective, many scholars and experts in China reiterate the official stand. Pan Zhenqiang argues that the invasion of Bush administration into Iraq, however, has brought havoc to the international cooperative anti-terror efforts. Instead of reducing the threat of international terrorism, the war on Iraq has created a safe heaven for all sorts of terrorist activities owing to the chaotic instability as a result of the American-led occupation (Pan, 2004:22). As a consequence, the terrorist attacks in 2003 have dramatically increased both in intensity and frequency (Pan, 2004:22).⁶⁶ Pan Zhenqiang also writes that the prospect of the world war on terror will largely emerge from the success in the speedy stabilization of Iraq and putting that country onto a normal track for reconstruction. To China, the correct and appropriate solution of the Iraq war will have far-reaching implications beyond Iraq because it will also signify the success of a multilateral approach, the restoration of a world order based on the respect of basic principles and norms in the international relations.

Zhu Feng is of the opinion that “the Iraq reconstruction in 2004 conveyed a message to the world, that the military mission in Iraq has no direct relations with counter-terrorism campaign at all, but the turmoil and bloodshed in this war-torn country today has dramatically changed the country into a battlefield against terrorists” (Ding, 2005:14). He also wrote that ‘counter-terrorism is a long-term struggle that requires courage and resolutions...’ (Ding, 2005:15).

The scholarly opinion also indicates that China is constantly insisting to follow on UN and international norms for fighting terrorism. But the most interesting aspect of the Chinese response can be seen in their readiness to support the US and the emerging international coalition in the urgent fight against international terrorism. On the relationship with the US, there seems to have different opinions among the Chinese scholars. Some analysts are optimistic about the prospects for great power counter-terrorism cooperation, while others believe that the US would be more

⁶⁶ The year 2003 saw 260 terrorist attacks, an increase of 45% over 2002. The attacks resulted in over 1600 deaths and over 5200 wounded, an increase of 23% and 68% respectively than 2002 (Pan, 2004:22).

assertive in safeguarding its self-interest with or without the consent of other states. In this context, the next section would try to examine the perception of the Chinese authorities and scholars on the impact of 9/11 on the Sino-US relations.

IV. 9/11 and Sino-US Relations

From Chinese perspective, the 9/11 gave a momentum to the already established “trusted cooperation” to the Sino-US relations. They believed that 9/11 certainly helped to increased contacts and created more common interests and cooperation between the two countries (Yu, 2002:39). China’s cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism certainly helped improve bilateral relations, but it was also being argued by some scholars that the 9/11 “only added momentum to the strengthening of ties” that had been evident since the EP-3 affairs in April 2001.⁶⁷ The result of this new momentum after 9/11 can be seen in December 2001, when the US government granted China permanent status as a normal trading partner which, according to the White House, marked ‘the final stage in normalizing US-China trade relations’ (*BBC News*, 28 December 2001).

Yang Fan and Zhao Binghui in a major article in *Foreign Affairs Journal* analyzed the various aspects of Sino-US relations after 9/11, and it is worth quoting from this article at some length. It appears to be a representative portion of mainstream scholarly opinion in China. The article reveals that:

- *First*, ‘although the US will still push its containment policy toward China, it has softened its tough attitude toward China. After 9/11, the US has adjusted its judgment of its principal threat and changed the attitude that had regarded China as the real strategic opponent. Therefore, the original possible focus in international community-Sino-US confrontation has changed, thus easing the tension in bilateral relations;
- *Second*, after 9/11, the US has expanded cooperation and need China for international cooperation to combat terrorists. Ever since 9/11, China has extended support and assistance to the US combat against terrorism in the fields of diplomacy, intelligence, and finance and law enforcement;
- *Third*, the outside pressure on China’s security environment eases in certain extent because there emerges a delaying effect in the east-oriented move of US strategic focus. The 9/11 incident influenced the adjustment of US global strategy greatly;
- *Fourth*, multipolarization is an inevitable trend of world politics and after 9/11, security cooperation among the vast majority of countries and governments concerning international anti-terrorism and other political issues have obviously strengthened (Yang and Zhao, 2002: 66).

⁶⁷ The Hainan Island EP-3 incident in April and May 2001 certainly increased tensions and strained relations between the two countries, but once it was resolved both sides moved quickly to put it behind them and begin a dedicated process of engagement with each other. Since the EP-3 affair, China has seemed eager to find ways to avoid further damage to the relationship with USA. This was particularly true in the period leading up to President Bush’s visit to Shanghai for the APEC summit (Ren, 18 October 2001).

Zhou Xiaozheng pointed out that after 9/11; China took an active role in the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in Shanghai in October 2001. A joint declaration for counter-terrorism was signed on behalf of the foreign ministers of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and “by doing so, China offered strong support to the US anti-terrorist military operations” (Zhou, 2002:16). Zhou Wenzhong, Vice-Foreign Minister of China in his *Foreign Affairs Journal* article writes that the 9/11 incident ‘shook the world and changed the United States at the same time it also changed the way many Americans viewed China’ (Zhou, 2003:7). He too writes that “terrorism, cross-boundary crime, proliferation of advanced weapons, and spread of deadly diseases pose a common threat to mankind. China and the US have extensive shared stake and common responsibility for meeting these challenges, maintaining world peace and security and addressing other major issues bearing on human survival and development. China is ready to keep up its cooperation in these areas with the US and the rest of the international community” (Zhou, 2003: 7). Pan Zhenqiang argues that ‘with regard to its relations with the US in particular, China advocates that future increasing common interests will be the firm bedrock for the cooperation among these powers, and that they will all gain from peaceful coexistence, and lose from conflicts. Differences among the major powers will be inevitable and normal but are not insurmountable’ (Pan, 2004:20).

Another set of scholars believes that while the ‘war against terrorism’ may have provided a new opportunity for Sino-US cooperation, it does not appear to provide a lasting basis (Li, 2000:17-20). This is because leaders in both countries have different views on the origins of terrorism, the approaches to fighting it and the expected outcomes of anti-terrorist cooperation. In fact, the expansion of US’s anti-terrorist networks has led to a deeper concern in China about US’s future role in the global system. On a variety of strategic, political and economic issues, the perceptions of Chinese and American policy-makers differ profoundly (Li, 2000:17-20). Fu Xiaoqiang views that ‘besides the anti-terrorism campaign and its economic interests, the US also has a global strategic plan, including stationing troops in Central Asia. The United States has already stationed its troops at military bases of some Central Asian countries under the pretext of provision of economic and financial aid, and intends to remain there for a long time. It currently has three military bases in Afghanistan and nine in Central Asia’ (Fu, 2002:6).

There was also a kind of concern among Western scholars that whether the US-Taiwan ties would suffer as a result of PRC support for the antiterrorism campaign. This issue was serious

enough to prompt US Secretary of State Colin Powell to deny publicly that Washington intended to reduce future arms transfers to Taiwan in exchange for the PRC's support for the antiterrorism campaign (as cited in Snyder, 23 September 2001). China was not capable of offering much tangible support to the war effort beyond sharing its intelligence on terrorist organizations in Central Asia and Powell said China had "knowledge and information" that "might be of help to us". Shortly thereafter China dispatched a group of its antiterrorism experts to US for consultations with their American counterparts (Glaser, 2001:2). Also China allowed the USS *John C. Stennis* aircraft carrier battle group, en route to the Arabian Sea, to make a port call in Hong Kong, which could be interpreted as a modest provision of logistical support for the war effort in Afghanistan. The principal benefits of Chinese support to the United States, however, were diplomatic and symbolic: by publicly endorsing the war against terrorism, China demonstrated unity with the other major states and, relaxing its earlier stance, signaled that it would not attempt to encumber the war effort through its membership in international organizations or its bilateral relationships (Glaser, 2001:3).

From a bilateral perspective, being permanent members of the UN Security Council, both China and the US share a wide range of common interests. Because both are victims of terrorism, fighting terrorism has become a major shared interest. In the war on terror, the Chinese and Americans have created a consultative mechanism to carry out effective cooperation. Designation of the East Turkistan Islamic Party as a terrorist group by the UN Security Council is an important product of their concerted efforts. Andrew Scobell argues that 'a top priority for China has been to maintain a cordial relationship with USA. China's highest priority is to ensure that its economy continues to enjoy robust growth (hence maintain domestic stability), which is dependent on peace and development in Asia and the World. For China, a stable relationship with the United States is critical to China's economic development. For this to continue, China desires a vibrant economic relationship and cordial strategic cooperation with the United States' (Scobell, 2005:315).

A Critical Analysis

Some aspects of China's behaviour and stance in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 suggested to some observers that China might offer only limited and very conditional support for an American counter-terrorism campaign. For example; Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasized the need for UN approval of any American response to terrorism (Cited in *Agence*

France-Presse, 2001).⁶⁸ To some, this suggested that China was placing conditions on cooperation in order to win a *quid pro quo* on US policy toward Taiwan and other issues. In other words, some feared that China was seeking to exploit US tragedy and vulnerability to exact diplomatic gains from Washington.

David Shambaugh in his article “Sino-American Relations since September 11: Can the New Stability Last?” opines that China took several steps to unambiguously support the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, but ‘it has not done as much as other neighboring nations or other countries in the world. For example, China did not offer military over flight or basing rights-as did every nation surrounding Afghanistan (except Iran). China’s reluctance to become militarily engaged in the Afghan conflict tarnishes its otherwise positive record in the war against terrorism’ (Shambaugh, 2004:199). Phillip C. Saunders argues that there is a difference in approaching the bilateral relations between China and US. He believes that ‘the US approach emphasizes functional cooperation and gradually building trust by working together on practical issues whereas the Chinese approach emphasizes on the overall relationship, with the attitude that “if two countries have good relations, they can work together on any issue” (Saunders, *CNS Report*). However, the potential areas where both the countries needs to cooperate with each other are: intelligence sharing, use of Chinese airfields and airspace, diplomatic support in the UN, controlling exports of small arms that might reach terrorist groups, and sanctions against states that refuse to cooperate in anti-terrorist efforts (Saunders, *CNS Report*).

But one week after the attack, the PRC already seemed much more forthcoming and cooperative. By all accounts, the visit of Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to Washington in late September was a great success. China seemed willing to help in the U.S.-led effort against terrorism, at least as it applied to the destruction of Al-Qaeda and the destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Secretary of State Powell emphasized that there was no *quid pro quo* offered to or requested by Beijing in return for its cooperation on terrorism (Snyder, 23 September 2001). And during his trip to Shanghai for the APEC summit, President Bush emphasized that

⁶⁸ Initial statements on 12 September predicting any actions on United Nations approval, for example, seemed to suggest that China might attempt to be an obstacle to U.S. freedom of action. See (Page, 2001: online). For an almost cautionary initial official statement, see “AFP: Senior PRC Military Official Urges Restraint in Reaction to US Attacks”, Agence France-Presse, September 12, 2001, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report*, September 12, 2001, document number CPP200109120000066.

President Jiang Zemin's support for the United States had been immediate and forthright (Vatikiotis, 2001:36-40).

A very important reason for China's cooperation with the United States in its anti-terror campaign is less widely discussed. China would have to be greatly concerned about the economic impact on the US of a failed campaign against terror. The per annum growth of Chinese exports had already dropped from nearly twenty-eight percent in 2000 to about seven percent in the months before the 9/11 atrocities (*China Daily*, 18 September 2001). The connection between economies and security and the international terrorist threat and the world economy have been noted at high levels in China. For example, in December Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan placed central importance on the slowdown in the American and world economies as factors that threaten global stability and progress. He also stated his opinion that the terror attacks and their aftermath have created a major obstacle to US economic recovery (*People's Daily*, 30 October and 17 December 2001).

Another important factor driving China's cooperation with the United States in the anti-terror campaign is that China wants to establish her image as a respected power. Chinese nationalism is often equated with condemnation of US "hegemonism" and the creation of coercive military capacity. But there are other, softer sides to Chinese nationalism. China is eager not to be excluded from any global coalition that includes all of other great powers in the world. Since Russia was cooperating actively with the United States as the latter prepared for an assault on Afghanistan, China had little choice but to maintain a similar posture (Lam, 27 September 2001). Since 9/11, another vital change can be seen in the Chinese approach that they have been very open and vocal about the terrorist incidents through out the world (For China's reactions to major international terrorist incidents refer Table-V).

Commenting on the Beslan incident, Chen Yurong said that 'the Beslan hostage-taking incident shocked Russian President Vladimir Putin and he focused immediate attention on the fight against terrorism.' Chen also holds that "unless the Chechen problem is settled, Russia would continue to be under the threat of pro-independence extremists" (*Beijing Review*, 2005:15). Xu Jian, an academician with the CIIS, believes that counter-terrorism measures should focus more on effective strategies for social and economic development, information, effective legislation and public security rather than on military solutions. He says that "launching war is not equal to fighting terrorism" (cited in Ding, 20 January 2005:15). He further argues that double standards

adopted in the anti-terror fight could easily lead to disintegration of the global counter-attack alliance. For instance, Russia and the USA diverged on dealing with Chechnya issue, after the hostage crisis in Beslan. “As America criticized Russia’s policy in Chechnya instead of condemning Chechen terrorist attacks, Russia was furious”, “this tendency is not good one for the international counter-terrorism fight” (*Beijing Review*, 2005:15).

On the London blast (7/7), Feng Zhongping noted that ‘the London explosions hinted that the terrorist network has become even more widespread since 9/11. He pointed out that even though the United States is still the top terrorist target, its antiterrorist system since 9/11 has sifted more terrorist and extremist attempts. 11 March 2004 terrorist attack in Spain and the recent London explosions proved that Europe might be the new focus of terrorist attacks. The west London area where the third explosion was detonated has a large Islamic population. These population hubs make it easier for extremists to blend in and carry out their plans’ (cited in Ding, 21 July 2005:16). Hong Yuan, an expert on international security at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), said that the timing and the short intervals between the series of explosions at London pointed to the long-term and thorough preparation of a very experienced terrorist group. The attacks were also the result of British politics and “it is the most disastrous cost that Britain has paid for its counter-terrorist alliance with the United States” (cited in Ding, 21 July 2005:14-15). Li Wei says that ‘the explosions made London one of the largest terrorist victims since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. He also said that London has been a terrorist target for a long time because of Britain’s involvement in the war in Iraq, among other things’.⁶⁹ He also writes that “as the third largest world financial centre and the second largest counter-terrorist centre, London is on the leading list of terrorist targets” (*Beijing Review*, 2005:14-15).

Ruan Zongze is of the view that ‘Tony Blair himself might take the terrorist attacks as an opportunity to strengthen his position in the Labour Party and the country. In 2005, Blair won his third term and created a legacy for the Labour Party’s ruling position. In his firm support of the United States on the Iraq war, he faced harsh critics from the Labour Party, the British people and the international community. After the London blast, with his post secured, he is finding wide support. “Much like the September 11 attacks, which raised George W. Bush’s political approval

⁶⁹ Personal interaction with Li Wei in Beijing. He is an expert on Counter-terrorism studies in China.

rating, the London terrorist attacks could bring Blair some political benefits” (cited in Ding, 21 July 2005:16). Wang Yanjuan and Michael Rice argues in the same journal that the “London bombings show terror threat is now homegrown and it has given a new dimension to terror” (cited in Ding, 21 July 2005:16).

Condemning the London blast, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson along with the G-8 industrialized countries and five leading developing countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, said that “we are united in our resolve to confront and defeat this terrorism that is an attack, not on one nation, but on all nations and on civilized people everywhere”. The spokesperson Liu Jianchao too said that China also had strong words for the extremists. “Anyone who launches terrorist attacks and causes casualties of civilians should be resolutely condemned, regardless of his or her purpose”. The tragedy also shows that the global fight against terrorism “remains an arduous task and the international community still has a long way to go”, the spokesman said. “China will continue to enhance cooperation with the international community in this field” (cited in Ding, 21 July 2005: 17).

Zhang Lijun in his article “Anti-Terrorism Alliance” writes that ‘frequently occurring global terrorist attacks in recent years have greatly impacted global stability, as well as exerting deep-seated and long-term influences on the future of international politics. The 11 March Madrid bombings, for example, completely changed the political situation in Spain and is believed a major reason for Spanish troops retreating from Iraq. Nowadays, quite a large number of terrorist attacks are launched by local militia groups, separatists and religious extremists, rather than Al Qaeda members. They follow the deeds of Al Qaeda and intend to achieve and enhance their international influence through terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks more likely set an example for them. International terrorism has entered a new booming period’ (Zhang, 2004:10).

For Zhao Yongchen, deputy director of the Ministry of Public Security's Counter-terrorism Bureau, who presided in the chair during the discussions on the subject on “counter-terrorism” at the 22nd Congress on the Law of the World in Beijing and Shanghai on 4-10 September 2005 said that; ‘terrorism has become a serious scourge for world and regional peace, development and stability in the 1990s, and is and will remain a common enemy for the world community. Referring to the incidents of Moscow theater siege, Bali bomb, the Madrid bombs, Beslan school hostage crisis and the recent London blasts; he said that China is also in the eyes of “East Turkistan” separatists since last 10 years. The criminal law amendment by the National People's Congress

(NPC) in 1997 incorporated international treaties regarding criminal punishment that have been signed by China. China opposes relating terrorist issues to specific religions or nations and counter-terrorism efforts should aim at removing causes as well as dealing with individual cases... Nations should use political, economic, legal, diplomatic and social means instead of mere force, and that the world community should avoid inequality and social conflicts by working together to ameliorate the widening disparity between rich and poor. Only by the establishment of a just and reasonable international order under which social injustice and social conflicts are properly addressed, wealth disparity is narrowed and mutual dependence and development encouraged can the world better uproot terrorism'.(Guy, 2005: online).

Reflecting regime interest and Chinese national aspirations, the Chinese government has consistently demonstrated a desire to cultivate a responsible and prestigious international image and to be consulted on important international issues. Taking this opportunity of the war against terrorism on many counts in post-9/11 era, many scholars such as Yan Xuetong said that “We don’t want to stand alone” (Lawrence, 2001:16). In fact the Chinese authorities and scholars continuously argued that China has its own problem of terrorism and separatism, on balance, China’s support for the US war on terrorism was consistent with key goals of the Chinese leadership. Since 9/11, the Chinese government has prepared an effective counter-terrorism strategy and responded to many international terrorist incidents more openly. The next part of this chapter thrusts on the Chinese counter-terrorism strategy and preparations for the future possible terrorist attacks on them.

PART-II

China’s Counter-terrorism Strategy

China has made remarkable progress in strengthening the counter-terrorism or anti-terrorism mechanisms since 9/11. *Counter-Terrorism and “Beijing 2008”*, this heading in the official websites of the Chinese Olympic Committee rightly speaks about the seriousness of Chinese government’s concern to counter possible terrorist attack in future (Official Website of the Chinese Olympics Committee, Beijing 2008: at <http://en.olympic.cn/08beijing/bocog/2005-06-07/582809.html>). It is noticed that a number of external and internal demands and compulsions have forced the Chinese government to reformulate and redesign the country’s security policy and environment ahead of the mega events. Even since the 9/11 incident, a series of various kinds of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, bombings and violent activities directed against Chinese citizens

have sounded the alarm for Chinese government to come out openly with the initiatives and measures to counter-terrorism both internationally and domestically.

Recently, China conducted its first anti-terrorism drill involving an oil tanker with a loading capacity of 300,000 tons on the safety of life at Sea. It was jointly organized by the China Maritime Search and Rescue Centre and China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO). On this occasion, Liu Gongchen, Director of the China Maritime Safety Administration said that "it is aimed to test China's ability in safeguarding traffic security on the sea" (*Xinhua*, 23 June 2004). In 2002, China set the principle of gradual participation in multilateral military exercises to broaden its security cooperation with other countries. This principle was also put into practice by the frequent joint military exercises and high-level military cooperation. The exercise will also help promote bilateral cooperation in non-traditional security field and maintain security and stability in the region (*Xinhua News Agency*, 29 July 2004).

TABLE-IV
PEOPLE LIBERATION ARMY'S (PLA) COUNTER-TERRORISM
MILITARY EXERCISES SINCE 2002

- September 25, 2002: The Chinese military launched a practice with live ammunition code-named "Iron Fist-2004," in the Queshan Training Base of central Henan Province. About 60 foreign military officers from 16 countries observed the exercise at the training base affiliated to the Jinan Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). This was the largest scale military exercise open to foreign observers. In 2002, China began gradual participation in multilateral military exercises to broaden security cooperation with other countries.
- October 10 to 11, 2002: The PLA and the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan held a joint anti-terror military exercise on the border of the two countries. It was the first time for China to hold a cross-border military maneuver with its neighbor and also the first bilateral anti-terror exercise conducted by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
- Aug. 6 to 12, 2003, SCO member nations: Armed forces from five SCO member countries including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan took part in a joint anti-terror exercise named "Coalition 2003". It was the first exercise of its kind within the framework of the SCO and also the first time China participated in multilateral joint military maneuvers.
- Aug. 25, 2003, China: China, for the first time, invited 27 foreign military observers from 15 countries to watch military maneuvers at its largest tactical drill base in Inner Mongolia, aiming to introduce Chinese armed forces to the world and strengthen cooperation with foreign armed forces.
- Oct. 22, 2003, China-Pakistan: On Oct. 22, 2003, Chinese and Pakistani naval forces conducted a joint search and rescue exercise off the coast of Shanghai in the East China Sea. It was the first time Chinese naval forces held a joint exercise with a foreign counterpart since the founding of the People's Republic of China.

- Nov. 14, 2003, China-India: Chinese and Indian naval forces conducted a joint search and rescue exercise off the coast of Shanghai in the East China Sea, the first between the two armed forces.
- March 16, 2004, China-France: Chinese navy held its first-ever maritime drills with its French counterpart, off the coast of East China's Qingdao city.
- June 20, 2004, China-Britain: Chinese and British navies held joint maritime exercise for the first time, off the coast of East China's Qingdao city.
- Aug. 6, 2004, China-Pakistan: The PLA and the Armed Forces of Pakistan held an anti-terrorism exercise at Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, northwest China's Uygur Autonomous Region, bordering Pakistan.
- Aug. 28, 2004, China-India: Chinese and Indian frontier troops held a joint mountaineering training, the first of its kind between the two armed forces, in southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region.
- Sept. 2, 2004, China: Some 50 servicemen from China and abroad observed an amphibian landing exercise in Shanwei of south China's Guangdong Province. The group consisted of military observers from France, Germany, Britain and Mexico.

(Source: *PLA Daily*, 27 September 2004, accessed on 26 August 2005 at http://english.pladaily.com.cn/english/pladaily/2004/09/27/20040927001009_TodayHeadlines.html)

China Daily wrote that China is 'gearing up military theories and researching methods to combat terrorism, conduct information warfare, and better adapt its military force to modern-warfare scenarios. The General Staff of the People's Liberation Army in its annual guidelines for military training, the headquarters said it was moving to explore new ways to combat terrorist activities and to enhance combativeness in anti-terrorism fighting. The moves come as a timely response to the international situation after 9/11, which have sparked global concerns over the surging wave of terrorist assaults in a variety of forms' (*China Daily*, 18 January 2003). Another article which clearly speaks about China's concern on terrorism is an article titled "China, Another Target for Terrorists?" published in *Beijing Review* (1 July 2004:12) which clearly suggests that China is on the alert.⁷⁰

Commenting on the report in *China Daily* that China is well prepared in the case of an attack by bio-chemical weapons, the foreign ministry spokesperson said that "the Chinese

⁷⁰ Over the years many Chinese citizens have been targeted both inside and outside China. For example, internally it can be said that one of the major terrorist incidents in the history of China which happened on March 16, 2001, in Shijiazhuang city of Central China. Four bombs detonated within the space of one hour at separate locations killing more than one hundred persons and seriously injuring at least thirty-eight others. (See, Chang; 2001: p.283). Among the external cases, the incident of June 10, 2004, when a group of terrorists attacked a Chinese construction area in Afghanistan manned by Chinese workers, killing 11 and injuring four. Even on May 3, Chinese engineering personnel were on the receiving end of a car bombing in the seaport of Gwadar in Pakistan (*Beijing Review*, 2004:12).

government attaches great importance to the prevention and handling of any sort of terrorist activities, including the attacks by bio-chemical weapons...In case of attacks by bio-chemical weapons, China will, according to the Law on the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and other relevant laws, handle quickly at the first minute of discovery and control resolutely” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/19426.html>). To counter these possible terrorist attacks, the Chinese government has developed an effective anti-terrorism mechanism at various stages. Pan Guang is of the opinion that China’s anti-terrorism preparations can be seen at the following levels;

- First, an early warning and prevention system has been set up. The objective of such a system is to monitor the activities of terrorist groups, so as to forestall terror attacks well in advance by such means as cutting the fund connections to terrorists;
- Secondly, a quick response system is now in place. The mission of such a system is, in case of terrorist attacks, taking speedy and strong measures to remove or contain the causes of such strikes, restrict their fallout, and work for a quick resolution of the problem.
- Thirdly, consequence control and management system is now being established. This system focuses on the control of both physical and human losses in the wake of terrorist attacks or during their development. It strives for containment of the destructiveness of terrorist attacks and restoration of the normal order. In this regard, China, drawing especially upon the 9/11, makes efforts at the co-ordination of policemen, fire- fighters, armed troops, civilian rescuers and medical personnel in emergency cases.
- Fourthly, a mass education and mobilization system is being worked out. This system focuses on the popularization of anti-terror knowledge, anti-terror expertise, etc., so as to upgrade the anti-terror awareness and emergency responsiveness of the people (Pan, 2004: 529-531).

On the eve of Olympics, the Chinese authorities are using the threat of terrorism as a ground to prepare its own domestic counter-terrorism law.⁷¹ There was no doubt that in future China will continue to be an active member in the international anti-terrorism coalition, and play a significant role in the international counter-terrorism cooperation, even though China does not endorse always the US unilateral actions on terrorism. However, it should be noted that the Chinese anti-terror strategy is not global in nature like other major powers. China still focuses on its domestic concerns and neighbouring regions to counter terrorism, keeping in mind its own stability and development. But, of course, it is also increasingly clear that the Chinese participation is indispensable for

⁷¹ Currently China is on the process of drafting a counter-terrorism law (*Beijing Portal*, online: 2005).

international anti-terrorism efforts, whether in Eurasia, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, or even Middle East.

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CONCLUSION

While it seemed in the days following 9/11 that the world had been completely transformed, it has since become clear that for many aspects of international security, the real challenge posed by 9/11 is to distinguish and analyze clearly between what has really changed and what has not. This concluding chapter offers an evaluation of China's foreign policy strategy and achievements prior to 9/11, and ends with an evaluation of China's future policy options. It will also make such assessments as are possible regarding the pattern, if any, in China's response to international terrorism.

It is clearly evident from our previous chapters that equally with other major powers, China has been affected by the geopolitical shifts unleashed by the war on terrorism. Furthermore, it has seen its long-term strategic goals compromised by the growing US military presence around its own periphery (Malik, 2002). It is noticed that since the last decade, China has expanded the number and depth of its bilateral relationships, joined various joint and multilateral security accords, deepened its participation in key multilateral organizations, and helped continuously to address the global security issues. Foreign policy decision-making has become "less personalized and more institutionalized, and Chinese diplomats have become more open, clear, constructive and sophisticated in their articulation of the country's goals and positions" (Medeiros and Fravel, 2004:388). More broadly, the Chinese foreign policy establishment has come to see the country as an emerging great power with varied interests and responsibilities.

At the same time, many strategists and Sinologists point to China's limited involvement in the recent Iraq crisis as proof that Chinese leaders still adopt a mostly passive approach to world affairs. In other words, China still tries to maximize its interests through minimal involvement abroad, by free-riding on the actions of other major powers while staking a claim about its presence

as a responsible power (Medeiros and Fravel, 2004:388). The changes in policy formulations by the Chinese may have been slow and subtle, but their impact and significance is huge and can be felt widely. And their implications will be critical for China's relations with both the US and other international organizations or community at large.

China's growing participation in multilateral anti-terror cooperation since the 1990s is not only motivated by the increasing necessity to safeguard its security, but also embedded in its new mind-set on security issues. In the last decade, non-traditional security factors, extremist forces in particular, have increasingly played a critical role in China's approach to national security. For China, "terrorism" is only a form of extremism and given the situation in China, there are primarily four types of extremist forces that are currently most active: terrorism, religious extremism, national separatism and cults (Jia, 2005:121). Evolving a new approach, China worked out its new security policy by the turn of the century. The objectives of this policy can be said threefold:

- to maintain China's own stability and development;
- to safeguard the peace and stability of China's neighboring regions; and
- to promote international security dialogue and cooperation.

Since the end of the Cold War, a new conception of what constitutes "national security" has taken place (*People's Daily*, 30 June 2002). As a result, the following changes can be seen in China's internal and external security environment which compels China to reformulate their security policy (Szonyi, 2002: *Commentary*):

- First, the collapse of the former Soviet Union led to the breakup of the global bipolar model. As a result, the possibility for worldwide wars between powers has become slimmer, and regional wars triggered off by ethnic, religious, border, and resources disputes have become more likely (*People's Daily*, 30 June 2002);
- Second, the number of traditional military confrontations has decreased, but non-traditional factors that threaten national and international security have been on the rise. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US fully exposed the vulnerability of individual nations to non-traditional threats to security;
- Third, the further advancement of the world's political multi-polarization and economic globalization makes all countries more interdependent. While providing historic opportunities for more reasonable resources distribution, economic globalization also poses new challenges to national security. To conform to the changing international situation, China has made a timely adjustment to its national security conception. China maintains that a universally accepted new security model should be set up to replace the Cold War mentality and bloc politics. To lay a political foundation and provide a

prerequisite for global and regional security, China proposes countries should establish relations with each other on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (*People's Daily*, 30 June 2002).

Counter-terrorism has become an important component of both China's diplomatic and domestic agenda. As we have discussed in the first chapter, terrorism for China has its historical roots and theoretical bases. Terrorism as a problem could be seen in parts of China even before 9/11, but it was only after 9/11 that China participated fully in the international anti-terror cooperation. The formulation of the new security concept in Chinese foreign policy has left obvious imprints on China's counter-terrorism strategy. At the same time, it can be said that following the new security concept, China opposes unilateralism in international counter terrorism campaigns. It emphasizes multilateral cooperation, and particularly, the role of the United Nations. It also opposes unrestrained expansion of anti-terror war, believing that terrorism will not be eliminated by military means alone, but by concerted political, economic, cultural and diplomatic efforts.

The Chinese participation, which assumes an increasing role in the international anti-terror campaigns, unfolds on the following levels:

- First, China has actively supported and participated in the international alliance against Taliban and Al-Qaeda;
- Secondly, the prominent role of the Chinese is manifested in the sharing of anti-terror information, uprooting the financial sources of the terrorist groups, granting support to the Pakistani anti-terror efforts, preventing the escalation of India-Pakistani confrontation that might have disrupted the regional anti-terror campaign, combating cross-border criminal activities related with terrorist organizations, and so on. As we have discussed in our chapters that the "East Turkistan" terrorists have for long been trained, armed and financed by international terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda in particular. Therefore, the Chinese campaign against the "East Turkistan" movement is a key link in international anti-terror campaigns;
- Thirdly, since 9/11, China has attempted to position its repression of Uyghurs as part of the global "war on terror". By exploiting the climate that followed the attacks on the US and the fact that some Uyghurs were found fighting in Afghanistan, China has consistently and largely successfully portrayed Uyghurs as the source of a serious Islamic terrorist threat in Xinjiang. This perception seems to have now become dominant with the Chinese public, which because of the lack of a free media has little ability to compare source of information and come to independent judgments about this claim;
- Fourthly, in the aftermath of 9/11, China successfully lobbied US to support its efforts to place the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" (ETIM) on a United Nations list of banned terrorist organizations. But Chinese officials admit that in recent years separatist activity

has actually decreased and is not a threat to the viability of the state. China has opportunistically used the post-9/11 environment to make the outrageous claim that individuals disseminating peaceful religious and cultural messages in Xinjiang are terrorists who have simply changed tactics;

- Fifthly, China, favours a dominant UN role in international anti-terror affairs, has taken an active part in the anti-terror efforts in the UN framework, which includes the construction of an international anti-terror legal system. Even before 9/11, China had joined most of the international conventions on anti-terrorism. After 9/11, China supported the UN and its Security Council in passing various anti-terrorism resolutions, in enforcing the relevant resolutions, in joining treaties like “The International Convention on Curbing Terrorist Explosions” and “The International Convention on Curbing Funding to Terrorism”, and in initiating negotiations and dialogues on anti-terrorism with countries concerned;
- Sixthly, China contributed significantly to the UN-led national reconciliation process in Tazhikstan, and the post-war reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Likewise, China’s role has also been obvious in seeking a political solution for the Iraqi problem before the Iraq war, and in assisting the UN to play a bigger role in the reconstruction of Iraq;
- Seventhly, China has promoted international anti-terror cooperation through such multilateral mechanisms as SCO, APEC, ASEM, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. As discussed in our case study one, the Shanghai Five/SCO that targeted the three evil forces since its initiation in 1996 has consistently played a pivotal role in the anti-terror struggles in Central Asia;
- Eighthly, China has developed an impressive bilateral anti-terrorism mechanism with other states. Countries that have so far initiated regular anti-terrorism cooperation with China or have conducted negotiations with China on such issues include the US, Russia, India, Pakistan, Britain, France, and Germany, to name the more significant ones;
- Ninthly, China’s growing participation in multilateral anti-terror cooperation since the 1990s is not only motivated by the increasing necessity to safeguard its security, but also embedded on its new mind-set on security issues. This new mind-set is termed a new security concept.

Although China has shown unwavering support for the eradication of terrorist activity, based on its indigenous problems with ethnic separatism and extremism near the country’s western frontier, the current US campaign against terrorism may still pose problems for future Chinese foreign policy.

The impressive anti-terrorism steps which China has taken to improve relations with other states both inside and outside its periphery have not completely allayed Chinese fears of containment by the US and its allies, and the specter of a future China being checked by US strategies and policies, even under the aegis of the fight against international terrorism, will remain

of concern in China's foreign policy making (Lanteigne, 2005:165). At the moment, China is checked by taking the following positions on three different cases differently. They are:

- **Case One: SCO:** SCO represents a successful endeavour by China to help in the creation of an international security institution which observes the parameters of Chinese foreign policy as it relates to cooperation with such organizations, namely that the SCO, despite its increased formalization after 2001, remains consensus-based, not directed towards a specific adversary, and is flexible enough to allow for new issues to be raised. China's position of being the strongest player in the SCO, economically and politically, has also allowed it to take the lead in directing the SCO to counter the rising threats in the Central Asian regions.
- **Case Two: Kashmir:** While the continuous terrorist incidents in the Kashmir valley has attracted constant condemnation from all major international bodies, China as a P-5 nation has taken no direct position on the issue of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. China has traditionally supported Pakistan against India, but now in the post-cold war era the Chinese have distanced themselves somewhat from Pakistan in order to cultivate better relations with India.
- **Case Three: 9/11:** Ever since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, China has actively participated in international consultations over anti-terrorism issues and committed itself to regional and global anti-terrorism campaigns. The Chinese government voted in favour of the anti-terrorism resolutions in the UN Security Council. China has extended support and assistance to the U.S. combat against terrorism in the fields of diplomacy, intelligence, and finance and law enforcement.

There are, already, elements of both continuity and change in Chinese security policy. The following major components can be seen as continuity: *First*, adhering to independence and safeguarding world peace. Chinese leaders decide on their approaches and policies regarding international issues independently. *Second*, establishing friendly and cooperative relations. China is willing to establish and develop good relations with all countries on the basis of five principles, often enunciated: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nona.

China's position and response on terrorism gradually acquired wider contours. Since 9/11 in particular, the Chinese discourse on terrorism duly appreciated its global dimension and extensive transnational linkages. From its domestic perspective, China has been facing an increasing number of incidents of terrorism and separatist movements within its own borders, and from time to time the government has adopted specific approaches in the foreign policy in dealing with the issue. Three emerging approaches can be seen in Chinese foreign policy in this context:

- One approach is prevention, which involves domestic legislation and widespread crackdowns on terrorist activities by law enforcement agencies to isolate and condemn

separatist groups. The recent constitutional amendments in regard to criminal law (articles 114, 120 and 191) and especially China's initiatives to draft a counterterrorism law to strengthen its fight against terrorism demonstrates the government's preventive approach to terrorism;

- The other approach is to cooperate with international forces to form a strong coalition against international terrorism. Evolving various regional mechanisms with its Central Asian neighbours and increasing cooperation with other international actors like USA, India, Russia in combating terrorism constitutes the framework for its cooperative approach;
- Another newly emerging approach to be noticed is the evolution of the Chinese government's approach to and position on the issue of terrorism and its strategies to tackle the menace through its various position papers, white papers and documents. Undoubtedly, these official papers and documents are promoting and projecting the image of the Chinese government as a responsive and responsible power at the global level (Panda, 2006:200).

Noticeably since the 9/11 incident, the Chinese government has raised and dealt with terrorism and counter-terrorism strategy in all significant official documents and government papers issued either for domestic or international purposes. In fact the latest *White Paper* "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation" when dealing with the international security situation refers to the non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational crimes and infectious diseases. Yet another *Position Paper on UN Reform*⁷² released on June 7, 2005 carries a substantial section on 'counter-terrorism' strategy. Emphasizing multilateralism, promoting democracy and rule of law in international affairs and urging reforms in United Nations, the position paper says, "China stands for and supports the fight against terrorism in *all* forms and manifestations (*italics added*). International counter-terrorism efforts should give full play to the UN leading and coordinating role, address both the root causes and symptoms and avoid politicization and double standards" (*China Daily*, online).⁷³ There are two significant aspects of the Chinese approach which emerge in these most recent publications: first, the Chinese government's stress on a consensus in the definition on terrorism at the international level and secondly, the consistent emphasis on the need for the UN

⁷² The paper is detailed in four parts: (a) development, (b) security, (c) rule of law, human rights and democracy, and (d) strengthening the UN. For the full text of China's Position Paper on UN Reforms, please refer http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/08/content_449696.htm

⁷³ For the full text of China's Position Paper on UN Reforms, please refer http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/08/content_449696.htm

to take a leading role in dealing with the issue of terrorism at the international level. Following the official standard of the Chinese government, in a similar manner Yang Huanning, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Security views that “the practice of broadening the scope of counter-terrorism arbitrarily should be prohibited, let alone the practice of making it a pretext of reaching other political aims. Terrorism should not be confused with particular ethnic or religious group. The approach of double standards should not be taken in fighting against terrorism” (Yang: p.184).

Another factor that has expanded China’s foreign policymaking process is the growing public discussion on various global issues and security related aspects. Open debates on sensitive issues such as nonproliferation, terrorism, missile defense are now part of the discussion openly in every workshops, shows and seminars. Today experts tackle all these issues in opinion pieces, TV talk shows, and books seeking to influence and shape China’s diplomacy. Meanwhile, Chinese media outlets, including the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, the *People’s Daily*, have started to regularly publish roundtable-style discussions by these newly vocal analysts. China is also using the Internet to make its position more transparent at the global level. All *White Papers* are now available on the Website of the State Council Information Office (www.china.org.cn), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offers a trove of useful data on its site (www.fmprc.gov.cn), including detailed descriptions of its positions on regional issues and transcripts of press conference and key speeches (Hao and Su, 2005: 111-112). Alongside these internal changes, China has adopted a more sophisticated approach to interacting with the international press bureaus. Also one can clearly see a systematic attempt on the part of the Chinese, as a major power, to set out norms insofar as inter-state behaviour and relations are concerned (Acharya, 2006:29).

These collective changes in the content, character, and execution of China’s foreign policy strategy over the last one decade represent an important evolution in its perception of the world. Within the last five years, since 9/11, the writings of Chinese strategists have begun to reflect a critical shift in their view of the international system and China’s role in it.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX-II

China's Position Paper against International Terrorism (02/10/01) (Released on September 25, 2001)

I. Terrorism, which endangers innocent lives, causes losses of social wealth and jeopardizes security of States, constitutes a serious challenge to human civilization and a serious threat to international peace and security.

II. The Chinese Government opposes and condemns all forms of terrorism and is against using terrorism as a means of achieving political objectives.

III. The fight against terrorism calls for protracted and concerted efforts of the international community. It is imperative to strengthen international cooperation at all levels and establish an international anti-terrorism mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, relevant Security Council resolutions, all conventions against international terrorism as well as documents adopted by the UN General Assembly in this regard.

IV. China supports all efforts aimed at strengthening anti-terrorism conventions within the framework of the United Nations, including the early completion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. China encourages all States to become parties to the existing international anti-terrorism conventions as soon as possible and to effectively implement such conventions.

V. In their cooperation to fight international terrorism, all States should faithfully fulfill their responsibilities and obligations, including:

- condemning all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable;

- taking necessary measures, in accordance with their national laws and international obligations, to cut off any financial, material and military support to terrorists;

- desisting from engaging in activities of organizing, abetting, assisting, financing or participating in terrorist acts in the territories of other countries, or acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their own borders that facilitate acts of terrorism in other countries, or sheltering, harboring or conniving at international terrorists, or supporting or tolerating for whatever reason or in whatever form and by whatever means, perpetrators of terrorist acts;

- taking appropriate measures to ensure that their territories are not used as terrorist training camps or to prepare or organize acts of terrorist activities against other countries or their nationals;

- arresting, prosecuting and extraditing perpetrators of terrorist acts in conformity with their domestic laws and provisions of relevant international treaties;

- making efforts to conduct international cooperation through bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements, particularly by promoting all forms of information exchange helpful to the fight against terrorism, providing legal assistance in terms of investigation, evidence-collection, arrest and prosecution procedures involving acts of terrorism, and extraditing or handing over by other means criminals to relevant authorities of countries concerned, in accordance with domestic laws as well as obligations provided for in international treaties. Developed

countries should provide to other Member States upon request necessary anti-terrorism technologies, financial assistance and training and help the latter to strengthen their anti-terrorism capacity building.

VI. The United Nations and its Security Council should play a leading role in the fight against terrorism. It is recommended that the Security Council should establish an anti-terrorism mechanism to explore and formulate and conduct concrete programs for the fight against terrorism.

VII. It is recommended that UN Secretariat strengthen its capacity of information-collection and analysis in the field of counter-terrorism and report to the Security Council periodically.

VIII. The fight against terrorism should be conducted in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other established norms of international law. There should be a comprehensive approach, involving political, diplomatic, economic and other means, to address both the problem of terrorism and its underlying causes, in an effort to eliminate the root causes of terrorism.

(Source: <http://www.china-un.ch>, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland).

APPENDIX-III

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Statement by H. E. Mr. Wang Yingfan
Ambassador and Permanent Representative Of the People's Republic of China To the United Nations At the 56th Session of the General Assembly Of United Nations
On Item 166: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism
3 October 2001

Mr. President,

The Chinese Delegation was deeply shocked by and strongly condemns the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. The item of Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism has been deliberated at the General Assembly for quite some years. But this year, the item has become more special and urgent than ever before. Terrorism, which endangers innocent lives, causes losses of social wealth and jeopardizes state security, constitutes a serious challenge to human civilization and dignity as well as a serious threat to international peace and security. The international community, therefore, must pool wisdom together and strengthen international cooperation against terrorism.

Mr. President,

The United Nations, which is the important forum for States to cooperate with each other in combating terrorism, should play a leading role in the international effort to this end. The main organs and other relevant agencies of the United Nations should step up their coordination and cooperation in preventing and combating international terrorism. The Security Council should play its due part and establish an international anti-terrorism mechanism. Since the adoption in 1994 by the General Assembly of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, commendable progress has been made in strengthening measures to combat international terrorism, as represented by the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism as well as the on-going formulation of an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. States should be encouraged to become parties as soon as possible to the existing international anti-terrorism conventions and implement them faithfully. More positive and constructive efforts should be made in order to finalize the above-mentioned two draft anti-terrorism conventions that are still under negotiation. States should take necessary measures, in accordance with their national laws and international obligations, to cut off any financial, material, military and all other sorts of support to terrorists, be determined in bringing perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice and refrain from supporting or tolerating them for whatever reason or in whatever manner. Resolution 1373 adopted by the Security Council on September 28th should be faithfully implemented.

The fight against international terrorism, which will be a protracted as well as complicated task, should be guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other well-established norms of international law. An integrated approach involving political, diplomatic, economic, legal and other means should be adopted in this regard. We are strongly against linking terrorism to a certain religion or ethnicity. In order to eliminate international terrorism, efforts must be made to address both the symptom and its underlying causes. In the international fight against terrorism, the diversity of civilization should be respected and the issue of development be addressed vigorously so as to enable people of all levels in all countries to benefit from globalization. The international community should strengthen its efforts to solve regional conflicts in a more positive manner and seek just and reasonable solutions on the basis of the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter.

Mr. President,

The Government of China firmly opposes and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It is China's basic policy to prevent and combat all terrorist activities. China has already been party to nine out of the twelve international conventions against terrorism and active preparations are under way for it to join the two recently adopted conventions, i.e. the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. The Chinese Government has dedicated itself to the promotion of regional and bilateral cooperation against terrorism and has, within the framework of the Shanghai Organization on Cooperation, concluded with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. The Chinese Government is determined to fight resolutely, together with all other States, against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

Thank you, Mr. President.

**(Source: Permanent Representative Of the People's Republic of China To the United Nations:
<http://www.china-un.ch>)**

APPENDIX-IV

SCO Declaration of 15 June 2001

The heads of state of the six countries -- Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- issued here today a declaration of the founding of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization." Its full text reads as follow:

Declaration of the founding of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization"

The heads of state of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Federation of Russia, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan Speak highly of the positive role that the "Shanghai Five" has played with respect to promoting and deepening good neighborliness, mutual trust, and friendly relations; and to consolidating regional security and stability and promoting common development between member countries ever since its establishment five years ago;

Unanimously maintain that the establishment and development of the "Shanghai Five" are in line with the historical trend that, after the Cold War, the human race wants peace and development; and they have demonstrated the enormous potential for countries with different civilization backgrounds and traditional cultures to achieve coexistence in harmony and cooperation in unity through mutual respect and mutual trust;

Specially point out that the two agreements, which the heads of state of the five countries -- Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Federation of Russia, and the Republic of Tajikistan -- signed in Shanghai and Moscow respectively in 1996 and 1997 on enhancing trust in the military sphere in border areas and on mutually reducing military forces in border areas, as well as the final documents they signed during their meetings in Alma-Ata (1998), Bishkek (1999), and Dushanbe (2000) have contributed significantly to safeguarding peace, security and stability of this region and the world, significantly enhanced their diplomatic and regional cooperation of this age, and created widespread and positive impacts in the international community;

Firmly believe that, against the background of the rapid development of political polarization and economic and information globalization in the 21st century, elevating the "Shanghai Five" mechanism to an even higher level of cooperation will help all member countries take advantage of the opportunities and deal with the new challenges and threats together more effectively;

Now solemnly declare:

1. That the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Federation of Russia, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan will form the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization."

2. That the objectives of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" are:

Strengthening mutual trust and good neighborly friendship between member countries; promoting effective cooperation between member countries in political, economic, scientific-technological, cultural, and educational spheres and in energy, communications, environmental protection, and other areas; working together to preserve and safeguard regional peace, security and stability; and building a democratic, just, and rational international political and economic new order.

3. That the heads of state of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" members countries will officially meet once a year and the heads of government of the member countries will meet at regular intervals in member countries on a rotational basis. To broaden and strengthen cooperation in all spheres, other new meeting mechanisms than the established ones governing meetings of leaders of corresponding departments may be established according to situations, and permanent and provisional working groups of experts may be established to study plans and suggestions for carrying out cooperation.
4. The "Shanghai Spirit," whose basic contents are "mutual trust, reciprocity, equality, consultations, respect for diverse civilizations, and quest for common development," created during the formation process of the "Shanghai Five" is a precious wealth that countries in this region have accumulated over the years during the course of their cooperation. This spirit should be amplified so that it will become the guiding principle for the mutual relationships between member countries of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization."
5. Member countries of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" will strictly abide by the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They will respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They will not interfere in each other's internal affairs. They will not use threat or force against each other. They will benefit each other on an equal footing. They will resolve all issues through consultations. They will not seek to achieve unilateral military superiority in contiguous areas.
6. The "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" is created on the basis of the two agreements signed in Shanghai and Moscow in 1996 and 1997 respectively on enhancing mutual trust in military sphere in border areas and on mutually reducing military forces in border areas. The scope of cooperation has been extended to political, economic, cultural, scientific-technological, and other areas. The principles embodied in the above agreements are the basis of the mutual relationships between member countries of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization."
7. The "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" upholds the principle of nonalignment, not targeting at any third country or region, and being open to the outside. It wants all forms of dialogue, exchange and cooperation with other countries and international and regional organizations. It will, on the basis of achieving consensus through consultations, admit other countries as new members into the organization -- countries that identify themselves with the objectives and missions of cooperation within the framework of the organization and the principles and other provisions expounded in article six of this declaration; and countries whose admission can help ensure cooperation.
8. The "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" attaches special importance to safeguarding regional security and will make all the necessary efforts to do so. All the member countries will work closely in implementing the "Shanghai Convention on Rebuffing Terrorism, Separatism, and Radicalism," which includes the establishment of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Antiterrorist Center" in Bishkek. In addition, the organization will draw up other multilateral cooperation documents for deterring illegal trading of weapons and narcotics, illegal immigration, and other forms of crime.
9. Taking advantage of its member countries' enormous potentials and opportunities for mutually cooperation in the economic and trade sphere, the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" will work hard to promote the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation and the diversification of cooperation between its member countries. To this end, the organization will, within its framework, activate the process of talks for facilitating trade and investment, draw up outlines for long-term multilateral economic and trade cooperation, and sign the relevant documents.
10. Member countries of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" will strengthen consultations and coordination while handling regional and international affairs, support one another and cooperating closely with one another on handling important international and regional issues, and work together in promoting and consolidating peace and stability in this region and the world. Under the current international situation, maintaining a global strategic balance and stability has especially important significance.
11. For the purpose of coordinating the cooperation and organizing the coordination of competent departments of the member countries of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization," a council of national coordinators of the organization's member countries will be established, and the council's activities will be regulated by provisional rules to be approved by the foreign ministers of the member countries.

The council of national coordinators will be instructed to begin drawing up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter on the basis of this declaration and the documents that the heads of state of the "Shanghai Five" have signed. This charter -- which shall specifically provide the goal, objectives and missions of the organization's future cooperation, the principles and procedures of admitting new members, the legal effects of its decisions, and the ways of cooperating with other international organizations -- will be signed when the heads of state of the member countries meet in 2002.

Reviewing the past and looking ahead, the heads of state of the member countries are convinced that the establishment of the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" is a landmark indicating that the process of the cooperation between the member countries has started to step onto a brand new stage of development; and that this is in line with the trend of this age and the real situation of this region, and is also in the fundamental interests of the peoples of all the member countries.

[Signed by Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Jiang Zemin, president of the People's Republic of China; Askar Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; Vladimir Putin, president of the Federation of Russia; Emomali Rakhmonov, president of the Republic of Tajikistan; Islam Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan]

(Source: Documents About Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the UN Office, Geneva:
<http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/eng/sco/sco02.htm>)

Press Release SC/7638 (20-01-2003)
Security Council
4688th Meeting (AM)

**MINISTERIAL-LEVEL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING CALLS FOR URGENT ACTION
TO PREVENT, SUPPRESS ALL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM**

**Declaration in Resolution 1456 (2003) Adopted Unanimously;
Highlights Counter-Terrorism Committee's Role in Implementation**

The Security Council this morning, meeting at the ministerial level, adopted a declaration reaffirming the severity of the global terrorist threat and calling on all States to take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active and passive support to terrorism.

With 13 of the Council's 15 members represented by their Foreign Ministers, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1456 (2003), containing the declaration. In doing so, the Council also called on its Counter-Terrorism Committee to intensify its efforts to promote the implementation by Member States of resolution 1373 (2001).

Adopted following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, resolution 1373 called on Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, refrain from providing any support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, and deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support and commit such acts.

Speaking at the outset of today's meeting, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that since the attacks of 11 September, the world had focused an unprecedented attention on terrorism and on the means of countering it. The tragic loss of life in terrorist acts, such as those recently in Moscow, Bali and Mombasa, was a dramatic reminder that success in countering that threat remained elusive. Despite enhanced attention and more concerted action, the problem required sustained long-term action. He stressed the increasing "indispensable" legal and institutional role the United Nations must play in the anti-terrorism campaign.

He also urged action to solve the political disputes and long-standing conflicts, which underpinned, fuelled and generated support for terrorism. While there was an urgent and compelling need to prevent acts of terror, there was a no less compelling need to pursue the goals enshrined in the Charter. To the extent that the Organization succeeded in fighting poverty and injustice, suffering and war, it was also likely help end the conditions that served as justification for those who would commit acts of terror.

Briefing the Council on the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, its Chairman, Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom), said that in 15 months the Committee had received over 280 reports from 178 Member States, which showed that the vast majority of governments throughout the world had begun to respond to the challenge laid down in resolution 1373 to prevent and suppress terrorism. "But there is still much more to do before terrorists find that the bar against terrorism has been raised everywhere", he said.

All States, he added, must work to implement resolution 1373. Thirteen States had not yet submitted a report to the Committee and two States had not yet "even picked up the telephone". The declaration to be adopted today set a final date for submission of 31 March, after which it must be clear that any non-reporting State would be held to be non-compliant with resolution 1373.

During the discussion, Council members reiterated that terrorism affected all countries and peoples and, therefore, international cooperation was crucial to fight it. Much had already been done with the adoption of resolution 1373, the sanctions against Al Qaeda and the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. At the same time, it was imperative to do more.

Terrorism was “far from being crushed”, said Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov. The new wave of terrorist acts that shook the world at the end of last year had reaffirmed, with alarming clarity, that the world continued to face a strong and ruthless enemy, which threatened international security and the foundations of the modern world order.

Others stressed the need to strengthen international cooperation, conclude negotiations on texts related to terrorism and assist countries, particularly those of the South, to better implement counter-terrorism measures. With regard to the latter, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin proposed setting up a cooperation and assistance fund at the United Nations, which would have its own resources and work closely with international financial institutions.

The time had come, noted several speakers, to take action regarding the link between terrorism and other illegal activities, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction, arms trafficking and illegal financing. Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists was a mortal danger to all, stated United States Secretary of State Colin Powell. In that connection, the Council would meet in the very near future to determine what to do in the case of Iraq, and when it did, Council members must not be “shocked into impotence” because they were afraid of the difficult choices ahead.

It was also stressed that in the fight against terrorism, national and international law, human rights, and the Charter must be respected. Human rights, in particular, said German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, should not be suspended under the pretext of combating terrorism. After all, that fight was not only about defending security, but also about fundamental values, namely, freedom, democracy and human rights.

Also addressing the Council this morning were: the Minister of State for External Relations of Cameroon, François-Xavier Ngoubeyou; the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Jack Straw; the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Solomon Passy; the Minister of External Relations of Angola, Joao Bernardo de Miranda; the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri; the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Luis Ernesto Derbez; the Foreign Minister of Spain, Ana Palacio; the Foreign Minister of China, Tang Jiaxuan; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Guinea, François Lonseny Fall.

Background

The Security Council met this morning, at the ministerial level, to discuss combating terrorism and, in particular, to examine the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001). Council members were expected to assess the actions that have been taken and consider formulating new guidelines to improve the effectiveness of combating terrorism. Two weeks after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Council adopted resolution 1373, which called on Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, refrain from providing any support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, and deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support and commit such acts. The Council also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the resolution's implementation through, among other things, reports from States on actions they had taken to that end. Briefing the Council last year, the Committee's Chairman, Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom), said the Committee would respond to each State's report, asking for more information, or outlining areas in which that State's capacity against terrorism could be upgraded and identifying possible resources of expertise or assistance. He also suggested establishing a trust fund to finance the Committee's work.

Draft Resolution

Following up is the full text of the draft resolution (document S/2003/60), containing its anti-terrorism declaration in an annex, before the Council:

“The Security Council,

“Decides to adopt the attached declaration on the issue of combating terrorism.

Annex

“The Security Council,

“Meeting at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 20 January 2003 reaffirms that:

- terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security;
- any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are to be unequivocally condemned, especially when they indiscriminately target or injure civilians;
- there is a serious and growing danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and therefore a need to strengthen controls on these materials;
- it has become easier, in an increasingly globalized world, for terrorists to exploit sophisticated technology, communications and resources for their criminal objectives;
- measures to detect and stem the flow of finance and funds for terrorist purposes must be urgently strengthened;
- terrorists must also be prevented from making use of other criminal activities such as transnational organized crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking, money-laundering and illicit arms trafficking;
- since terrorists and their supporters exploit instability and intolerance to justify their criminal acts, the Security Council is determined to counter this by contributing to peaceful resolution of disputes and by working to create a climate of mutual tolerance and respect;
- terrorism can only be defeated, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, by a sustained comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, international and regional organizations, and by redoubled efforts at the national level.

“The Security Council therefore calls for the following steps to be taken:

- “1. All States must take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active and passive support to terrorism, and in particular comply fully with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolutions 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003);
- “2. The Security Council calls upon States to:
 - (a) become a party, as a matter of urgency, to all relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, in particular the 1999 international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism and to support all international initiatives taken to that aim, and to make full use of the sources of assistance and guidance which are now becoming available;
 - (b) assist each other, to the maximum extent possible, in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, wherever they occur;
 - (c) cooperate closely to implement fully the sanctions against terrorists and their associates, in particular Al Qaeda and the Taliban and their associates, as reflected in resolutions 1267 (1999), 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), to take urgent actions to deny them access to the financial resources they need to carry out their actions, and to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001);
- “3. States must bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens, in accordance with international law, in particular on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute;
- “4. The Counter-Terrorism Committee must intensify its efforts to promote the implementation by Member States of all aspects of resolution 1373 (2001), in particular through reviewing States' reports and facilitating international assistance and cooperation, and through continuing to operate in a transparent and effective manner, and in that regard the Council;
 - (i) stresses the obligation on States to report to the CTC,

according to the timetable set by the CTC, calls on the 13 States who have not yet submitted a first report and on the 56 States who are late in submitting further reports to do so by 31 March, and requests the CTC to report regularly on progress;

(ii) calls on States to respond promptly and fully to the CTC's

requests for information, comments and questions in full and on time, and instructs the CTC to inform the Council of progress, including any difficulties it encounters;

(iii) requests the CTC in monitoring the implementation of

resolution 1373 (2001) to bear in mind all international best practices, codes and standards which are relevant to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), and underlines its support for the CTC's approach in constructing a dialogue with each State on further action required to fully implement resolution 1373 (2001);

“5. States should assist each other to improve their capacity to prevent and fight terrorism, and notes that such cooperation will help facilitate the full and timely implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), and invites the CTC to step up its efforts to facilitate the provision of technical and other assistance by developing targets and priorities for global action;

“6. States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply

with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law;

“7. International organizations should evaluate ways in which they can

enhance the effectiveness of their action against terrorism, including by establishing dialogue and exchanges of information with each other and with other relevant international actors, and directs this appeal in particular to those technical agencies and organizations whose activities relate to the control of the use of or access to nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials; in this context the importance of fully complying with existing legal obligations in the field of disarmament, arms limitation and non-proliferation and, where necessary, strengthening international instruments in this field should be underlined;

“8. Regional and subregional organizations should work with the CTC and

other international organizations to facilitate sharing of best practice in the fight against terrorism, and to assist their members in fulfilling their obligation to combat terrorism;

“9. Those participating in the Special Meeting of the Counter Terrorism

Committee with international regional and sub-regional organizations on 7 March 2003 should use that opportunity to make urgent progress on the matters referred to in this declaration which involve the work of such organizations;

The Security Council also:

“10. emphasizes that continuing international efforts to enhance dialogue

and broaden the understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, to further strengthen the campaign against terrorism, and to address unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development issues, will contribute to international cooperation and collaboration, which by themselves are necessary to sustain the broadest possible fight against terrorism;

“11. reaffirms its strong determination to intensify its fight against

terrorism in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, and takes note of the contributions made during its meeting on 20 January 2003 with a view to enhancing the role of the United Nations in this regard, and invites Member States to make further contributions to this end;

“12. invites the Secretary General to present a report within 28 days

summarizing any proposals made during its ministerial meeting and any commentary or response to these proposals by any Security Council member;

“13. encourages Members States of the United Nations to cooperate in

resolving all outstanding issues with a view to the adoption, by consensus, of the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism and the draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism;

“14. decides to review actions taken towards the realization of this declaration at further meetings of the Security Council.”

Statements

TANG JIAXUAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, said that it was incumbent on the international community to formulate a common strategy to fight terrorism. The central task in fighting terrorism was to ensure the peace and the security of mankind. Solving hotspot issues such as the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan would impact positively on international cooperation to fight terrorism. All ways and means employed must be conducive to the easing of such tensions.

Also, it was necessary to proceed with the counter-terrorism campaign with the goal of promoting universal development and prosperity, he said. Only when the gap between rich and poor was narrowed could the soil of terrorism be eradicated. The early realization of all development goals set forth in the Millennium Declaration would be significant in mobilizing international cooperation. Further, the struggle against terrorism should provide an opportunity for nations to learn from one another. All countries should strive to promote understanding and tolerance.

The success of the international campaign against terrorism required common cooperation and coordination, he said. Success also depended on the leading role played by the United Nations. He hoped that the Counter-Terrorism Committee would adopt more forceful measures to allow developing countries to fully implement measures to fight terrorism. His country had attached great importance to counter-terrorism. It had signed and ratified almost all the United Nations Conventions on counter-terrorism. China had been a victim of terrorism. The “East Turkistan” terrorist organization had perpetrated numerous terrorist attacks in China’s Xinjiang province and neighbouring areas. In September, the Security Council had put that group on the list of terrorist groups.

APPENDIX-VI

China and the Suppression of International Terrorism (2003/10/28)

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The "September 11" incident showed that terrorism had become a grave threat to international peace and security. In 2002, international terrorist forces continued to create terrorist incidents in Bali Island of Indonesia, Moscow of Russia and other places. The East Turkistan terrorist forces launched a terrorist attack directed at Chinese diplomats in the Kyrgyz Republic. All those show that the anti-terrorism situation facing the world and China today is still grave.

China is consistently opposed and condemns all forms of terrorism, and no matter it occurs at what time, in which place, and is directed at whom, it should be combated resolutely. China maintains that combating terrorism should have conclusive evidence and clear objectives and that all anti-terrorism actions should conform to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the generally recognized

principles of international law, and should be conducive to the maintenance of regional and world peace and stability. The United Nations should play a leading role in the fight against terrorism in the world. Terrorism belongs to a handful of extreme evil forces and should not be linked up with any specific race or region. The anti-terrorism fight is a contest between peace and violence and not a conflict between races, religions or civilizations. The diversity of civilizations should be recognized and respected and different social systems and civilizations should seek common ground while reserving differences and seek long-term co-existence. Terrorism should be combated by looking into both its symptoms and root cause. Political, economic and diplomatic measures should be adopted in a comprehensive way to completely get rid of the root of terrorism. To solve the problem of development and eliminate poverty is of vital importance to the suppression of terrorism. The international community should attach importance to the question of development with a sense of more urgency.

"The East Turkistan Islamic Movement" is a part of the international terrorist forces. It created a great number of incidents of terrorist violence inside and outside China, posing a grave threat to the regional security and stability. China appreciates the entering of the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" by the UN Security Council into the list of terrorist organizations and individuals that it has announced earlier, and will continue to cooperate with the international community for a joint fight against terrorist activities in all forms including the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement".

In 2002, China took many measures in the field of fighting against terrorism. First of all, it took an active part in international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. At the multi-lateral plane, China supported anti-terrorism resolutions adopted by UN agencies including the Security Council and conscientiously implemented the relevant resolutions. On January 28-February 1, 2002, the 6th session of the Special Committee against Terrorism of the General Assembly met. At the meeting, China continued to adopt a serious and constructive attitude to participate actively in the work of drafting a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. China hoped that the parties concerned would go further to take a cooperative and pragmatic stand and complete the drafting at an early date. Within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the heads of state of other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization signed on June 7, 2002, the Agreement of the State Parties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency at the Summit Conference in Petersburg of Russia. The Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to be established soon in accordance with the Agreement will play a positive role in the international anti-terrorism fight. On December 28, 2002, the 31st Session of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress made a decision to approve the Agreement. In the bilateral field, China has established anti-terrorism consultation mechanism with the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, India and Pakistan and made use of all international occasions to publicize its own anti-terrorism stand. Secondly, domestic anti-terrorism measures had been strengthened. The relevant Chinese departments had further adopted practical measures in the fields of finance, law, civil aviation security and entry and exit administration to combat and prevent terrorism and achieved good results.

China's stand of being firm, just, cooperative and good at suiting its actions to its words in the fight against terrorism has won universal praise from the international community.

APPENDIX-VII

Position Paper of China at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly 2004/08/05

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2594/2602/t146392.htm>

Since the 58th Session of the UN General Assembly, the international situation has continued to undergo profound and complicated changes. Peace and development remain the themes of the times. Maintaining world peace and promoting common development is the shared aspiration of peoples across the world. In the meantime, however, there are increasing uncertainties affecting peace and development. Ethnic and religious problems and local conflicts sparked by boundary and territorial disputes crop up from time to time. The North-South gap is still widening. Raging terrorism, rampant transnational crimes, the spread of disease, environmental pollution and other non-traditional security factors are threatening human development in a wide range of areas. In this context, the authority and role of the UN need to be secured and enhanced.

Against this backdrop, the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly is of great significance. This Session is, in the main, aimed at strengthening the role of the UN, building consensus on multilateralism, promoting democratization and the rule of law in international relations, and further implementing the Millennium Declaration. China hopes that at this Session, UN member states will have in-depth discussions on major and pressing issues that bear on world peace and development, so as to reach broad consensus and take coordinated actions.

I. The United Nations

1. Multilateralism and Role of the UN

Multilateralism is an effective way to meet mankind's common challenges, an important means to settle international disputes, a strong guarantee for sound globalization, and the best avenue to push for democracy and the rule of law in international relations. To put multilateralism on a more effective footing, it is essential to cultivate a global partnership based on equality, mutual trust and cooperation under the guidance of a new security and development concept.

Being the most universal, representative and authoritative intergovernmental organization and the best platform for the practice of multilateralism, the UN has an indispensable role to play in this regard. It is the appeal of the world at large that the UN should be given a stronger role, its authority safeguarded and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter adhered to. China, as always, unswervingly supports the UN's central role in international affairs.

2. UN Reforms

China supports the UN to keep abreast of the times and have necessary and reasonable reforms. The purpose of the UN reforms is to enhance the role of the UN and its capacity to meet new threats and challenges. The principle of the reforms should follow the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. And the approach of the reforms is to build broad consensus on the basis of full consultations in a democratic and transparent manner.

Peace and development are mutually reinforcing. The key to the UN reforms is to achieve progress on development issues. In the reforms, the reasonable concerns and legitimate rights and interests of the developing countries should be fully accommodated, the developing countries should be given a bigger say on UN matters, and more input should be made by the UN in development.

China supports the Security Council to conduct necessary and reasonable reforms. First and foremost the reform needs to redress the current imbalanced composition of the Security Council by following the principle of equitable geographical distribution and increasing representation of the developing countries as a priority. China is in favor of taking further measures to improve the working methods of the Security Council, so as to make it more efficient and transparent.

China supports the work of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change initiated by Secretary General Kofi Annan. And China looks forward to strategic analyses and recommendations from the Panel on how to tackle major world threats of the day, which will be discussed by all member states.

3. UN Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations are among the core means of the UN Security Council in fulfilling its duty of maintaining international peace and security. Intensified effort in this respect can help enhance the authority of the UN, give full play to the mechanism of collective security and push forward multilateralism.

China hopes that, with a view to maintaining regional and global peace and stability, all member states will provide political, funding, human and equipment support to the UN peacekeeping operations in a timely and sufficient manner, so as to create necessary conditions for the success of all peacekeeping missions.

In the new circumstances, the UN peacekeeping operations need further reforms and clearly defined and pragmatic strategies. It is important to give full play to the UN Security Council Working Group of the whole on Peacekeeping Operations, increase communication and coordination between and among the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and all the member states, and facilitate cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. The international community should also assist Africa in enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities.

4. UN Financial Issues

In the spirit of the UN Charter and under the principle of capacity to pay set by the General Assembly resolution, all member states should conscientiously fulfill their financial obligations by paying their assessed contributions for both regular budgets and peacekeeping on time, in full and without conditions, so as to ensure a solid and stable financial basis for the UN.

In utilizing UN resources, it is important to follow the principle of integrating resources with programs, and use resources more efficiently while fully considering and accommodating the reasonable concerns and requests of the developing countries.

Member states should step up coordination and communication, work more efficiently and give more guidance to the Secretariat in program coordination and fiscal budgeting.

II. The Development Issue

1. Economic Globalization

China believes that to move economic globalization forward in the right direction of balanced and stable development and secure a win-win result for all, the international community should make efforts in the following areas:

-- To carry out effective global management of economic globalization by reforming and improving the international financial system, increasing the openness and fairness of the multilateral trading system, and enhancing the UN's overall planning and coordinating capability in the field of development to ensure equal participation for all countries, the developing ones in particular, in the decision-making on world economic issues;

-- To further strengthen coordination and consultation and explore concrete measures and mechanisms to implement the Millennium Summit's consensus on development cooperation;

-- To urge the developed countries to discharge their due obligations and duties, further open their markets, remove trade barriers and earnestly fulfill their commitments of increasing financial aid and technical assistance debt relief, etc.;

2. Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The MDGs are the first set of comprehensive quantitative development goals the international community has ever put forward. Helping all countries, the developing ones in particular, meet these goals is an important mission of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. To that end, it is important for the international community to:

Take concrete actions to mobilize fund to promote sustained and steady growth in development aid and meet the goal that the developed countries' official development assistance accounts for 0.7% of their GNP; Facilitate the sound development of international trade. The United Nations needs to help the new round of multilateral trade negotiations stay focused on development issues and make it a real "development round"; Step up international cooperation on sustainable development. The existing mechanisms should be fully utilized to implement the consensus and goals of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD); Strengthen capacity-building in the developing countries. The international community should give substantive support to the developing countries in light of their respective needs in such fields as institutional building, personnel training and competitiveness development;

Establish a fair and rational framework to evaluate the progress made towards the MDGs that not only assesses respective domestic progress but also monitors and evaluates the fulfillment of development assistance commitments;

Establish a global partnership. Governments, international organizations, private sectors and civil society shall work in close cooperation to meet the MDGs. In this connection, the UN needs to play a leading and coordinating role.

III. Counter-terrorism

China supports the fight against all forms of terrorism. The UN Security Council should play a leading role in the international fight against terrorism. To serve the interests of regional as well as world peace and security in the long run, it should draw up a long-term and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy in line with the UN Charter and the norms of international law. China supports a bigger role of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council.

Poverty, backwardness, social injustice, extremist thoughts, conflicts and wars are all breeding ground of terrorism. To combat terrorism, strenuous efforts must be made to wipe out its root causes. China welcomes dialogue between different civilizations and opposes the linkage of terrorism to a specific country, ethnic group or religion as well as the adoption of double standards on this issue.

China is also a victim of terrorism. The fight against the "Eastern Turkistan" terrorists is an important component of the world campaign against terrorism. The Chinese Government cherishes the life of each and every Chinese compatriot and will never tolerate any terrorist threat to the safety of its citizens.

China endorses and has taken an active part in the formulation of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and hopes that all parties concerned will continue consultations on the remaining questions of the two Conventions in a constructive and cooperative manner and adopt them as soon as possible.

IV. Regional Issues

1. Iraq

It is the position of China that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Iraq be safeguarded, the wish and choice of the Iraqi people respected, the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty and Iraqi people running Iraq truly realized, and a broadly representative Iraqi government established through fair and democratic elections.

China believes the important role of the United Nations on the Iraqi issue should be brought into full play, the views of Iraq's neighbors and other Arab states should be noted and heeded, and extensive participation of the international community should be encouraged in an endeavor to help Iraq stabilize its situation and embark on the path towards peace, stability and development at an early date.

2. Middle East

China welcomes the recent peace-making efforts by the international community to break the impasse in the Israel-Palestine peace talks.

The relevant UN resolutions and the principle of "land for peace" are an important basis and guiding principles for a political settlement of the Middle East issue. Accepted by the parties concerned and endorsed by the UN Security Council, the Middle East "roadmap" for peace is now a practical plan to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflicts and needs to be further promoted.

The implementation of any solution plan on this issue must be based on adequate dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned. The efforts of the international community should show full respect for the cultural background, religious traditions and social customs of the Middle East region and conduce to maintaining and promoting peace and development in the region.

3. Afghanistan

The forthcoming general election in Afghanistan will be a key step towards peace and reconstruction of the country. The world community should continue to pay attention to the Afghan issue, help the country overcome such difficulties as instability in its security situation, facilitate a smooth general election, and deliver the promised aid as soon as possible to promote its economic development. China supports the United Nations' continued leading role on the Afghan issue.

4. African Conflicts

Conflicts and wars have seriously impeded economic development and social progress in Africa. It is the common responsibility and obligation of the international community to help African countries realize national reconciliation, resolve regional conflicts and embark on a road to rejuvenation.

The international community should pay more attention to African conflicts. The United Nations needs to play an even bigger role in assisting African states in preventing, mediating and settling conflicts, peacekeeping, providing humanitarian aid and post-war reconstruction.

The fundamental solution to African conflicts is development. It is imperative for the international community to step up its efforts in debt relief for Africa, and in helping the continent reduce poverty and control diseases in support of the economic and social development in African countries.

China supports the African Union and other regional organizations in their efforts to resolve conflicts and maintain peace and stability in Africa.

5. Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and firmly opposes the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery.

China believes that to properly address non-proliferation issues at their roots would require concerted efforts of the international community. First and foremost, a sound international and regional security environment needs to be put in place so as to remove the root cause for the proliferation of WMDs. Second, international cooperation must be strengthened and political and diplomatic means should be pursued in

dealing with non-proliferation issues. Third, all members of the international community should have a role to play so as to ensure that international efforts in this regard are impartial, rational and non-discriminatory. Fourth, the relationship between non-proliferation and international cooperation on the peaceful use of relevant high technologies should be properly handled so as to ensure the right of all countries to the peaceful use of these technologies.

China supports the due role of the UN in non-proliferation and hopes Security Council Resolution 1540 will be effectively implemented. China is active in international non-proliferation cooperation, accedes to all international treaties on non-proliferation and vigorously develops its relations with relevant multilateral export control mechanisms. Furthermore, it conscientiously honors relevant international obligations and commitments and continues to strengthen its non-proliferation legal system.

China has all along exercised a high degree of restraint in the development of nuclear weapons. It has never taken part in any arms race, nor will it do so in the future.

China has always endorsed the conclusion of international legal instruments on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and has maintained that all countries seriously implement nuclear weapon reduction treaties already reached in a verifiable and irreversible way. Security should be shared by all countries so as to create a positive and favorable international security environment for possible progress in nuclear disarmament.

The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) conduces to preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the nuclear disarmament process. It represents a crucial step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China supports the CTBT and works vigorously to help it take effect at an early date.

China supports the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in its efforts to agree on a comprehensive and balanced program of work as soon as possible so that negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and substantive work on other agenda and items may start at an early date.

China believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism and its role is irreplaceable. Under the current international non-proliferation situation, continued efforts should be made to safeguard and strengthen the universality and authority of the NPT, and the NPT review mechanism should be used to enable the treaty to play its role more effectively in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting nuclear disarmament and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

China supports the purposes and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention and has been fulfilling its obligations under the Convention in a serious and strict manner. China calls upon those countries that have not signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible. The States Parties that possess chemical weapons and those that abandoned such weapons on the territories of other State Parties shall make further efforts to speed up the destruction process.

China supports the purposes and objectives of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has been implementing its obligations under the Convention in a comprehensive and strict manner. China is willing to continue to make positive contributions to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention within the multilateral framework.

China maintains that the various questions related to missiles should be properly settled within the framework of the UN in an all-round, balanced, non-discriminatory, orderly and gradual manner, with the premise that security for all countries should not be compromised, the positions and concerns of various parties be fully reflected, and comprehensive consideration be given to global strategic stability and regional security situation.

China stands for peaceful use of the outer space and opposes arms race in or the introduction of weapons into the outer space. China appeals to the international community to attach great importance to the current developments of weaponization of the outer space, and to take vigorous and effective preventive measures including negotiating relevant international legal instruments to avoid possible trouble.

China will continue to support, participate in and promote progress in the work of Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). After ratifying

the Amendment Article I of the Convention, China is now making active preparations to ratify the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War.

China understands and attaches importance to the humanitarian concerns of the international community over indiscriminate injuries to innocent civilians caused by landmines. It has always supported and taken an active part in international efforts to solve the problem. As a State Party to the amended Landmine Protocol to the CCW, China has strictly honored its commitments and vigorously participated in international de-mining assistance.

China supports the UN's leading role in combating illicit trade in small arms. It attaches importance to and conscientiously implements the Program of Action adopted at the United Nations' Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects held in 2001. China also supports negotiating and concluding an international instrument concerning the identification and tracking of illicit small arms while taking a constructive approach to participate in relevant negotiations currently underway.

China attaches importance to the Firearms Protocol supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Active preparation for the implementation of the Protocol is under way. China is ready to work with other countries to see an early entry into force of the Firearms Protocol.

China supports the UN's role on the question of information security and will actively participate in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Safety. China maintains that the Group of Experts conduct in-depth study on issues of major and immediate significance in the field of information security to the shared interest of all countries so as to build consensus and come up with specific recommendations.

VI. Social Problems

1. Human Rights

Every country in the world has the obligation to promote and protect human rights in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international human rights instruments in light of the country's actual conditions. The international community should respect the fact that human rights can not be separated from one another, redress the tendency of putting much emphasis on civil and political rights while making light of economic, social and cultural rights, and work towards a balanced development of both types of human rights while giving full attention to the right to development.

China calls for international cooperation on human rights. The international community should recognize different views about human rights that derive from the political, economic and cultural differences of each country. Countries should go for common development by increasing exchanges and mutual understanding and learning from each other on the basis of equality and mutual respect. China is opposed to double standards on human rights or making human rights a political issue.

China supports the UN in reforming the human rights mechanism in a prudent and proper way on the basis of heeding the views of various parties. Such reform should help reduce confrontation on human rights issues, promote relevant international cooperation and increase the efficiency of the human rights mechanism.

2. Women

It is the consensus of the international community to enhance women's status, safeguard their rights and interests and realize gender equality. The women issue is not an isolated one and should be incorporated into the global strategic framework for peace and development.

The Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 and the UN General Assembly special session on women in 2000 contributed significantly to the cause for women throughout the world. Countries should implement the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, the documents of the special session on women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) so as to move the global cause for women forward.

Development is a crucial means to achieve gender equality. The international community should enhance their cooperation on women issues. The developed countries, in particular, should help women in the developing ones to develop themselves more rapidly.

3. Persons with Disabilities

The rights and interests of the disabled should be protected, their value be respected and potentials be utilized. This is a major indicator of a civilized and progressing society. The disabled are entitled to equal rights and their rights should be realized through development.

China supports the UN in developing a convention on the rights of persons with disabilities at an early date and also takes an active part in the Ad Hoc Committee. China stands ready to have exchanges and cooperation with the rest of the international community for the early completion and entry into force of such a convention so as to contribute to the cause for the disabled throughout the world.

China attaches great importance to the cause for the disabled. It has promulgated the Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons in addition to other related laws and regulations and has integrated the development program for disabled persons into its overall national development plan.

4. Public Health Security

The transnational nature and potential harm of public health security issue, which could pose a non-traditional security threat, are becoming more pronounced in the context of rapid economic globalization.

The international community should increase their cooperation in response to public health threats on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. Countries, the developing ones in particular, need to enhance their capacity building in public health and establish a sound global public health security response mechanism. The developed countries have the obligation to provide the developing ones with technology and financial assistance so as to help them strengthen capacity building in this regard.

China maintains the international community takes follow-up actions and implements the resolutions on public health capacity building adopted respectively at the 58th Session of the UN General Assembly and the 60th Session of UNESCAP.

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APPENDIX-VIII

China and the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly 2003/10/28

(<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2627/t15468.htm>)

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From September 23 to November 7, 2002, the Sixth Committee of the 57th Session of the UN General Assembly met in the UN Headquarters in New York. The Sixth Committee deliberated 16 topics in total. Of them, the important ones were:

1. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-fourth session;
2. Measures to eliminate international terrorism;
3. Establishment of the International Criminal Court;
4. Convention on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property;
5. Scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel;
6. Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization;
7. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its thirty-fifth session.

The Chinese Delegation actively participated in the discussion of the above-mentioned topics. The main circumstances were as follows:

(1) Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-fourth session

This session discussed such special-item topics in the report on the work of the International Law Commission as "diplomatic protection", "reservations to treaties", "unilateral acts of States", "international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law", "responsibility of international organizations" and "fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law".

With regard to the question of "diplomatic protection", the Chinese Government held that on the promises of exclusion of exceptional circumstances, to take nationality connection as the condition for diplomatic protection was not only in conformity with the theory and practice of the customary international law, but also was an important restriction on preventing the abuse of diplomatic protection, and that in regard to the exceptional cases of the exhaustion of local means of remedies rule, the International Law Commission should act with caution to keep a proper balance between the exhaustion of local means of remedies and their exceptional cases; and the exceptional cases should meet definite requirements and their application should be relatively defined. The Chinese Government also hoped that the International Law Commission will take the question of diplomatic protection as a priority topic for discussion in the next session and achieve results as soon as possible.

With regard to "the liability for compensation for injuries caused by acts not prohibited by international law", the Chinese Government agreed to the line of thinking of the Commission in its deliberation to determine that the operator should assume the main liability and, through some mechanism or insurance system, the parties concerned should share the liability for the injuries. At the same time, the Chinese Government hoped that the Commission should seek a balance of rights and obligations among the operator, the beneficiary and the victim when formulating rules for compensation.

With regard to "the responsibility of international organizations", the Chinese Government held that the basic principles established by the Commission on the concept of responsibility, the concept of international organization and the relationships between the responsibility of international organizations and the responsibility of States were basically workable.

The Chinese Government agreed with the International Law Commission to place "the fragmentation of international law" on the agenda as a special topic for study. It was of the view that the topic for study and the plan for study worked out by the Commission for the item of the agenda were workable and expressed the hope that a deep-going and useful study on the special topic would be conducted.

With regard to the special topic of "reservations to treaties", the Chinese Government was of the view that a treaty-keeping body was the keeper of the text of a treaty which could only conduct a formal examination of the keeping and, when necessary, call the attention of the countries concerned. The treaty-keeping body was not an interpreter of the text of a treaty, nor a judge for the acceptability of a reservation on a substantial content. Whether a reservation was acceptable should be decided by the parties to the treaty themselves. With regards the question of the supervisory body of a treaty, the Chinese Government agreed to the decision of the International Law Commission on the approach of not submitting draft principles to the Drafting Committee. On the question of partial withdrawal of a reservation, the Chinese Government held that it was of positive significance for a special reporter to draft clauses for the principles independently on the question of partial withdrawal of a reservation, but pointed out that it should be handled with caution, so as to avoid the occurrence of effects which would be unfavourable to the effective application of the treaty, and even adverse effects.

With regard to the topic of "unilateral acts of States", the Chinese Government was of the view that it was necessary for the International Law Commission to compile this topic for discussion. To bring about much more progress on this complicated topic, it was necessary not only to try as extensively as possible to collect and study the practice in various countries in this respect, but also, simultaneously with discussing general rules, to start to study some acts (such as protest, acknowledgement, renunciation and promise) that were relatively easy to determine their nature and legal validity and formulate concrete rules.

(2) Measures to eliminate international terrorism

The Chinese Delegation pointed out that the Chinese Government was consistently opposed to all forms of terrorism, no matter it occurred at what time, in which place, was directed at whom and appeared in what form. All actions for fighting against terrorism should comply with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the generally recognized principles of international law and should be conducive to the preservation of peace and stability in the region and in the world. In fighting against terrorism, it was necessary to look into both the symptoms and the root cause. Political, economic, diplomatic, social and other measures should be taken in a comprehensive way to eliminate its root cause completely. Terrorism should not be linked up with any given ethnic group, religion or civilization. The diversification of civilizations should be recognized and respected. Different social systems and civilizations should be encouraged to seek common ground while reserving differences and embark on a road of common development.

The Chinese Delegation stated that the Chinese Government had been consistently active in participating in the international anti-terrorism cooperation and will continue to participate actively in the drafting of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, and hoped they would be adopted at an early date. The Chinese Government expressed its appreciation to the Security Council for including "the East Turkistan Islamic Movement" in its announced list of terrorist organizations and individuals.

(3) The establishment of International Criminal Court

The Chinese Delegation stated that the Chinese Government had all along understood and supported the establishment of an independent, impartial, effective and universal international criminal court. The Chinese Government had actively participated in the entire process of establishment an international criminal court and was willing to see that the court would perform its anticipated part. Though China was not yet a party to the Agreement on the International Criminal Court, the Chinese Government would, by adopting a serious and responsible attitude, continue to follow the progress and operation of the

International Criminal Court and was ready to make further contributions to the rule of law in the international community.

(4) The Convention on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property

The Chinese Delegation pointed out that it had taken more than ten years for the United Nations to negotiate on the formulation of a convention on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, and the main differences were concentrated on a number of questions such as the criteria for judging "State commercial acts", the relationship between a State and a State enterprises, and the compulsory measures against State property. Though some countries had formulated domestic legislations on jurisdictional immunities for foreign States and their property, if the international community could formulate a unified international convention, it would be of great significance to the regulation of States' acts and the clarification of States' jurisdiction and would produce positive influence on the safeguarding of the harmony and stability of international relationships. Therefore, the Chinese Delegation agreed to convene another meeting of the Special Committee in 2003 in anticipation of reaching consensus on formulating a convention on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property.

(5) The scope of legal protection under "the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel"

The Chinese Delegation stated that the pressing matter of the moment was not the expansion of the scope of applying the Convention and the application of the scope of the protection of the Convention to all humanitarian organizations that appeared in the United Nations actions, but the enhancement of the universality of participating countries of the convention, especially the accession to the Convention by the host countries of UN actions. This was the key to the strengthening of the protective system of the Convention. In connection with the non-governmental organizations that carried out humanitarian actions but had no appropriate ties with the United Nations, the Chinese Government maintained that the existing international law did not provide any protection, and if a further protection was needed, it might be considered to realize it by formulating a separate international document.

(6) Report of the Special Committee of the United Nations Charter and the Strengthening of the Role of the United Nations

The Chinese Government maintained that in connection with the assistance to the third countries affected for executing measures of sanctions, the proposal for establishing a special fund and a mechanism for permanent consultation was significant and merited deep-going study. In regard of the question of sanctions as an approach to deal with threat and sabotage of international peace, the Chinese Government maintained that any decision to take sanction measures should be taken with caution; imposing a sanction should have strict criteria, especially should be in conformity with the United Nations Charter and the basic norms of international law; and one of the preconditions for taking a sanction should be the exhaustion of all means of peaceful settlement of international disputes as prescribed in the Charter. The Chinese Government did not agree to regard sanction as a preventive measure and maintained that sanction should not be unlimited in terms of time. With regard to the present state and the future of the Trustee Council, the Chinese Government maintained that for the time being there was no necessity and urgency to cancel or change its functions. And because cancellation or change of its functions involved the revision of the Charter, it should be given an overall consideration within the general framework of strengthening the role of the United Nations and the reform of the United Nations, and due caution should be exercised in making acts.

(7) Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its thirty-fifth session

The Chinese Government was of the view that the Commission should fully consider different levels of development and the status of legislation of various member states and continue to strengthen the technical assistance and the training of personnel for developing countries; in the course of taking charge of formulating a series of conventions and model laws, the Commission should solicit opinions from various quarters more extensively, take account of the actual situations and objective needs of different countries, and make it possible for more countries to approve and accept the relevant conventions and model laws, so as to continuously promote the coordination and unity of different scopes of law and push forward the cooperation and development of the international trade. Moreover, the membership of the United Nations

Commission on International Law should be expanded as soon as possible to guarantee that the composition of the Commission would represent various legal traditions and economic systems, truly reflecting the principle of equitable territorial representation.

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APPENDIX-IX

(<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2630/t15488.htm>)

**China's Legal Work in the Field of the UN Combating Transnational Organized Crimes
2001/07/09**

In the year of 2000, China continued to participate actively in the drafting of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes and its supplementary protocols. The UN Special Committee on the Drafting of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes held 5 sessions in Austria in 2000 (the 7th to 11th sessions) and held a high-level political signing conference for the convention in Italy. China sent delegations to the various sessions of the special committee.

Initially the negotiations on this convention were actively promoted by the western countries. The west once dominated the process of the negotiations. However, with the deepening of the negotiations, the developing countries coordinated their positions through mechanisms like "the Group of 77+China", gradually shaping a force that could contend with the west and have played an important role. Realizing that strengthening cooperation through the formulation of an international convention and combating transnational organized crimes conform to the needs and interests of the international society, the various countries all showed the political willingness to complete as soon as possible the drafting work; what is more after three years of negotiations, the positions of the various sides were all clear and definite. Therefore, the various sides demonstrated flexibility in the negotiations; thus the draft resolutions of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes and its two supplementary protocols (the Protocol on the Sale and Shipment of People and the Protocol on the Smuggling of Immigrants) were adopted successively at the 10th session (July 2000) and the 11th session (October 2000). In November 2000, the draft resolutions of the above-mentioned convention and its supplementary protocols were adopted at the 55th General Assembly.

The convention not only stipulates the various aspects of international cooperation against transnational organized crimes, but also emphasizes the basic principles of international relations such as sovereign equality and non interference in internal affairs. At the same time, it also stipulates articles like providing the developing countries with financial and technical assistance. A nice balance is kept between the rights and obligations of the state parties.

From December 12 to 15, 2000, the High-Level Political Signing Conference for the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes and its supplementary protocols was held in Palermo, Italy. Over 600 delegates from 151 countries, the UN relevant agencies and NGOs attended the meeting, during which 118 countries signed the convention. Among them 77 signed the Protocol against the Sale and Shipment of People, 74 signed the Protocol against the Smuggling of Immigrants. Deputy Minister Wang Guangya of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China signed the convention on behalf of the Chinese Government on the very first day when the convention was open for signatures and spoke at the meeting, enunciating the Chinese Government's stand of actively participating in international cooperation and combating transnational organized crimes and its determination of striving as always to spur the international society to effectively prevent and combat all types of criminal activities.

APPENDIX-I

CHRONOLOGY OF SCO SUMMITS AND ANTI-TERRORISM DECLARATIONS

YEAR	VENUE	DELEGATIONS	MAJOR
April 26, 1996	Shanghai	Presidents of China, Russia,	* Deepening
Military Trust in the border region Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan			
April 24, 1997	Moscow	Heads of "Shanghai Five"	* Agreement on
Mutual Reduction of military forces in border regions.			
July 3, 1998	Alma-Ata	Heads of "Shanghai Five"	* Matter of
Security and Regional Cooperation was signed.			
August 24-26, 1999	Bishkek	Heads of "Shanghai Five"	* Opinion
Exchanged on Regional Security, Cooperation and international situation			
November 1999	Bishkek	Heads of Law-Enforcement	* Security matters
discussed			
bodies of "Shanghai Five"			
* First "Bishkek Group" Meeting			
March 2000	Astana	Defense Ministers of	* Adopted Joint
Communiqué "Shanghai Five"			
discussed.			
* Regional Situations and Mutual Military Contacts were			
July 4, 2000	Dushanbe	Foreign Ministers of	* First Meeting of
Foreign Ministers			
"Shanghai Five"			
* Official Start of			
the Mechanisms			

July 5, 2000 an Observer	Dushanbe	Heads of "Shanghai Five"	* Uzbekistan as * Exchanged of opinion on Multilateral Cooperation, Regional and International Problems discussed * Declaration was Signed
April 28, 2001 Opinions on Shanghai Summit to be held Communiqué and Statements Released for Press	Moscow	Foreign Ministers of "Shanghai Five"	* Exchange of * Joint
June 14-15, 2001 Establishment of SCO Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism on Joining Uzbekistan provisions signed by Foreign Affairs Ministers on the order of activity of the Council of National Coordinators of SCO member states	Shanghai	Heads of Member-States of SCO	* Declaration on * Convention on * Joint Statement * Temporary * Ministers of
Defense published the joint Communiqué September 13-14, Discussed Such as Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation, 2001 Member States	Alma-Ata	Heads of SCO SCO development issues	* Matters * Signed a MOU * Published an
Information Report on results of the first meetings of Heads of SCO member states condemning 9/11 incident			* Statement for
October 10-11, situation was discussed 2001 against "three evils"	Bishkek	Members of SCO	* Afghanistan * Joint statement
January 7, 2002 opinion on Afghanistan, against "three evils", increasing role mutual understandings Statement Principles of Mechanism of operative reaction of SCO.	Beijing	Meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers of SCO	* Exchanged of SCO and * Signed Joint * Ratified
April 11-12, 2002 was signed	Beijing	Culture Ministers Meeting	* Joint Statement

April 26, 2002 St. Petersburg Summit	Moscow	Foreign Ministers Meeting	* Preparation for * Exchange of * strengthening * Information
opinions on regional and international situations			
SCO construction and cooperation under its framework			
report and Press release			
April 29-30, 2002 Multilateral cooperation in the sphere of liquidation of humanitarian aid	St. Petersburg	Heads of SCO members	* Expansion of * Approved the * instructed
consequences of elemental acts and positions on matter of providing emergency			
Russian side initiative on necessity of signing the agreement on providing the mutual aid during extreme situations			
experts to develop the draft of such agreement in the shortest possible time			
carrying out the regular consultations at a level of persons in charge and experts of corresponding departments of SCO member states.			* Agreed upon
May 15, 2002 matters strengthening cooperation of six states in military spheres	Shanghai	Defense Ministers Meeting	* discussed * Agreed to
support and improve the mechanism of regular meetings of Defense Ministers and representatives of Joint Staffs of Six states.			
May 23, 2002 draft agreement among SCO	Astana	Heads of Law-Enforcement bodies member states of Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was signed.	* Decision on * The draft was
adopted and it was recommended to accelerate on its basis elaboration of other corresponding order to launch the antiterrorist structure in maximum compact time.			
May 28-29, 2002 exchange of opinions on matters of regional economic	Shanghai	First Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Trade of SCO Members	* profound * Establishment
of the mechanism of meetings of Ministers of Economy and Trade			
results the protocol to the Memorandum among governments of SCO participant states on the basic goals and directions of regional economic cooperation and launching process of creating favorable conditions in the sphere of trade and investments and joint statement was signed the first meeting of the Ministers, responsible for external economic and foreign trade activity was published.			* On meeting's

June 7, 2002	St. Petersburg	Ind meeting-Heads of SCO Members	* Parties signed
the Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the		Agreement on Regional antiterrorist structure and the	Declaration of
Heads			of SCO member-
states.			
September 11, 2002	-----	Foreign Affairs Ministers Meetings	* Statement was
published regarding the current situation in the sphere of		struggle against terrorism and their active approach to struggle against	“three evils”.
October, 2002	Chinese-Kirghiz	Military Experts	* within the
framework of SCO, China and border Kyrgyzstan held joint		anti-terrorist excursion in the region of Chinese-Kirghiz border.	
October 23, 2002	Moscow	Ministers of Foreign Affairs	*
Recommendation of the Council of National Coordinators for further		institutionalization of works of the organization was approved.	
			* Provisional
scheme of mutual relations between SCO and other		international organizations and states was signed.	
October 30, 2002	Shanghai	Meeting of General Public	* Parties
discussed effective ways of further expansion and deepening of		Prosecutors of SCO members	cooperation of six
states in the sphere of security and	exchanged opinions	on matters of cooperation in legal sphere, representing mutual interest.	
November 20, 2002	Bishkek	Meeting of Transport Ministers	* discussed
cooperation in the field of transportation, defined main		directions of interstate cooperation in the interests of removing obstacles	transportation,
in			
establishing and perfecting international transport corridor,	all-round development of	transboundary transportation.	
			* Decisions on
official launching the mechanism of regular meetings of	Ministers of Transport of SCO members, Joint statement was released.		
January 20-23, 2003	Astana	Meeting of the Council of	* Matters
discussed like SCO institutional constructions, the budget of		National Coordinators	organization and
assessable contributions of member states, plans of the	official high level measures		
			* signed the
meetings Protocol			
February 28- March 3	Beijing	Meeting of the Council of	* Primary
attention was paid to the	important matters of conducting	National Coordinators	official high level
2003	events within SCO framework, spadework of	establishment of the Secretariat and Regional antiterrorist structure and	matters of the
organization’s budget. Participants also held preliminary	consultations on the draft of regulations on SCO structures.		

March 26-28, 2003	Cholpon-Ota Kyrgyzstan	Meeting of the Council of National Coordinators	* Primary
attention was paid to discussion of matters of organizing this year high level events within SCO framework, establishing permanent bodies, the budget of the Organization and distribution of dues, and also external relations and other matters.			
April 26-28, 2003	Alma-Ata	Meeting of the Council	* exchange of
opinions on matters of institutional constructions and National Coordinators institutional constructions and matters of SCO financial-budgetary mechanisms took place.			
April 29, 2003	Alma-Ata	Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers	*At the meeting
profound exchange of opinions on institutional construction of the Organization, matters of security and regional cooperation in economic and other spheres, external relations, as well as other international and regional problems of mutual interest took place. As a result of the meeting, ministers of six states signed a number of decisions, approved a number of legal documents regulating mechanisms of various meetings within SCO framework, activity of permanent bodies and financial- budgetary aspects of the Organization, drafts of the emblem and the flag, and also designated a nominee of the Executive secretary and decided to ratify it at the meeting of highest level in Moscow in May this year. As a result of the meeting the information report was published.			
May 26-27, 2003	Moscow	Council of National Coordinators	* Participants
ratified political documents of Moscow summit for signing by Heads of member states and determined primary goals of the Council of National Coordinators in the second half of the year.			
May 28-29, 2003	Moscow	IIIrd Meeting of Heads of SCO	* Approved and
signed the Agreement on order of formation and administration of SCO budget, Regulations about the Council of Heads of SCO member states, Regulations about the Council of Heads of the governments (Prime Ministers) of SCO member states, Regulations about the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of SCO member states, Regulations on the Council of National Coordinators of SCO member states, Regulations on meetings of Heads of the Ministries and/or departments of SCO member states, Regulations on the SCO Secretariat, Regulation of Executive committee of the SCO Regional Antiterrorist structure and Regulations on permanent representatives of SCO member- states at the SCO Secretariat, ratified the nominee of the Executive secretary (ambassador Zhang Deguan) and SCO symbols.			

			* The Declaration
of Heads of SCO member states was also signed and published.			
June 25-27, 2003	Dushanbe	Council of National Coordinators	* Main task was
to realize the spirit of the Moscow summit, to prepare establishment of permanent bodies of SCO			
July 29-31, 2003	Alma-Ata	Council of National Coordinators	* discussions in
important matters with regard to the launch of SCO permanent bodies.			
August 8-12, 2003	-----	Five SCO members	* conducted joint
anti-terrorist exercises.			
September 1-2, 2003	Lisbon	IInd OSCE Meeting	* meeting on
prevention of and struggle against acts of terrorism	Portugal		* Representatives
of eight international organizations and ten states took place			* Ambassador of
China in Portugal Ma Enhan speaking on behalf of SCO and matters of struggle against terrorism			
September 3-4, 2003	Tashkent	Council of National Coordinators	* major goals
were to prepare and hold a meeting of Heads of the Governments and an extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of six states, as well as			
discussing matters related to the start of SCO permanent bodies.			
September 3-4, 2003	Bishkek	General Public Prosecutors	* Matters of
mutual legal aid among SCO members states in the field of struggle of SCO members member states in the field of struggle against "three evils", illegal			
circulation of weapons and drugs and other dangerous crimes, creation of the mechanism of direct contacts and exchanges of the information in the sphere			
of struggle against transnational criminality and establishment of preparatory and probation centers for inspectors and workers of the offices of Public			
Prosecutors were discussed. The agreement on holding the next meeting of general public prosecutor of SCO member states in 2004 in Alma-Ata was reached.			
September 5, 2003	Tashkent	Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers	* discussed
questions of SCO institutional constructions, preparations for forthcoming meeting of Heads of the governments of six states of SCO, as well as the			
international and regional problems. They signed			
Protocols on modification of SCO Charter, the Shanghai convention on			

struggle against terrorism,

separatism and extremism, the Agreement on
SCO Regional antiterrorist structure, and published the Joint communiqué.

September 5-6, 2003 Kyrgyzstan Ministers of Economy and Trade * Thorough
Exchange of opinions on matters of promoting regional
economic cooperation, adopted the programme of multilateral trade

September 10, 2003 St. Petersburg Ministers of Transport * concluding
multilateral agreement on auto transport, joining of
SCO member states to the European highway transport
agreement

September 19, 2003 Beijing Council of National Coordinators * SCO Charter
came into force.

September 23, 2003 Beijing Heads of Governments * discussed
matters of deepening regional economic cooperation (Prime
Ministers) and accelerating the construction of SCO permanent bodies
signed the

Memorandum on technical start of SCO permanent
bodies, ratified the Program of multilateral trade and
economic cooperation of SCO member states, SCO budget for 2004 and the
Regulations on the monetary maintenance,
guarantees and indemnifications for staff members of SCO permanent bodies,
adopted the decision on structure and list of
staff of the Executive committee of SCO Regional antiterrorist structure,
signed and published the Joint communiqué.

* At the

meeting Heads of Governments were received by Hu
Jintao, Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

October 27-29, 2003 Tashkent Council of National Coordinators * Meeting
order of SCO Secretariat and SCO RATS Executive
committee were determined

October 31, 2003 Tashkent SCO RATS Council * Elected
representative of Uzbekistan as the first Chairman of
SCO RATS Council

* exchange of

opinions on matters of strengthening the
antiterrorist structures, developing cooperation and adopting the
Plan of measures in
this sphere for 2004-2005 years

December 9-10, 2003 Dushanbe Council of National Coordinators * Participants
ratified the typical contract with the staff member
of SCO permanent body and personnel assignments in the SCO
Secretariat.

January 12-13, 2004 Beijing Council of National Coordinators * study of documents took place with regard to external relations of SCO, legal, financial matters and regional struggle against terrorism.

January 15, 2004 Beijing Foreign Affairs Ministers * Ministers of six states signed the decision on approval of nominees to the posts of SCO Deputy Executive Secretaries and on submitting the nominee of director of SCO RATS Executive Committee to the approval by the Council of Heads of SCO states, published press- communiqué.

meeting of ministers of six states with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia took place. * The protocol

inauguration ceremony of the SCO Secretariat took place. The ceremony was attended by member of PRC State Council Tan * Official

Ziasuayan, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Coordinators of six member states, representatives of the United Nations, EU, OSCE, CIS and other international organizations, members of a diplomatic missions in Beijing, heads of Chinese services.

March 16-17, 2004 Beijing Council of National Coordinators of SCO * Executive secretary Zhang Deguan delivered a report, in which he informed participants on Secretariat activities and expressed views regarding this year's Organization performance.

April 21-22, 2004 Moscow Council of National Coordinators * matters, related to holding the Tashkent summit were discussed, Convention on privileges and immunities of SCO, proposal of the SCO Secretariat on establishment of the SCO Day and other documents were adopted.

April 23, 2004 Moscow Foreign Affairs Ministers * exchanged views on international and regional situation. The press-communiqué was signed and published.

June 17, 2004 Tashkent Heads of SCO Members * The heads of six states signed and adopted Regulations on the observer status.

among member-states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on combating the trafficking of illegal narcotics and psychotropic substances

* Agreement

June 15 as “SCO day” and also a political document of the summit

* establishing

heads of six member-states, the president of a transitional government of Afghanistan H. Karzai and Mongolian External Relations Minister Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun (as a special envoy of Mongolian president) participated in the summit.

* Besides the

September 23, 2004 Bishkek Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) * SCO
 Secretary-General Zhang Deguan took part in this meeting.

* Issues were

considered on further developing and deepening cooperation within the SCO frameworks in trade-economy, investment, transport, environment, humanitarian and other spheres, in light of realization of agreements

Sources: China Daily, News From China, SCO Website: www.sectSCO.org etc.

TABLE-V
CHINA'S REACTIONS TO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
SINCE 9/11: AN OVERVIEW

11 September 2001, Place- New York, World Trade Centre Incident, Country-USA.

- > In a message sent on September 11, Jiang Zemin condemned the attacks and expressed his condolences.
- > Jiang Zemin telephoned Bush on September 12, promptly offering China's cooperation in the worldwide counterterrorism struggle.
- > Helping craft and pass two key resolutions in the UN Security Council and General Assembly.
- > Supporting in principle the coalition attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (China's vote on Resolution 1368 marked the first time that China had voted in favour of –rather than its usual practice of abstaining from-authorizing international use of force).
- > Diplomatically working quietly behind the scenes with its close partner Pakistan to persuade General Pervez Musharraf's government to support the war against the Taliban regime.
- > Sharing intelligence with the United States on Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
- > Initiating a series of exchanges with the United States on counter-terrorism, leading to a practical working relationship in this field.
- > Sealing China's short border with Afghanistan to prevent Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters from migrating into the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
- > Inspecting bank accounts in Hong Kong and China for links to terrorist groups.
- > Offering aid for Afghan refugee resettlement in Pakistan and some reconstruction aid in Afghanistan.

13 December 2001 attack on Indian Parliament

- > Briefing the media following talks between Zhu Rongji and the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, on January 15, 2002, Ms. Zhang Qiyue, a spokesperson of the visiting Chinese delegation said that during the discussions on India-China bilateral counter-terrorism dialogue

mechanism that “We (China) were shocked at the December 13 attack on Indian Parliament and expressed our condemnation”. She further said that Zhu expressed the hope that the disputes (between India and Pakistan) would be solved through peaceful means in conformity with peace in South Asia. The media claimed that she “circumvented” a question, which sought to know whether China had supported India’s stand on terrorism during the talks. She confined herself by saying that during the discussions between the two Prime Ministers, China had declared its support for the international efforts against terrorism. She added “China’s position is clear. It is opposed to terrorism and supportive of international efforts against it”.

11 March 2004, Madrid Railway Station Blast, Spain.

- In response to the series of terrorist blasts in Madrid, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao said that China strongly condemns the terrorists blasts in Spanish capital of Madrid. The Chinese side was “shocked” by the terrorist attacks, said Liu.
- Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao sent a message of condolence to Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing sent a message of condolence to Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio, strongly condemning the terrorist acts and expressing sincere sympathy to families of the victims, Liu added. The Chinese government opposed terrorism in any form and was willing to cooperate with the international community to eliminate terrorism, Liu said.

1 September 2004, Beslan School in North Ossetia, Hostage Victims, Country-Russia.

- > Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in a telegram to his Russian counterpart Mikhail Fradkov that the Chinese government strongly condemns this terrifying atrocity and persistently supports the efforts of the Russian government to maintain national security and defend justice and peace. Wen Jiabao also expressed his willingness to work with the Russian government to fight terrorism, separatism and extremism in order to maintain peace in the region and the world as a whole.
- > Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo went to the Russian Embassy in China to give his condolence to the hostage victims in Beslan. Dai strongly condemned the attack and said that China supports Russia’s struggle against terrorists, as well as efforts to safeguard nation’s security and territorial integrity. Russian Ambassador to China Igor Rogachev expressed gratitude for the support of the Chinese government and people, and said that Russia will work with China in the bilateral framework as well as in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to safeguard regional and world peace and security.
- > China offered 10 million yuan (1.2 million US Dollars) worth of medical equipment and medicine to Russia as emergency aid for the country’s recent tragedy.
- > Chinese President Hu Jintao sent a message on September 8 to Russian President Vladimir Putin, strongly condemning the “atrocious terrorist acts”. He said that the Chinese government would offer goods to assist those affected by the tragedy and to show China’s sympathy and support.

9 September 2004 Jakarta Bombing, Indonesia.

- > On September 10, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan says the car bombing outside the Australian Embassy is shocking and China expresses its condolences to the victims’ families and their countries.
- > Kong Quan says four injured people from Chinese companies in Jakarta have been sent to hospital and Chinese embassy officials went to see them.

7 July 2005, London Blast

- > Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said China opposes terrorism of any form and said that it was shocked at the terrorist explosions in London and strongly condemned the terrorist attacks. He said that “anyone who launches terrorist attacks and causes casualties of civilians should be resolutely condemned, regardless of his or her purpose”. The tragedy

shows that the global fight against terrorism “remains an arduous task and the international community still has a long way to go”, the spokesman said.

> Secretary General of SCO Zhang Deguang condemned the terrorist attacks on London and said that “we strongly condemn these acts of terror and extend our deepest condolences to the families of the victims”. He also said that the SCO is ready to strengthen unity with the international community, make joint efforts in fighting against terrorism, separatism and extremism and work for the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region and the world over”, the statement said.

15 October 2005, Terrorist Attacks in Nalchik, North Caucasus of Russia

China condemned the terrorist attack in Nalchik, North Caucasus of Russia, expressing condolence for the civilians and law-enforcement personnel who were killed or injured in the incident. "The Chinese government gives firm backing to the measures taken by the Russian government in cracking down on terrorism and safeguarding national security and social stability," said Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan. He said China would work with Russia in the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization to fight against the "three evil forces" (terrorism, extremism and separatism) and make unremitting efforts for long-term stability of the two countries and regional peace and stability. On early Thursday, about 150 terrorists launched attacks at several government and public facilities in Nalchik, capital city of Kabardino-Balkaria in Russia's North Caucasus, causing deaths and injuries of civilians. The terrorist resistance was suppressed and all hostages were freed unhurt Friday.

Data Collected From Various Sources: *Beijing Review*, *China Daily*, *News From China*, www.chinaview.com, www.sina.org.cn, www.fmprc.gov.cn, www.CRIENGLISH.com,
